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COPyRIGHT DEPOSrr. 



THEISM 



BY 



BORDEN P. BOWNE 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN BOSTON UNIVBRfiITT 



COMPBISING THE DEEMS LECTURES FOR 1902 



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NEW YORK.:. CINCINNATI .:• CHICAGO 

AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY 



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THE LIBRARY OF 

CONeR€SS, 
Two CoHfeB Reosvid 

DEC. 24 1902 

DLASe ^XXok Na 
OOPY B. 



COPTBIGHT, 1887, BY 

HARPER AND BROTHERS. 

COPTBIGHT, 1902, BY 

BORDEN P. BOWNE. 

E^TTEBED AT STATIONERS' HaLL, LONDON. 



THEISM. 
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PREFACE 

This work is a revision and extension of my previous 
work, " Philosophy of Theism." An invitation to deliver 
the Deems lectures before the New York University gave 
a welcome opportunity for revision. In the earlier work 
the argument was somewhat meagerly presented, and the 
arguments from epistemology and metaphysics were only 
hinted at. This shortcoming I have sought to remedy. 
The work has been largely rewritten, and about fifty per 
cent of new matter has been added. In all this, however, 
I have confined myself to my original plan of giving the 
essential argument, so that the reader might discern its 
true nature and be enabled to estimate its rational value. 
To do this is more important at present than to mak^ 
collections of facts and illustrations, however bulky, which 
decide nothing, so long as the logical principles of the 
discussion are not cleared up and agreed upon. The 
point at issue among thinkers concerns the nature and 
value of theistic logic ; and this cannot be settled by elo- 
quence, or by question-begging illustrations. From this 
point of view the work might be called The Logic of 
Theism. 

Kant pointed out that the ontological argument prop- 
erly proves nothing, and that the cosmological and the 
!■ ill 



iv PREFACE 

design argument depend on the ontological. The argu- 
ment, then, is not demonstrative, and rests finally on the 
assumed existence of a perfect being. In a different form 
I have maintained the same position ; but so far from 
concluding that theistic faith is baseless, I have sought 
to show that essentially the same postulate underlies our 
entire mental life. There is an element of faith and voli- 
tion latent in all our theorizing. Where we cannot prove,-^ 
we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate, we choose ♦ 
sides. This element of faith cannot be escaped in any 
field of thought, and without it the mind is helpless and 
dumb. Oversight of this fact has led to boundless verbal 
haggling and barren logic chopping, in which it would be 
hard to say whether the affirmative or the negative be the 
more confused. Absurd demands for "proof" have been 
met with absurd "proofs." The argument has thus been 
transferred from the field of life and action, where it 
mainly belongs, to the arid wastes of formal logic, where 
it has fared scarcely better than the man who journeyed 
to Jericho from Jerusalem. In opposition to this error I 
{ have sought to show the practical and vital basis of belief, 
and have pointed out that logic has only a regulative 

4 

function with respect to the great beliefs by which men 
. and nations live. These beliefs are formulations and^ 
expressions of life, rather than syllogistic and academic 
inferences ; and they depend for their force on the energy 
of the life that produces them. The conclusion is that 
theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life. It 
cannot, indeed, be demonstrated without assumption, but 
it cannot be denied without wrecking all our interests. 



PREFACE V 

This claim has been especially emphasized in considering 
the bearing of theism upon the problem of knowledge. I 
have sought to show that our cognitive and speculative 
interests, as well as our moral and religious interests, are 
so bound up with theism as to stand or fall with it. If 
we say, then, that theism is strictly proved by nothing, 
we must also admit that it is implicit in everything. 
Anti-theistic schemes are generally in the instinctive stage 
of thought, where knowledge constitutes no problem and 
is taken for granted. In this stage any theory whatever 
may be held, however self -destructive ; and when its sui- 
cidal implications are pointed out, the theorist falls back 
on unreasoned common sense, and repudiates, not his own 
theory, which is the real offender, but the critic. He sets 
up natural selection as the determining principle of belief, 
and then repudiates the great catholic convictions of the 
race. He shows how the survival of the fittest must 
bring thought and thing into accord, and then rejects the 
beliefs which survive. He defines mind as an adjustment 
of inner relations to outer relations, and forthwith drifts 
off into nescience. He presents the Unknown Cause as 
the source of all beliefs, and then rules out most of them 
as invalid, and, at times, declares them all worthless. 
And this compound of instinct and reflection, in which 
each element destroys the other, is mistaken by many for 
the last profundity in science and philosophy. But this 
kind of thing is fast passing away, as the insight becomes 
general that knowledge is one of the chief problems of 
speculation, and that every theory must be judged by its 
doctrine of knowledge. When this insight is reached. 



VI PREFACE 

atheism and all mechanical schemes of the necessitarian 
type appear as philosophically illiterate and belated. 

And as epistemology reveals the suicidal nature of 
atheistic thought, so metaphysical criticism shows the 
baselessness of its metaphysics. The crude realism of 
popular thought, when joined with the notion of me- 
chanical necessity, furnishes excellent soil for an atheistic 
growth. This realism in its popular form may be re- 
garded as finally set aside, and also the mechanical natu- 
ralism based upon it. Philosophy is coming to see the 
emptiness of all philosophizing on the mechanical and 
impersonal plane ; so that the choice for both science and 
philosophy is either a theistic foundation or none. Both 
the abstractions of mechanical theory and the impersonal 
categories of philosophical dogmatism are found to cancel 
themselves when taken apart from living and self-conscious 
intelligence, in which alone they have either existence or 
meaning. 

Upon the whole the theistic outlook is most encourag- 
ing. The atheistic gust of the last generation has about 
blown over. It was largely a misunderstanding due to 
the superficial philosophy of the time. But we have 
analyzed our problems and improved our criticism since 
then, and now understand ourselves and our problems 
much better. Science and philosophy, through a wise 
division of labor or just partition of territory, have come 
to dwell together in friendship; and conflicts of science 
and religion, which were at one time a standing order of 
the day, have almost entirely vanished. The triumphs 
and panics of that time were alike baseless, and closely 



PREFACE vii 

resembled scuffles between blind men. The air has 
cleared. Fundamental problems are seen to remain about 
what they always were. A better epistemology has shown 
the suicidal nature of atheistic thought. A better meta- 
physics is curing the naturalistic obsession. A proper 
division of labor has secured to science and philosophy 
their appropriate fields and inalienable rights, while theism 
more and more appears as the supreme condition of both 
thought and life. 

BORDEN P. BOWNE. 



CONTENTS 

PAQB 

Introduction 1 

Religion a Fact, 1. Origin of Religion, 2. Theories of 
Origin Ambiguous, 4. They are never Explanations of the 
Religious Fact, but Descriptions of its Temporal Develop- 
ment, 5. History of Religion, 10. Rational Basis of Re- 
ligion, 11. Logical Method, 15. Method of Rigor and 
Vigor, 16. Practical and Teleological Basis of Belief, 20. 
Function of Logic, 30. Logic Regulative, not Constitutive, 
31. Theism and Atheism alike Hypotheses to be tested by 
their Positive Adequacy to the Facts, 41. 

CHAPTER I 

The Unity of the World-ground 44 

Kant's Criticism of the Theistic Arguments, 44. The 
Traditional Classification of the Arguments abandoned and 
a Starting Point found in the Fact of Interaction, 51. 
Verbal Explanations of Interaction, 54. Interaction be- 
tween Independent Things a Contradiction, 56. The 
Fundamental Reality must be One, 59. 

CHAPTER II 

The World-ground as Intelligent 64 

Two Classes of Arguments, Inductive and Speculative, 65. 
Argument from Order, 67. Theism the only Explanation 

ix 



X CONTENTS 

PAOB 

of Order, 70. Source of the Plausibility of the Atheistic 
Explanation of Order, 70. The Argument from Teleology, 
75. Points to be noted in studying the Argument, 77. 
Atheistic Objections, 89. Mechanical Explanation shown 
to be Empty, 89. Source of the Illusion, 93. Evolution, 
103. Ambiguity of the Doctrine, 104. Evolution as Phe- 
nomenal, 107. The " As-If " Objection, 110. The Argu- 
ment which disproves Mind in Nature disproves Mind also 
in Man, 114. The Argument from Finite Intelligence, 119. 
The Argument from Epistemology, 123. Suicidal Charac- 
ter of All Mechanical Doctrines of Knowledge, 124. The 
Basal Certainties of Knowledge are not Things, but Persons 
and Experience, 127. Knowledge implies Identity of the 
Laws of Thought and the Laws of Things, 130. A Knowa- 
ble World necessarily a Thought World, 134. The Meta- 
physical Argument, 134. Idealistic Theism the only Solu- 
tion of the Problems of Thought, 145. 

CHAPTER III 

The World-ground as Personal 150 

Agnostic Objections, 151. Impersonal Intelligence, 155. 
Alleged Contradiction in Infinite Intelligence, 160. The 
Contradiction is Verbal, 163. Psychological Objections, 
164. Complete Personality possible only to the Absolute, 
167. The Truth in the Objections, 169. 

CHAPTER IV 

The Metaphysical Attributes of the World-ground . 172 

Unity, 173. Unity possible only on the Personal Plane, 
174. Unchangeability, 177. The Self-identity and Self- 
equality of Intelligence the only Unchangeable, 179. Om- 



CONTENTS xi 



nipresence, 179. Impossible under the Space Form, 180. 
Eternity, 181. Relation of the World-ground to Time, 184. 
Omniscience, 186. Possibility of Foreknowledge, 188. Om- 
nipotence, 190. Relation of God to Truth, 191. The Divine 
Will and the Divine Existence, 197. 



CHAPTER V 

God and the World 199 

Pantheism, 199. Quantitative Pantheism Untenable, 200. 
Two Conceptions of the Finite, 203. Spirits created, 206. 
Untenability of All Forms of Pantheism, 209. Reality of 
the Finite Spirit, 214. Theistic Conception, 218. Creation 
Temporal or Eternal ? 220. Present Relation of the World 
to God, 226. God as Ruler of the World, 230. Man's Re- 
lation to Nature, 234. Naturalism and Supernaturalism, 
244. God as Immanent and Transcendent, 246. 



CHAPTER VI 

The World-ground as Ethical 248 

Distinction of Metaphysical and Moral Attributes, 249. 
The Empirical Argument, 250. Argument from the Moral 
Nature, 251. Argument from History and Social Structure, 
254. Logic and Life, 258. Optimism and Pessimism, 263. 
Both Optimist and Pessimist fall a Prey to Abstractions, 264. 
Apriori Discussion Futile, 271. Unpermissible Anthropo- 
morphism, 275. Laws of the System Good, 277. Man's 
Worst Woes of his own Making, 278. Only a Practical 
Solution Possible, 282. Evil in the Animal World, 285. 
Ethics and the Absolute, 287. Can the Absolute be 
Ethical? 287. 



xii CONTENTS 



CHAPTER VII 

PAOB 

Theism and Life 291 

Practical Argument for Theism explained, 291. Atheism 
and Duties, 294. Atheism and the Moral Judgment, 295. 
Consistent Atheism cannot defend itself against Ethical 
Skepticism, 298. Dependence of Ethics on our General 
Theory of the Universe and Life, 299. Atheism and the 
Moral Ideal, 302. Atheism and Moral Inspiration, 304. 
Position of the Religious Nature in Modern Atheism, 312. 

Conclusion 315 



THEISM 



INTRODUCTION 

Man is religious. However it came about, and 
whether we like it or not, man is religious. A de- 
scriptive inventory of our human life and tendencies 
that omitted religion would be lamentably imperfect. 
A history of humanity that overlooked its religious 
tendencies and activities would miss one of its most 
significant manifestations. The most irreligious 
statesman would admit that religion must be 
reckoned with as a fact, however baseless or patho- 
logical he might deem it. The most unbelieving his- 
torian must recognize, with whatever vexation, the 
tremendous part religion has played. And from the 
economical and financial standpoint, the religious 
budget appears as one of the great items in our total 
expense. For good or ill, the earth is full of religion ; 
and life and thought, art and literature, are moulded 
by it. As our earth moves under the influence of 
forces lying beyond itself, so our human life is mov- 
ing under the influence of ideas that have their 
roots in the invisible. There are powers, we think, 
beyond seeing and hearing, on whom we depend, to 
whom we owe various duties, and who take note of 

1 



2 INTRODUCTION 

our life and conduct ; and our relation to these 
powers is the deepest and highest and most solemn 
element in our existence. Religion may be a mistake, 
an illusion, a superstition, but as an historical fact it 
is undeniable; and no exorcism has yet been found 
potent enough permanently to exorcise the evil spirit. 
The fact being thus indisputable, three questions 
arise. These concern respectively the source of reli- 
gion, the history of religion, and the rational founda- 
tion or warrant of religion. 

Origin of Religion 

To the question concerning the source of religion 
various answers have been given. Some have been 
content to view rehgion as a device of state, and 
priestcraft; but this view has long been obsolete. 
The impossibility of long imposing purely adventi- 
tious and fictitious ideas upon the mind by external 
authority makes it necessary to look for the source of 
religion within the mind itself. Such source was 
found at a very early date in fear. Man, being timid 
and helpless, feigns gods partly to help himself and 
partly as projections of his fears. This view, which 
finds full expression by Lucretius, has been extended 
by Hume, who traces religious ideas to the personify- 
ing tendency of the mind. Man projects his own 
life into all his objects, and thus surrounds himself 
with a world of invisible beings. Others have held 
that the idea of an invisible world first got afloat 
through dreams, trances, fits, etc., and once afloat, it 
took possession of the human mind in general, with 
the exception always of a few choice spirits of rare 



ORIGIN OF RELIGION 3 

insight ; and from this unseemly origin the whole 
system of religious thought has been developed. 

Suggestions of this kind are numberless and unedi- 
f3dng. In the first place, the alleged facts are open 
to doubt. For a good while the anthropologists re- 
garded some animistic or ghostly origin of religion 
as finally established ; but further and deeper acquaint- 
ance with the religious phenomena and beliefs of the 
lower races has seriously shaken this confidence. Rela- 
tively high and pure conceptions are found cropping out 
among uncivilized peoples, and often antedating their 
more earthly and sensuous aberrations. Popular an- 
thropology has been very superficial and unsympathetic 
in its study of religious phenomena. A good deal 
of the work has been done under the influence of a 
speculative theory, or in the conviction that religion 
is a delusion or a disease. In the former case the 
facts have been selected that support the theory. In 
the latter, mechanical collections have been made of 
stories of religious and subreligious crudities and 
horrors ; and these have often been put forth as the 
true essence and original of religion. As Mr. Lang 
says, " Anthropology has mainly kept her eyes fixed 
on . . . the lusts, the mummeries, conjurings, and 
frauds of priesthoods, while relatively, or altogether, 
neglecting what is honest and of good report." ^ 
Such methods are not likely to lead to impartial in- 
vestigation, or to any deep insight into the facts. 
These need a finer sympathy with humanity and a 
deeper sense of historical reality. The faith that 
finds a sufficient account of the great religious de- 
velopments of the civilized nations in the dreams and 

1 " Making of Religion," p. !^ /^$ 



4 INTRODUCTION 

fancies of savages is certainly beyond anything in 
Israel. 

But however this may be, the historical problem is 
seen to be not so simple as has been supposed; and 
no single and compendious formula seems possible. 
Moreover, apart from any question as to the facts, 
our popular anthropological accounts of the source of 
religion generally suffer from a thoroughgoing ambi- 
guity. It is not clear whether they are offered as 
explanations of religious phenomena, or only as 
descriptions of the order of their historical appear- 
ance, — two things widely different. 

As explanations these accounts are failures. They 
are mainly an extension of the sensational philosophy 
into the realm of religion. As that philosophy seeks 
to reduce the rational factors of intellect to sensation, 
and ethical elements to non-ethical, so also it seeks to 
reduce the religious nature to something non-religious. 
But in all of these attempts it succeeds only by tacitly 
begging the question. If we take a mind whose full 
nature is expressed in a certain quality A, it will be 
forever impossible to develop anything but A out of 
it. Or if we assume a mind which by its nature is 
limited to a certain plane A, again it will be impos- 
sible to transcend the A with which we start. In 
order to move at all the A must be more than A ; it 
must have some implicit potentiality in it which is the 
real ground of the movement. Thus a being whose 
nature is exhausted in sense objects can never tran- 
scend them. Everything must be to him what it 
seems. The stick must be a stick, not a fetish. The 
sun and moon must be lighted disks, not gods. To 
get such a being beyond the sense object to a religious 



ORIGIN OF RELIGION 6 

object we must endow him with more than the A of 
sensation, or the B of animal fear. The cattle have 
both ; but only some very hopeful evolutionists have 
discovered any traces of religion among them ; and if 
it should turn out that these traces are not mislead- 
ing, it would not prove that simple sensations can 
become religious ideas, but that the animal mind is 
more and better than we have been accustomed to 
think. 

When thought is clear, these accounts of the origin 
and source of religion can never be more than descrip- 
tions of the order of religious ideas in their temporal 
development. They simply recite the crude concep- 
tions with which men began in religion and describe 
the long, slow process by which they passed from those 
raw beginnings to the more adequate conceptions of 
to-day. In such description all that the critic cares 
to insist on is that the facts shall have been as 
reported, and that no fashionable speculation or pre- 
conceived theory shall be allowed to improvise history. 
The fact in rehgion is the same as in science and 
social order. Men began with very crude notions, 
and by long experience and much reflection, and 
through a deal of error, only slowly found their way. 
The fact has equal theoretical significance in each 
case. There is no simple something, religion or sci- 
ence or government, of which the first forms were the 
essential reality, and which then developed themselves, 
yet in such a way as never to get beyond their primi- 
tive form. This notion, which underlies much of 
what the anthropologists have said about the origin 
of religion, is full-blown illusion. This fancy would 
make the essence of chemistry alchemy, or the essence 

THEISM 2 



6 INTRODUCTION 

of astronomy astrology, just as certainly as it makes 
the essence of religion animism. The concrete, his- 
torical fact in all these cases is men trying to find their 
way, and gradually exchanging low and inadequate 
conceptions for higher and more adequate ones, as life 
unfolds, and experience accumulates, and reflective 
thought deepens and clarifies itself. There is nothing 
in such a development at which thought should take 
offense; least of all is there anything in it which 
degrades the later conceptions by identifying them in 
essence with earlier and cruder ones. This is the 
na'ive misunderstanding of a blind sensationalism 
which has lost itself in verbal identities. Wherever 
there is real development, the meaning of the earlier 
is revealed only in the later. The true nature and 
potentialities of the acorn are seen only in the oak. 
The true nature of mind is seen only in its mature 
manifestation. If we would see what the mind is in 
respect to its cognitive powers, we must study the 
highest unfoldings of thought. In like manner, if we 
would know what the mind is in respect to religion, 
we must study the highest religious manifestations of 
humanity. This, which is plain upon inspection, is 
overlooked by the popular anthropologist, who can 
see nothing in religion but fetishes, and totems, etc., 
to the total neglect of the great religious leaders and 
teachers of the race. This is as shortsighted as it 
would be to find a complete account of science in a 
collection of stories about the crude notions of the 
earliest men, while entirely ignoring the masters and 
marvels of a later day. Anthropology, we said, is 
open to criticism for its imperfect induction of facts ; 
it is equally open to criticism on account of its failure 



ORIGIN OF RELIGION 7 

to master its own logic. The logic would bid us look 
to the future for the highest and truest expression of 
things ; but the speculator, under the influence of 
certain illusions of uncritical thought, gropes among 
the raw beginnings of things for their true and essen- 
tial nature. 

It may be, then, that early religious conceptions 
were molded by dreams, trances, and various mysteri- 
ous phenomena ; but we must note two facts. First, 
these things are by no means the sum of religious 
phenomena; this sum includes the whole religious 
life of humanity. Secondly, we cannot get from 
these dreams, etc., to anything religious without posit- 
ing a religious factor in human nature itself ; just as 
we cannot get from the fancies of childhood to the 
clearer thought of maturity without positing a 
rational nature of which the fancies were only the 
first manifestation, and not the final expression. A 
developing being can never be defined by its present ; 
account must also be taken of all which it is to 
become ; and these potentialities must be founded in 
the nature of the being. 

Another view of the origin of religious ideas is 
that they are the product of reflective thought. This 
view is disproved by experience. Man was religious 
before he became a philosopher. Speculative thought 
has had the function of criticising and clarifying 
religious ideas, but never of originating them ; and 
often they have been much more confidently held 
without its aid than with it. On this account many 
h^ve viewed speculative thought in its religious 
efforts as a kind of inverted Jacob's ladder. 

On the other hand, it has been suggested that 



8 INTRODUCTION 

religious ideas are innate. This could only mean 
that the human mind is such as to develop religious 
sentiments and ideas under the stimulus of our total 
experience. But experience shows such difference of 
religious thought that the contents of this religious 
intuition could hardly be more than a vague sense of 
an invisible and supernatural existence. Besides, the 
phrase, innate ideas, has so many misleading sugges- 
tions that we had better avoid it. 

In the same line it has been held that the soul has 
a special organ or faculty for the reception of religious 
truth ', and the state of this faculty has even been 
made a ground for important theological distinctions. 
Sometimes it has been called faith, sometimes feeling, 
and sometimes the " God-consciousness." But psy- 
chology long ago discovered that nothing is explained 
by reference to a faculty, since the faculty itself is 
always and only an abstraction from the facts for 
whose explanation it is invoked or invented. The 
faculty that explains language is the language faculty ; 
the faculty that explains vision is the visual faculty. 
We do not get the language or the vision from the 
faculty, but we affirm the faculty because of the lan- 
guage or the vision ; and the affirmation at bottom 
consists in saying that we must be able to speak or 
see because we do speak or see. There is probably no 
question more utterly arid and barren than the search 
for the faculty from which religion springs. Fortu- 
nately, the question is fast becoming antiquated. 

The conclusion as to the source of religion is this : 
no external action can develop into anything fn 
empty mind, which has no law, nature, or direction. 
This would be to act upon the void. Psychology also 



ORIGIN OF RELIGION 9 

shows that nothing can be imported into the mind 
from without in any case. All external things and 
influences of whatever sort only furnish the occasion 
for a manifestation of the soul's own nature. Hence 
it is hopeless to look for the source of religious ideas 
in external experience alone. We must assume that 
religion is founded in human nature as one of its 
essential needs and constitutional tendencies. At 
the same time it must be said that the religious 
impulse or instinct alone is not self-sufficient and 
does not move unerringly to its goal. Unless under 
the guidance of intellect and conscience, religion may 
take on grotesque or terrible forms. It always re- 
flects the stage of mental and moral development 
reached by the individual or the community, and 
varies with it. It is a function of the entire man. 

The stimulus to religious unfolding is no simple or 
single thing, but is as manifold as life itself. Schlei- 
ermacher found it in the sense of dependence. This 
is without doubt a potent factor in awakening men 
to a sense of religious need. It is easy to conceive 
a worldly life so comfortable and undisturbed that 
nothing more would be desired. An ancient writer, 
speaking of persons living such a life, said, " Because 
they have no changes therefore they fear not God " ; 
and Mr. Lowell has spoken of persons ^^who have 
had the idea of God fattened out of them." But this 
is only one factor of many. The needs of the intellect, 
the demands and forebodings of conscience, the crav- 
ings of the afections, the impulses of the aesthetic 
nature, and the ideals of the will, — all enter into the 
problem, apart from words of revelation, or any 
direct influence of God on the soul. 



10 INTRODUCTION 

History of Religion 

So much on the origm of rehgion. Similar consid- 
erations apply to its history. It is referred to because 
there is a fancy that the truth of religion can be 
tested by studying its development, either in the 
individual or in the history of the race. But a little 
reflection shows that the psychological and temporal 
emergence of an idea is not to be confounded with its 
philosophical worth and validity. When the latter 
question is up, the former is quite irrelevant, unless 
it be shown that philosophical value is compatible 
with only one form of psychological genesis and his- 
tory. This showing has never been made. Mean- 
while the rational worth of religion can be determined 
only by considering its contents and the reasons which 
may be offered for it. 

After this confusion of genesis and history with 
rational worth and validity has been warded off, no 
inquirer can have any interest in rejecting anything 
that sober investigation may reveal concerning the 
early forms of religious thought and practice. One's 
only interest is in having the history as it was, and 
not as some current speculation has decided it must 
have been. The attempt to stigmatize later concep- 
tions because of the crudities of earlier ones is due to 
those verbal identifications into which untrained and 
superficial thought is sure to fall. The illusion van- 
ishes when we remember that the objective fact is not 
lower ideas evolving higher ideas, but living men 
thinking and gradually adjusting and enlarging their 
ideas as experience broadens and thought grows clear. 



RATIONAL BASIS OF RELIGION H 

In one sense only does the history of religion have 
any bearing on the question of its truth. When we 
study the entire religious movement of humanity, 
noting not only the crude forms in which it began, 
but also the higher forms to which it grew, we may 
get a deeper sense of the universality and ineradica- 
bility of the religious element, and also a valuable 
hint of the direction in which its normal development 
lies. Such a historical fact would be a revelation of 
the nature of things, and would have the significance 
of any great cosmic manifestation and product. Such 
a fact would also be an argument. It would con- 
stitute a weighty presumption in favor of the objective 
truth of religion. To set it aside as sheer illusion 
would be an act of skeptical violence that would go 
far toward shattering reason itself. 

Rational Basis op Religion 

But our present concern is with neither the source 
nor the genesis and history of religion, but rather 
with its rational foundation, and more particularly 
with the rational foundation of the theistic idea, 
which is the central and basal element of religion. 
We set aside, therefore, all inquiry into the origin 
and development of religious ideas, and inquire rather 
whether they have any rational warrant, now that 
they are here. And we do this with all the more 
confidence because, on any theory of knowledge, our 
cognitive and critical insight is more trustworthy in 
its mature and developed forms, than in its crude and 
elementary stages. If experience be the source of 
knowledge, the longer and broader the experience, the 



12 INTRODUCTION 

more certain its indications. If evolution and natural 
selection are developing faculty and insight, then our 
present faculties must be more trustworthy than those 
of previous generations. As no one would think of 
trusting the insight of the child against that of the 
man, so no one should think of going back to the 
childhood of the race for a standard of truth. As 
Bacon said, we are the true ancients ; that is, we have 
the longest experience, and we have been longest ex- 
posed to the drill of natural selection whose sifting action 
is supposed to bring about the survival of the fittest, 
in thought as well as elsewhere. It is plain that we have 
to use such faculties as we have in any case ; and now 
it is clear in logic that we may confidently begin with 
our present faculties and attainments, and seek to deter- 
mine their rational value, without much concerning 
ourselves as to what our earliest human or sub-hiunan 
ancestors may have thought on religious matters. 
They were badly astray on most things ; and there 
is no good reason for making them authorities in 
religion. By continual trial and rejection men have 
slowly emerged from primitive confusion and error 
respecting material things, and we ought not to be 
surprised to find the same order in spiritual things. 

And as every one can see the absurdity of making 
/ primitive scientific conceptions the standard of scien- 
tific truth, so we may hope that gradually we may 
attain to the insight that primitive religious concep- 
tions have no better right to be the standard of 
religious truth. In both cases there is a human in- 
terest in knowing the history of the ideas, but their 
truth is to be determined in another way. 

We take, then, what may be called the theistic 



RATIONAL BASIS OF RELIGION 13 

consciousness of the race as the text for a critical exe- 
gesis, with the aim of fixing its contents and philo- 
sophical worth. We do not aim at a philosophical 
deduction or speculative construction of religion ; we 
aim only to analyze and understand the essential 
data and implications of the religious consciousness. 
The outcome of this inquiry might conceivably be 
threefold. The theistic idea might be found to be 
absurd or contradictory. Or it might appear as an 
implication of the religious sentiment only, and with- 
out any significance for pure intellect. Or it might 
appear as a demand of our entire nature, intellectual, 
moral, aesthetic, and religious -, so that the true and 
the beautiful and the good alike would find in it 
their root and spring. In the first case theistic faith 
would have to be abandoned. In the second case it 
would be a fact of which no further account could be 
given than that the religious nature implies it, but it 
need not be rejected because of the lack of specula- 
tive reasons. In the last case theism would appear 
as the implication of all our faculties, and would have 
the warrant of the entire soul. How this may be, 
the course of our study must show. 

The function of the theistic idea in human thought 
as a whole is very complex. First, theism may be 
advanced as an hypothesis for the explanation of phe- 
nomena. As such it has no religious function at all, 
but solely a logical and metaphysical one. The ques- 
tion is considered under the law of the sufficient rea- 
son ; and the aim is to find an adequate explanation of 
phenomena, especially those of the external world. 
Most theistic argument has been carried on upon this 
basis. The facts of the outer world have been ap- 



14 INTRODUCTION 

pealed to, especially those which show adaptation and 
adjustment to ends ; and the claim has been set up 
that only intelligence could account for them. These 
facts have been supplemented with various metaphysi- 
cal considerations concerning the absolute and the 
relative, the infinite and the finite, the necessary and 
the contingent, the self -moving and the moved ; and 
the work was done. How far this comes from satisfy- 
ing the religious nature is evident. 

Secondly, theism may be held as the implication 
and satisfaction of our entire nature, intellectual, 
emotional, aesthetic, ethical, and religious. These 
elements reach out after God so naturally and, when 
developed, almost so necessarily, that they have 
always constituted the chief actual grounds of theistic 
belief. Accordingly the human mind has always 
adjusted its conception of God with reference less to 
external nature than to its own internal needs and 
aspirations. It has gathered its ideals of truth and 
beauty and goodness, and united them into the 
thought of the one Perfect Being, the ideal of ideals, 
God over all and blessed forever. A purely aetio- 
logical contemplation of the world and life with the 
sole aim of finding an adequate cause according to 
the law of the sufficient reason would give us an 
altogether different idea of God from that which we 
possess. 

Hence it has been frequently maintained, even 
among theologians, that arguments for theism are 
worthless. They may produce some assent, but no 
living conviction ; and when they are strictly logical 
they reach only barren results which are religiously 
worthless. These sterilities are transformed into 



LOGICAL METHOD 15 

fruitfulness only by implicitly falling back on the liv- 
ing religious consciousness ; and this might as well be 
done openly and at the start. 

This contention is partly true and partly false. It 
is true that purely ^etiological arguments, like that 
from design, are inadequate, but they may be good as 
far as they go. It is also true that purely metaphys- 
ical arguments concerning the absolute, or uncondi- 
tioned, do not bring us in sight of living religious 
sentiment, but they have their value nevertheless. 
On the other hand, it is a grave oversight to suppose 
that such considerations alone can give the full 
religious conception of God. ' The actual grounds of 
theistic belief are manifold, being intellectual, emo- 
tional, aesthetic, and ethical; and no one can under- 
stand the history of the belief without taking all of 
these into account. 

But here the very grave doubt meets us whether 
most of these elements are proper grounds of belief, 
and whether theistic argument does not confessedly 
proceed by a much looser logic than obtains in our 
mental procedure elsewhere. This compels us to 
take a short survey of mental method in general. A 
very large part of our difficulties arise from a false 
conception of method which leads to baseless expecta- 
tions with resulting failure and disappointment. 

^ Logical Method 

It is a traditional superstition of intellect that 
nothing is to be accepted which is not either self- 
evident or demonstrated. The corresponding con- 
ception of method is this : Let us first find some 



16 INTRODUCTION 

invincible fact or principle, something which cannot 
be doubted or denied without absurdity, and from 
this let us deduce by cogent logic whatever it may 
warrant. When we reach the end of our logic let 
us stop. In other words, admit nothing that can 
be doubted. Make no assumptions, and take no step 
which is not compelled by rigorous logic. And, 
above all, let no feeling or sentiment or desire have 
any voice in determining belief. If we follow this 
rule, we shall never be confounded, and knowledge 
will progress. 

Opposed to this conception of method is another, 
as follows : Instead of doubting everything that can 
be doubted, let us rather doubt nothing except for 
reasons. Let us assume that everything is what it 
reports itself until some grounds for doubt appear. 
In society we get on better by assuming that men are 
truthful, and by doubting only for special reasons, 
than we should if we assumed that all men are liars, 
and believed them only when compelled. So in all 
investigation we make more progress if we assume 
the truthfulness of the universe and of our own 
nature than we should if we doubted both. 

Such are the two methods. The former assumes 
everything to be false until proved true; the latter 
takes things at their own report, or as they seem, 
until proved false. All fruitful work proceeds on 
the latter method; most speculative criticism and 
closet philosophy proceed on the former. Hence 
their perennial barrenness. 

The first method, which may be called the method 
of rigor and vigor, is always attractive to beginners. 
The developing intellect in the self-sufficiency of its 



LOGICAL METHOD 17 

dawning majority is pretty sure to admire this 
method for a time. And if there were any beings 
who had nothing to do but to syllogize and for whom 
belief had no practical bearing, they might safely 
adopt the method. But for us human beings rigor 
and vigor apply only to mathematics, which is a 
purely formal and subjective science. When we 
come to deal with reality, the method brings thought 
to a standstill. At the beginning of the modern era, 
Descartes pretended to doubt everything, and found 
only one imshakable fact — "I think ; therefore, I am." 
But from this he could deduce nothing. The bare 
fact, '^I think," is philosophically insignificant. What 
I think, or how I think, whether rightly or wrongly, 
is the important matter. But from the bare "I 
think" Descartes could reach neither the world of 
things, nor the world of persons, nor the world of 
laws. The method was so rigorous as to leave 
thought without an object. And in general, if we 
should begin by doubting everything that can be 
doubted, and by settling all questions in advance, we 
should never get under way. There are questions in 
logical theory, in the theory of knowledge, and in 
metaphysics, which even yet are keenly debated. 
The skeptic and agnostic and idealist are still abroad. 
If, then, man were only an abstract speculator, 
this method of doubting everything which cannot 
be demonstrated would condemn the mind to a barren 
subjectivity. But man is not only, or chiefly, an 
abstract speculator, he is also a living being, with 
practical interests and necessities, to which he must 
adjust himself in order to live at all. It has been 
one of the perennial shortcomings of intellectualism 



18 INTRODUCTION 

that man has been considered solely as an intellect or 
understanding ; whereas, he is a great deal more. 
Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration ; and 
these are far more powerful factors than the logical 
intellect. Hence, in its practical unfolding the mind 
makes a great variety of practical postulates and 
assumptions which are not logical deductions or 
speculative necessities, but a kind of modus vivendi 
with the universe. They represent the conditions 
of our fullest life ; and are at bottom expressions of 
our practical and ideal interests or necessities. And 
these are reached as articulate principles, not by 
speculative construction, but by analysis of practical 
life. Life is richer and deeper than speculation, and 
contains implicitly the principles by which we live. 
The law the logician lays down is this : Nothing 
may be believed which is not proved. The law the 
mind actually follows is this : Whatever the mind 
demands for the satisfaction of its subjective inter- 
ests and tendencies may be assumed as real in default 
of positive disproof. We propose to trace this prin- 
ciple in the realm of cognition as being the realm 
which is commonly supposed to be free from all sub- 
jective elements. 

As cognitive beings we desire to know. But real- 
ity as it is given to us in immediate experience is not 
adapted to the needs of our intelligence, and we pro- 
ceed to work it over so as to make it amenable to our 
mental necessities. This working over constitutes 
what we call theoretical science. To do it we tacitly 
assume that the vast collection of things and events 
fall into fixed classes, are subject to fixed laws, and 



LOGICAL METHOD 19 

are bound up into a rational system. We assume, 
further, the essential truthfulness of nature, so that 
the indications of all clearly determined facts can be 
triisted. We assume, once more, that nature is not 
only essentially comprehensible, but that it is com- 
prehensible by us ; so that what our nature calls for 
to make the facts intelligible to us is necessary to the 
facts themselves. For, after all, our explanation of 
facts always consists in saying that if we may assume 
certain facts we can understand the actual facts. 
Thus back of the real universe of experience we 
construct an ideal universe of the intellect, and we 
understand the former through the latter. In this 
way we reach two entirely different conceptions of 
things. One is furnished by the senses ; the other is 
reached by thought. The former represents reality 
as it reports itself ; the latter represents reality as 
made over by the mind. 

And this is not all. For soon the ideal universe 
passes for the real, while the real universe of experi- 
ence is degraded into a phenomenon or appearance. 
Nothing is allowed to be what it reports itself. All 
the senses are flouted. The reports of the unsophisti- 
cated consciousness are derided. Numberless worlds 
are invented ; a whole family of ethers is generated ; 
and the oddest things are said about everything, as if 
our aim were to give the lie direct to every sponta- 
neous conviction of common-sense. The doctrines of 
astronomy, and the current theories of heat, light, 
sound, and matter, are examples. All of these things 
are, without exception, a series of ideal constructions 
by which we seek to interpret the reality of experience 
and make it amenable to our intelligence. 



M 

20 ^ INTRODUCTION 

If now we ask for the source and warrant of this 
theoretic activity, we must finally find it in the living 
interests of our cognitive nature. The facts them- 
selves are indifferent alike to comprehension and non- 
comprehension. But we seek to comprehend as a 
matter of course, and take for granted that we have a 
right to comprehend, that the universe is comprehen- 
sible, and that we are able to comprehend it. The as- 
sumptions we make are so natural that they even seem 
necessary truths at times ; but in fact they are primarily 
but projections upon reality of our mental nature and 
our subjective interests. That conception of a crystal- 
line system of law is purely a subjective ideal and is not 
known to be an objective fact. The comprehensible 
universe is as pure an assumption as the religious and 
moral universe. Moreover, the actual universe, that is, 
the universe as given in experience, is not intelligible ; 
it is that other assumed ideal universe, which we 
have put behind the real universe, that is intelligible. 
From a strictly logical and critical standpoint the 
intelligible universe is purely an idol of the human 
tribe; nevertheless we insist upon its reality because 
the admission of an essentially irrational and incogi- 
table world violates our cognitive instincts, throws the 
mind back upon itself without an object and without 
meaning, and leaves it a prey to skepticism and 
despair. 

The existence of this assumptive element ma}^ be 
further shown by adopting a suggestion of Arthur 
Balfour in his "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," and 
constructing a refutation of science on the model of 
the familiar refutation of religion. We need only 
demand that the scientist prove his postulates and 



LOGICAL METHOD 21 

demonstrate his assumptions to put him in a sad 
plight. Let him settle with the philosophic skeptic. 
Let him rout the agnostic. Let him put the idealist 
to flight. Let him prove that a system of law exists 
in objective fact. Let him show that what he needs 
to comprehend the facts is necessary to the facts 
themselves. Let him clear up the difficulties in his 
own metaphysics. Action at a distance, the nature 
of the ether, and the relations of matter and force 
would be good points to begin with. Let him show 
that our desire to have the universe comprehensible 
proves that it is so, or that our unwillingness to 
admit an irrational reality is an argument against it. 
Let him remember that the scientific interest which 
is so strong in him is very limited indeed, so that it 
must seem like extreme arrogance on his part to seek 
to impose the tenets of his little sect upon the uni- 
verse of necessary laws of the same. 

When all these demands have been met, there can 
be some talk about science, but not before. As long 
as the skeptic and agnostic are abroad, there is 
no security that science is not sheer fiction. As long 
as the idealist is not silenced, it is doubtful whether 
even the objects of science exist. If the system of 
law is not proved to exist, the deductions from it are 
worthless. Until we prove that what we need to 
understand the facts is necessary to the facts them- 
selves, our theorizing may be only a projection upon 
the outer world of our mental nature, and in no way 
an apprehension of objective reality. As to the 
metaphysics of science, it is well known to contain 
difficulties equal to any in theology. So far from 
answering these questions the average scientist has 

THEISM — 3 



22 INTRODUCTION 

never heard of them, and 3^et they seem to concern 
the life of science itself. The truth is, we meet here 
the opposition of method to which we referred at the 
start. The critic affects to doubt whatever cannot 
be proved, while the scientist takes for granted what 
every one admits. 

The way of rigor and vigor would be hard even 
for the mature speculator. He would find himself 
in the presence of insoluble problems, and would have 
either to abandon them, or seek some more excellent 
way. Of course the great majority of men must 
follow some other road. It would be overwhelmingly 
ludicrous to require the mass of men to think for 
themselves. In the nature of the case they must live 
by hearsay and imitation and intellectual contagion. 
The intellect of the community is the only safe stand- 
ard for them to follow; for however the community 
/ intellect may fall short of perfection, it is commonly 
far wiser than the intellect of the individual. 

The sum is this : The mind is not a disinterested 
logic-machine, but a living organism, with manifold 
interests and tendencies. These outline its develop- 
ment, and furnish the driving power. The implicit 
aim in mental development is to recognize these 
interests, and make room for them, so that each shall 
have its proper field and object. In this way a series 
of ideals arise in our mental life. As cognitive, we 
assume that the universe is rational. Many of its 
elements are opaque, and utterly unmanageable by 
us at present, but we assume spontaneously and un- 
consciously that at the center all is order, and that 
there all is crystalline and transparent to intelligence. 
Thus there arises in our thought the conception of 



LOGICAL METHOD 23 

a system in which all is light, a system whose founda- 
tions are laid in harmony, and whose striictm-e is 
rational law, a system every part of which is produced 
and maintained and illumined by the majestic and 
eternal Reason. But this is only a cognitive ideal, 
to which experience yields little support; yet we 
hold fast the ideal and set aside the facts which make 
against it as something not yet comprehended. 

But we are moral beings also, and our moral 
interests must be recognized. Hence arises a moral 
ideal, which we join to the cognitive. The universe 
must be not only rational, but righteous at its root. 
Here, too, we set aside the facts that make against 
our faith as something not yet understood. This is 
especially the case in dealing with the problem of 
evil. Here we are never content with finding a cause 
for the good and evil in experience ; we insist upon 
an explanation which shall save the assumed goodness 
at the heart of things. 

Finally, we are religious, and our entire nature 
works together to construct the religious ideal. The 
intellect brings its ideal; and the conscience brings 
its ideal ; and the affections bring their ideal ; and 
these, together with whatever other thought of per- 
fection we may have, are united into the thought of 
the one Perfect Being, the ideal of ideals, the supreme 
and complete, to whom heart, will, conscience, and 
intellect alike may come and say, "Thy kingdom 
come ; thy will be done." Here, as in the previous 
cases, we do not ignore the facts which make against 
the view ; but we set them aside as things to be ex- 
plained, yet which must not in any way be allowed 
to weaken our faith. 



24 INTRODUCTION 

All of these ideals are, primarily, alike subjective. 
They are produced, indeed, under the stress of experi- 
ence, but they are not transcripts of any possible ex- 
perience. That transparent universe of the reason is 
as purely a mental product as that righteous universe 
of the conscience, or as the supreme perfection of 
religion. In each of these cases the mind appears 
with its subjective ideals, and demands that reality 
shall recognize them ; and in all ahke reality recog- 
nizes them only imperfectly. To some extent the 
universe is intelligible. To some extent the power 
not ourselves makes for righteousness. To some 
extent God is revealed. But in all these cases a 
pm-ely logical and objective contemplation of the 
known facts would leave us in great uncertainty. 
The assured conviction we have rests upon no logical 
deduction from experience, but upon the optimistic 
assumption that the mind has a right to itself, and is 
at home in the universe. The mind will not consent 
to abandon its nature and resign itself to utter mental 
and moral confusion. This is, to be sure, an act of 
pure faith, but it is an act upon which our entire 
mental life depends. A purely speculative knowledge 
of reality, which shall be strictly deductive and free 
from assumption, is impossible. 

This result will not at once commend itseK to the 
rationalizer, whether religious or irreligious. The 
religious rationalizer will see in it an attempt to found 
religion on something less and lower than reason, 
which he views as a degradation of religion. The 
irreligious rationalizer will see in it an attempt to 
palm off religion on an illogical basis of feeling, in- 



LOGICAL METHOD 25 

stead of the sure foundation of reason ; and he may 
even be moved to write an essay on the crime of 
easy belief, in v^hich he will deal most condignly 
with the iniquity of believing anything that is not 
proved. Neither party very clearly conceives what 
is meant by reason, but both tend to limit it to formal 
ratiocination of the syllogistic type. For their sake, 
therefore, we put the matter already given in a dif- 
ferent form. 

The test of formal truth and error is the law of 
/contradiction. Propositions of which the mind can 
conceive the contradiction are not founded in the nature 
of the logical understanding. The test of concrete 
truth and error is practical absurdity. Solipsism 
involves no contradiction and is easily conceivable, so 
far as logic goes. The irrationality and uninterpreta- 
bility and badness of nature are by no means difficult 
conceptions. The absurdity that emerges is practical, 
rather than speculative. Life is crippled. Thought 
has no object, action no aim. There is a practical 
contradiction of om* nature and interests, but there 
is no formal contradiction of the laws of thought. 
The test is aesthetic, ethical, practical, teleological, 
not theoretical. The argument in such cases consists 
entirely in analyzing and setting forth the feelings 
and interests involved, and in pointing out the aesthetic 
and practical bearings of the question. Such argu- 
ment has cogency only for one who has the appropriate 
sentiments and interests. And when persons who do 
not understand this matter nevertheless attempt to 
deal with it, they are apt to estimate their own argu- 
ments very highly, calling them proofs and demon- 
strations, without ever suspecting that the reasoning 



26 INTRODUCTION 

gets all its force from something deeper than itself. 
Meanwhile an opponent, with a different set of inter- 
ests, finds no force in it whatever, and rejects it as a 
begging of the question. We must, then, keep these 
two tests of truth distinct, if we would understand 
the procedure of the living mind. Of course if we 
sum up all the interests and intuitions of the soul 
in the term "reason," we may make reason cover the 
whole field of conviction and insight ; but reason as 
the faculty of inference through argimaent is second 
and not first ; for it presupposes premises. 

But is not this equivalent to saying that we 
believe things because we wish to, and can there be 
any greater logical iniquity than this ? In reply we 
may say that private prejudices, whims, and desires 
can never be any proper ground for belief, but the 
great catholic interests and tendencies of the race 
may well be a good ground for belief ; for these 
reveal the essential structure and needs of the mind, 
and have all the logical significance of any great cos- 
mic product. They are made for us rather than by 
us, and they cannot be discredited without involving 
our whole system of knowledge in disaster. Any 
evolutionary doctrine of knowledge must find deep 
significance in the great organized interests, emotions, 
and beliefs of humanity. They are a product for 
which the power not ourselves is far more responsible 
than we are. Of course in any theistic scheme their 
teleological nature is manifest. For we must remember 
that these feelings and beliefs are only to a slight 
extent the product of reflective logical processes ; they 
are rather expressions of life and history and all the 
complex interactions of men with nature and with 



LOGICAL METHOD 27 

one another. They are growths rather than deduc- 
tions. They are lines of least resistance along which 
life moves ; and as thus viewed they belong to the 
nature of things as much as the law of gravitation 
itself. They are the principles by which men live 
and without which men cannot live their best life. 
There is no surer test of reality than this. We can 
object to it only as we assume that the sensuously 
presentable alone is real ; and this view is even in- 
telligible only because it is false. 

All hope of deduction and logical demonstration, 
then, must be given up ; all that thought, scientific or 
religious, can hope to do is to interpret experience. 
It seeks to explain or clarify or systematize the matter 
given in experience. But this matter itself has to be 
taken for granted. It is not to be deduced, but 
accepted. Without it the mind is a vacuum. All 
science that understands itself assumes the truth of 
experience, and then seeks to interpret it. So all 
religious thought that understands itself knows that 
its only function is not to demonstrate abstract the- 
orems, but to interpret man's religious experience. 
It has not to produce the experience but to under- 
stand it and trace its implications. And in both( 
cases our final trust in the results reached rests on, 
the mind's basal faith in the essential truthfulness of 
life and reality. Neither has any superiority in logic [_ 
over the other. 

Thus we see that all our thinking rests on a teleo- 
logical foundation. The mind is not driven by any 
compulsion of objective facts, but rather by the sub- 
jective necessity of self-realization and self-preserva- 
tion. We need to bear this fact in mind if we would 



28 INTRODUCTION 

escape the illusions of rigor and vigor, and also that 
naive dogmatism of naturalistic thinking which crudely 
fancies that science has a speculative foundation apart 
from all subjective interests, and one quite superior to 
that of religion. 

Reflection, however, shows that the teleology of 
self-realization and self-preservation is immanent in 
our entire system of thought; and the history of 
thought shows the same fact. The fundamental 
interests of the mind have always, sooner or later, 
vindicated themselves and secured recognition. From 
the beginning, the philosophic skeptics have raged 
and have imagined many bright and more vain 
things ; but the burden of their cry has always been, 
" You cannot prove that you have a right to do what 
you are doing." But this barren doubt has been 
ignored, practically by common sense, and theoreti- 
cally by earnest thinkers, who, having once admitted 
that it is always abstractly possible, and having seen 
that it is eternally empty, imitate priest and Levite, 
and pass by on the other side. The mind is sure to 
conceive the universe so as to provide for its own 
interests. So long as any fundamental interest is 
overlooked or ignored, there can be no peace. Some- 
times the intellect has been too hasty, and has satis- 
fied itself with simple and compendious explanations, 
which left no place for heart and conscience, and ran 
off into dry and barren atheisms and materialisms. 
But before long the rising tides of life and feeling 
compelled it to try again. On the other hand, religion 
has often made the mistake of denying intellect and 
conscience their full rights ; and forthwith they began 
their crusade for recognition. Conscience alone has 



LOGICAL METHOD 29 

proved a sturdy disturber in theological systems ; and 
one great source and spring of theological progress has 
been the need of finding a conception of God which 
the moral nature could accept. The necessity of 
moralizing theology has produced vast changes in that 
field ; and the end is not yet. And in all fields, as the 
inner life has grown more complex in manifestation 
and richer in content, the system of conceptions has 
progressed to correspond. It is by this contact with 
life and reality that thought grows, and not by a 
barren logic-chopping or verbal haggling about proof. 
Thus science, ethics, and religion grow ; and the mind, 
in its increasing sense of self-possession and of har- 
mony with the reality of things, becomes more and 
more indifferent to the objections of the skeptic, and 
works with ever growing faith to build up the temple 
of science, of conscience, and of God. 

What,then, of skepticism? Nothing. Specific doubt 
founded on specific reasons is always respectable, 
being but a case of rational criticism ; but any other 
kind of skepticism must be left to itself. So far as it 
is founded on the method of rigor and vigor, it results 
from an ignorance of human conditions ; so far as it 
rests on the abstract possibility of doubting without 
reasons, it is forever possible and forever irrational. 
It appeals from reason and life rather than to them ; 
and there is no court left in which the appeal can be 
tried. Such skepticism may do damage to individuals 
who are mentally debilitated, but in the develop- 
ment of the race it is of no importance. Skepticism 
of this type must not be flattered by being too much 
noticed, but should be left to the sobering influence 
of real experience. Finally, universal skepticism is 



30 INTRODUCTION 

no skepticism ; for, being impartially distributed over 
all our faculties, it leaves everything where it was 
before ; and by discrediting everything it practically 
discredits nothing. Such skepticism has only academic 
or polemic existence; it is meaningless in practice. 
Academic doubt is always possible about the uni- 
formity of nature or the existence of om* neighbors. 
Religious doubt based on similar principles ought not 
to have any more influence. 

It is, too, a strategic error for the theist to 
attempt to solve all the puzzles of epistemology and 
metaphysics. Owing to the brevity of life, and for 
other equally good reasons, the theist may well begin 
with the faith in the trustworthiness of our faculties 
which is common to all investigators. It is manifest 
that all we can do in this or any other field which 
lies beyond the senses is to inquire how we must 
think in the case. And this can be decided only by 
analyzing and reflecting upon our experience. If in 
this way we come to some clear indications of reason, 
we shall have the only possible warrant for conviction. 
As just said, general doubts about the competency of 
reason and the validity of knowledge have no prac- 
tical influence, except with persons who are satisfied 
with pretexts. The only dangerous doubt is that 
arising from discrediting the higher nature in the 
interest of the lower ; but doubt in general, which is 
always formally possible, is harmless. 

Function of Logic 

To adjust ourselves to the universe, and the uni- 
verse to ourselves, so that each shall correspond to 



FUNCTION OF LOGIC 31 

the other, we have said, is the implicit aim of mental 
development; and the law that the mind implicitly 
follows is this : Whatever onr total natm:e calls for 
may be assumed as real in default of positive dis- 
proof. This gives rise, we have seen, to a variety of 
practical postulates, which are born of life and not 
of speculation. 

What, now, is the function of logic with regard 
to these postulates ? Plainly not to prove them, but 
to bring them and their implications out into clear 
consciousness, and to keep them from losing their 
way. The function is not constitutive but regulative. 
These postulates themselves are not primarily known 
as such, but exist rather as implicit tendencies than 
as clearly defined principles. In this state they 
readily miss their proper aim. Thus the scientific or 
cognitive consciousness is a comparatively recent de- 
velopment ; and its implications are very imperfectly 
understood. What is involved in the assumed possi- 
bihty of objectively valid knowledge is a question 
rarely asked, and still more rarely answered. Hence, 
by the grace of ignorance, many a theory lives along 
in good and regular speculative standing which, if 
understood, would be seen to destroy knowledge 
altogether. The farce in such cases is as if one 
should regard himself as the only existence, and 
should insist on proving it to his neighbors. The 
ethical consciousness, in like manner, is rarely in full 
possession of itself, and consequently many ethical 
theories acquire currency, which, if developed into 
their consequences, would prove fatal to all ethics. 
The religious nature also is developed into self-posses- 
sion only by a long mental labor and experience 



32 INTRODUCTION 

extending over centuries. Left to itself it may fail 
utterly of comprehending its own implications, and 
may even lose itself in irreligious assumptions. 

In every field of thought, then, there is need of a 
critical procedure which shall aim to secure consistency 
in the development of our postulates, and to adjust 
their mutual relations. The justification of life must 
come from life itself, but the formulation of life is 
a matter for logic. Hence, if we assume a rational 
and righteous universe, we must first know what we 
mean, and what is implied; and we must make no 
assumptions incompatible therewith. In particular, 
such a critical procedure is needed to restrain the 
insolence and fanaticism of the understanding itself. 
This faculty, unless chastened by criticism, tends to 
become hasty, impatient, and overbearing. It dislikes 
to leave questions open, and often gets through too 
soon. If it makes the motions of explanation, it 
ignores the fact that sometimes there is no real prog- 
ress. When the virtue of mental integrity is not 
strongly developed, it will even ignore or distort facts 
in order to have a theory. In this way rationalism 
has become a synonym for all that is most superficial 
and purblind in speculation. Here, then, is a field 
and most important function for logic ; and here logic 
has its inalienable rights. And in this process of 
inner development, adjustment, and rectification, logic 
is equally the servant of cognition, of ethics, and of 
religion; while all alike are fundamentally the out- 
growths and expressions of our subjective needs and 
tendencies as evoked by our total experience. In all 
alike humanity is realizing and expressing itself. 

It would, then, be a complete misunderstanding of 



FUNCTION OF LOGIC 33 

our aim to suppose that we are engaging in a polemic 
against logic and metaphysics. That they are not 
positively sufficient to give us the principles of prac- 
tical life is clear, but they do not forbid us to make 
practical postulates, provided we recognize them in 
their practical character, and do not proclaim them as 
demonstrated. But nothing can warrant ns in con- 
tradicting logic and metaphysics, and no such contra- 
diction can escape final destruction. The lack of 
proof may be atoned for by practical necessity, but 
disproof can never be ignored or set aside by any sen- 
timent. Such a difficulty arises in the field of the 
logical understanding, and there only can it be met. 
The failure to distinguish the lack of proof from dis- 
proof has led to many unwise utterances on the part 
of some religious teachers. They have proclaimed an 
independence of both logic and metaphysics, and a 
complete indiference to their conclusions. Sometimes 
they have even proclaimed a contradiction between 
speculation and religion, apparently to show the 
strength of their own faith. Such a view must lead 
either to complete speculative skepticism, or to a civil 
war among the faculties of the soul; and in either 
case the result would not be religiously desirable. 

To ward off this misunderstanding the following dis- 
tinction is useful. A mental inventory reveals several 
classes of propositions : some which we must believe, 
some which we must not believe, and some which we 
may believe or assume. The first two classes rest 
upon the essential structure of intelligence ; and what- 
ever conflicts with them will, sooner or later, be aban- 
doned. The third class belongs to the realm of practice 
and probability, where most of what is valuable in life 



34 INTRODUCTION 

and conduct lies. It is only in this class that our 
interests or desires can have a vote, or that the " will 
to believe " has a permissible function. In most prac- 
tical matters a purely logical contemplation would 
leave us in uncertainty, and the will to believe, be- 
cause of the necessity of doing something, comes in 
to overturn the equilibrium and precipitate a conclu- 
sion. But such beliefs must never be spoken of as 
proved ; they are of the nature of choices. They rep- 
resent the man's assumptions, or postulates, or practi- 
cal platform, or the things for which he stands. Thus 
the belief becomes personal and moral. And logic 
never objects to beliefs of this sort, provided they are 
not set forth as demonstrations, and are seen in their 
practical characters as personal decisions and moral 
ventures. 

Let us further admit, or rather affirm, that the 
necessity of passing over difficulties, and taking so 
much for granted, is not the final cognitive ideal. 
That ideal no doubt involves the speculative solution 
of all problems, so that our entire -thought sjitstem may 
be perfectly transparent to intelligence. But this 
ideal is unattainable at present, owing to our limita- 
tions. In every deparfinent our knowledge is patch- 
work, and rests on assumption. And, since this is so, 
it is well to recognize it, in order that we may not 
delude ourselves with a false show of logical rigor, or 
do injustice to the demands of practical life. 

We have made this long digression on method, of 
set purpose, because many of our difficulties arise from 
a false method. Persons untrained in criticism never 
suspect that logic depends on experience for its prem- 



FUNCTION OF LOGIC 35 

ises in concrete matter, that experience stands in its 
own right, and that the premises are often simply the 
vital instincts of the mind thrown into propositional 
form. Hence such persons have a pathetic faith in 
formal reasoning, and in rigor and vigor in general. 
And when this method is applied to religious matter, 
the absence of demonstration at once appears ; and 
this is supposed to prohibit faith. It was, therefore, 
not only worth while, but even pedagogically neces- 
sary, to point out the inapplicability of this method 
to any concrete matter. It is as fatal to science as to 
religion. Any method to be obligatory must be one we 
can apply. In the concrete realm we can deduce noth- 
ing, we can only take our experience as a datum, at 
once indeducible and undeniable, and seek to interpret 
it for our own rational peace and satisfaction. From 
this point of view the problem has a new aspect. We 
have no longer to seek for an impossible demonstra- 
tion, but only for a rational interpretation. 

These facts in the natural history of belief must 
be borne in mind if we would understand our mental 
procedure and development. They explain how it is 
that we have many beliefs which are not held because 
we have proved them, but which we try to prove 
because we hold them, and which we insist on hold- 
ing whether we can prove them or not. Such a fact 
is a terrible scandal to the disciple of rigor and vigor, 
but it is a self-evident result of the form of human 
development and of the way in which beliefs grow. 
The same facts further explain the barrenness of 
purely logical criticism. Faiths that are rooted in 
life were not given by logic, and logic cannot take 
them away. Further, these facts throw light on the 



36 INTRODUCTION 

peculiar variations of belief to which all are subject. 
Since the roots of belief often lie in the sublogical 
realm of emotion, sentiment, aspiration, our convic- 
tion will vary as the tides of life and feeling rise and 
fall. Since the belief expresses the life, it must vary 
with it. Finally, these facts explain the peculiar 
moral quality that attaches to certain beliefs. It 
would be quite absurd to hold one responsible for 
belief, if it were always the passionless conclusion of 
a syllogism. But some beliefs express the believer 
himself, what he loves, what he stands for, what he 
desires to be. Such beliefs have personal and moral 
quality. 

Further, it is plain that all thought of strict 
demonstration must be given up. Demonstration is 
necessarily confined to the subjective and logical 
relations of ideas, and can never attach to reality 
without some element of assumption. But this is as 
true for physical science as it is for religion. And, 
in any case, there is no such thing as an objective 
and self-sufficient demonstration. Truth, as such, is 
not dependent on demonstration, but exists eternally 
in its own right. Demonstration is only a makeshift 
for helping ignorance to insight. It is a stimulus to 
the mind of the learner to think in certain ways 
which shall lead him, at last, to see the truth pro- 
posed. But such demonstration is conditioned, not 
only by the nature of the stimulus, but also and 
especially by the development of the mind to which 
it is addressed. And when we come to an argument 
in which the Avhole nature is addressed, the argument 
must seem weak or strong according as the nature is 
feebly, or fully, developed. The moral argument for 



FUNCTION OF LOGIC 3T 

theism cannot seem strong to one without a con- 
science. The argument from cognitive interests will 
be empty when there is no cognitive interest. Inter- 
pretations of experience must seem empty or baseless 
when there is no experience. Little souls find very 
little that calls for explanation or that excites sur- 
prise ; and they are satisfied with a correspondingly 
small view of life and existence. In such a case we 
cannot hope for universal agreement. We can only 
proclaim the faith that is in us, and the reasons for 
it, in the hope that reality may not utterly reject it, 
and that the faith in question may not be without 
some response in other minds and hearts. Faith and 
unfaith alike can do no more; and the survival of 
the fittest must decide between them. 

This renunciation of demonstration has been dis- 
tasteful to many, but needlessly so. In any case it has 
to be made. We cannot make an argument a demon- 
stration by calling it such ; and, besides, the force of 
an argument in no way depends on its name, but on 
its logic. But the chief ground of trouble seems to 
lie in a psychological oversight. If a proposition is 
not demonstrated, then it is at best only probable, 
and, if probable, then uncertain. Hence, to renounce 
demonstration is to hand the subject over to uncer- 
tainty, and who can live on uncertainties? The next 
thing is to call God a " perhaps," and the shortcom- 
ings of natural theology stand revealed. This is 
rigor and vigor again. Such utterances tacitly as- 
sume that belief is always the product of logic. But 
life abounds in practical certainties for which no very 
cogent reasons can be given, but which are neverthe- 
less the foundation of daily life. Our practical trust 

THEISM — 4 



38 INTRODUCTION 

in the uniformity of nature, in one another, in the 
affection of friends, in the senses, etc., are examples. 
Numberless logical objections could be raised which 
reduce all of these to matters of probability ; but 
none of these things move us. The things which we 
hold, or rather which hold us, with deepest conviction 
are not the certainties of logic, but of life. 

Theistic discussion has been largely confined to the 
one question of the divine intelligence. The narrow- 
ness of such a view and its sure failure to reach a 
properly religious conception are already apparent. 
This limitation of the argument has several grounds : 

First, the question of intelligence is basal, and 
everything else stands or falls with it. Hence, the 
question between theism and atheism has been gen- 
erally conceived as a question between intelligence 
and non-intelligence as the ground of the universe. 

Secondly, this question can be debated largely on 
the basis of objective facts. It seems, therefore, to 
involve fewer subjective elements, such as appeals to 
conscience and feeling, and hence it furnishes more 
common ground for the disputants than the other 
arguments. 

Thirdly, the argument has seemed religiously ade- 
quate, because the theist has generally had the Chris- 
tian conception of God in his mind ; and hence when 
some degree of skill and contrivance was shown in 
the world about us, this conception, together with the 
ideal tendency of the soul, at once came in to expand 
this poor result into the ideal religious form. Thus, 
it is no uncommon thing to find fervid theistic writers 
claiming that the eye of a fly proves the existence of 



TRADITIONAL ERRORS 39 

God. Of course^ all it would prove in any case would 
be the existence of a fly-maker ; and this certainly is 
not logically coincident with the idea of God. Such 
writers confound the illustration of a faith they 
already possess with its adequate demonstration. 

But, in spite of the previous strictiires, most of our 
time will be devoted to discussing the question of 
intelligence versus non-intelligence. The idea of God 
may be treated from a double standpoint, meta- 
physical and religious. In the former, God appears 
as the principle of knowing and explanation. In the 
latter, he is the implication of the religious conscious- 
ness, or that without which that consciousness would 
fall into discord with itself. The former view does 
not attain to any distinctly religious conception, but 
it furnishes elements which must enter into every 
religious conception. Hence, in any study of the 
subject, it can never be needless, though it may be 
incomplete. Opposing errors are traditional here. 
On the one hand, mere reasoning has been made all- 
sufficient, and a very dry and barren rationalism has 
been the result. On the other hand, feeling has been 
made supreme, and the just claims of intellect have 
been ignored. This has often gone to the extent of 
basing religion on speculative skepticism. But though 
the lion and the lamb have been induced to lie to- 
gether for a while, it has always ended in the lion's 
making way with the lamb. On a subject of such 
importance we cannot have too many allies. It does 
not weaken the argument from feeling and aspiration 
to show that the pure intellect also demands and 
implies God. Our preliminary work will deal chiefly 
with the intellectual aspects of the question, though 



40 INTRODUCTION 

we reserve the right to appeal to the emotional nature 
upon occasion. 

From the side of pure intellect, also, the theistic 
question can take on two forms. We can seek to 
show that the order of the world cannot be understood 
without intelligence as its cause, and that reason itself 
falls into discord and despair without God. In the 
former case God appears as a necessary hypothesis 
for the understanding of the facts ; in the latter case 
God appears as a necessary implication of the rational 
life. Of course such an aim implies that the laws of 
thought are objectively valid ; that over against the 
subjective necessities of thought are corresponding 
objective necessities of being ; but this assumption 
underlies the whole system of objective knowledge, 
and is not peculiar to theism. The only rational aim 
must be to show that the mind being as it is, and 
experience being as it is, the belief in God is a neces- 
sary implication of both. If this aim should be 
attained, then every one would have to decide for 
himself whether to accept his nature with its implica- 
tions and indications, or to abandon it arbitrarily and 
capriciously. If, however, any one does choose the 
part of the irrationalist, his manifest duty is silence. 
No one has a right to be heard who has renounced 
the conventions of our common intelligence. 

Finally, a word of a pedagogical character must 
be allowed. Owing to certain instinctive prejudices 
of common sense, theism is often unfairly dealt with. 
In particular it is often tacitly assumed that matter 
and force, and with them atheism, have the field, and 
must be allowed to remain in possession until they 
are driven off. Thus theism is branded as an hypoth- 



TRADITIONAL ERRORS 41 

esis, and is called upon to prove a negative ; while 
atheism is supposed to express the fact of experience, 
and to need no further proof. Hence the failure of 
theism to demonstrate its position is oddly enough 
regarded as establishing atheism. Every one ac- 
quainted with atheistic treatises will recognize that 
their chief force has been in picking flaws in the 
theistic argument. There has been comparatively 
little effort to show any positive sufficiency of atheism 
to give a rational account of the facts. 

Such a position is infantile in the extreme ; it 
properly belongs to the palseontological period of 
speculation. The nature of reality is a thought prob- 
lem ; and our thought of reality is the solution of 
that problem. Whether we think of it as one or 
many, material or immaterial, the theory is equally 
speculative in each case ; its value must be decided 
by its adequacy to the facts. If theism is an hypothe- 
sis, atheism is no less so. If theism is a theory or 
speculation, atheism is equally so. The candid mind 
must seek to judge between them. This can be done 
only as we put both views alongside of the facts and 
of each other, and choose the simpler and more 
rational. No theory can be judged by its ability to 
make grimaces at opposing views, but only by its 
own positive adequacy to the facts. The theistic 
theory, with all its difficulties, must be put alongside 
of the atheistic theory with all its difficulties. When 
this is done the theist will have little cause to blush 
for his credulity, or to be ashamed of his faith. 

Another common error must be noted. When we 
come to the deepest questions of thought we always 
come upon impenetrable mystery. We have to affirm 



42 INTRODUCTION 

facts whose possibility we cannot construe. We have 
to make admissions which we cannot further deduce 
nor comprehend. In unclear and untaught minds this 
is often made a stumbling-block ; and the fancy gets 
abroad that theism is an especially difficult doctrine. 
In truth, all science and all thought are full of what 
has been called limit-notions ; that is, notions which 
the facts force upon us, and which are perfectly clear 
from the side of the facts, but which from the farther 
side are lost in difficulty and mystery. They express 
an ultimate affirmation along a given line of thought, 
and can never be grasped from the farther side. When 
we take them out of their relations, or when we seek 
to comprehend them without remembering the law of 
their formation, nothing is easier than to make them 
seem contradictory or absurd. But theism must not be 
held responsible for all the difficulties of metaphysics ; 
and in particular we must be careful in escaping one 
difficulty that we do not fall into a greater. The 
notion of an eternal person, an unbegun conscious- 
ness, is at least no more difficult than the alternative 
notion of eternal matter and unbegun motion. It is 
not the mark of a high grade of intelligence to take 
offense at the difficulties of a given view, and end by 
adopting another still more obnoxious to criticism. 
In these matters it is never a question of finding a 
line of no resistance for thought, but the line of least 
resistance. Only a very ignorant or very superficial 
person would dream of finding a line of no resistance. 

This long introduction seemed necessary to get the 
problem and the method of treatment clearly before us. 
Theistic speculation has suffered greatly in the past 



TRADITIONAL ERRORS 43 

from failure to understand its own problem, and from 
having no just conception of philosophic method. In 
this way it has exposed itself to criticism, partly 
sound and partly quibbling, and has undertaken im- 
possible tasks. It is a step forward to see that the 
question is not one of syllogistic rationalizing alone, 
but also and more profoundly one of life and hu- 
manity and its history. We do not purpose then to 
prove the divine existence, but rather to propose a 
solution of the problem which the world and life 
force upon us, or to offer an interpretation of expe- 
rience in which the soul can rest. We have no 
expectation of clearing up all the puzzles of meta- 
physics. We simply hope to show that without a 
theistic faith we must stand as dumb and helpless 
before the deeper questions of thought and life as a 
Papuan or a Patagonian before an eclipse. 



CHAPTER I 

THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

It cannot be the function of philosophy to produce, 
or deduce, the idea of God. This idea is slowly de- 
veloped in the unfolding life of the race. Moreover, 
men were religious before they became philosophers ; 
and when philosophy began, religion had the field. 
But philosophy has the important function of clarify- 
ing and rectifying the ideas that spring up thus 
spontaneously in the religious field, and of showing 
their rational foundation. In this way arise the vari- 
ous arguments for the existence of God. These have 
seldom been the source of theistic faith ; they are 
rather the justifications of a belief already existing. 

Kant has grouped the leading theistic arguments 
into three : ontological, cosmological, and physico- 
theological, and has made each the subject of a 
special criticism. In this, along with much that is 
incisive and final, there is also much that is arbitrary 
and verbal. His discussion, as a whole, is somewhat 
antiquated, and is conducted throughout on Kantian 
principles. The argument from design, he holds, 
fails to reach the full idea of God ; and the notion of 
a necessary and perfect being upon which the other 
arguments depend is a subjective ideal of the reason. 

His criticism rests on two pillars. The first is the 
traditional prejudice of intellectualism, that demon- 

44 



THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 46 

stration is necessary to belief. In the realm of 
science, in the Kantian sense, as in mathematics, we 
must have demonstration or nothing. And as there 
is no apodictic demonstration of theism, it can have 
no properly scientific standing. At the same time it 
is an implication of reason and a demand of practical 
life; and on this account it may be held, not as a 
speculative, but as a practical truth. Atheism, on 
the other hand, has no standing whatever, either 
speculative or practical. 

The second pillar of Kant's criticism is his general 
principle that the forms and ideals of the reason 
have no objective significance. They are valid only 
in the field of experience, and do not apply to reality. 

Both of these Kantian claims have been outgrown. 
Few theists certainly would now expect mathematical 
strictness of demonstration in matters of theistic 
faith. Since technical probability is quite compatible 
with the highest practical certainty, they are not 
concerned at finding theistic faith, like scientific 
faith, a matter of probable, rather than of demon- 
strative, argument. 

As to the Kantian subjectivity, it has long been 
evident that Kant himself never thought the subject 
through. In some sense all knowledge is necessarily 
subjective and individual. In no way can any mind 
get outside of itself and be the thing, or grasp the 
thing, otherwise than through the conceptions which 
its nature allows it to form. In its psychological - 
origin, then, knowledge is both subjective and indi- 
vidual. But this fact in no way decides whether the 
knowledge thus arising as a special experience of the 
individual may not have validity beyond himself for 



46 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

other individuals and for the system of objects. 
This question is purely one of fact, and can be 
answered only by consulting experience. A thorough- 
going subjectivity would shut us up in solipsistic 
individualism, and deny the world of persons and 
objects together, except as a set of individual fancies 
or dreams. To this extreme no one would venture 
to go. It follows that in spite of ourselves we are 
compelled to attribute objective validity or univer- 
sality to some of our thoughts, and that fruitful criti- 
cism must be restricted to inquiring which of our 
thoughts are thus valid. How must we think about 
reality when thought becomes critical and reflective ? 
This is the only question which thought can profit- 
ably raise, and this question can be answered only 
by thought itself. When we have found what the 
essential utterances of thought are, each one must 
decide for himself whether to accept them. Kant 
himself labored under the delusion that a system of 
extra-mental things in themselves exists to which our 
faculties are so related, or rather unrelated, that we 
can never grasp it in its true nature. This fiction 
later thought has successfully banished by the dis- 
covery that there are no things except those which 
thought af&rms, and that there is no objectivity in 
things except their validity for thought itself, that is, 
for experience. 

How must we think about things ? Our present 
answer is that when thought is clear and self- 
conscious we must think theistically, but in discuss- 
ing this question regard must be had not merely to 
logical theory, but also to psychological conditions. 
Many arguments which may be logically good are not 



THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 47 

adjusted to the pedagogical situation. And since our 
aim must be to produce conviction, it is important, 
first, to find some admitted fact or principle as a 
point of departure, and, secondly, not to attempt to 
do too much at once. Such a point is not furnished 
by either the ontological or the design argument. 

The ontological argument in its common form rests 
on the notion of the perfect being. The idea of the 
perfect necessarily includes the idea of existence, and 
would be a contradiction without it. Hence it has 
been concluded that the perfect exists. There is not 
a shadow of cogency in this reasoning. It only 
points out that the idea of the perfect must include 
the idea of existence; but there is nothing to show 
that the self -consistent idea represents an objective 
reality. Hence Descartes sought to supplement the 
argument by showing that only the perfect can be 
the source of the idea; but this did not much help 
the matter. In fact, the argument is nothing but the 
expression of the aesthetic and ethical conviction that 
the true, the beautiful, and the good, which alone 
have value in the universe, cannot be foreign to the 
universe. The mind will not consent to abandon its 
ideals. The ontological argument owes all its force 
to this immediate faith in the ideal. Its technical 
expression is due to the desire to give this faith a 
demonstrative logical form. The result is to weaken 
rather than strengthen it. 

This faith, when abstractly stated and logically 
tested, seems to be not only baseless but even non- 
existent. We accost it skeptically, and it vanishes 
hke a fading gleam. It reveals itself in its work 
rather than in any conscious manifestation. But its 



48 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

work is everywhere manifest. When the cosmo- 
logical argument has convinced us that a first cause 
must be affirmed, it is the faith in the perfect ideal 
which transforms this non-rehgious, speculative ab- 
straction into the idea of God. When the design 
argument has affirmed a contriver of the adaptations 
revealed in experience, it is the same faith that 
passes from this not very great result to the idea of 
the infinite and perfect God. And as we have seen 
in the Introduction, this faith is the implicit major 
premise of the soul's life. While not demonstrated 
or demonstrable by anything, it is really implicit in 
everything. 

The teleological or design argument is based upon 
the purpose-like adaptations that are found, espe- 
cially in the organic world. This has always been a 
favorite with the Anglo-Saxon mind ; and Kant men- 
tions it with great respect. Whatever its logical 
faults and speculative shortcomings, it is better 
adapted to convince common sense than the more 
speculative arguments. Still, when taken strictly, 
it is open to so many critical objections, and the 
affirmed design in nature is so much in dispute, 
especially in these days of evolution, that, in the 
present state of thought, it does not offer the best 
starting point for the discussion. Thus the great 
mass of natural products look more like effects than 
purposes. In the complex disposition of natural 
agents, of land and water, of mountain and plain, 
etc., there may be purpose ; but to observation these 
things seem to be simple facts from which certain 
results follow. Again, in the relation of the organic 
and the inorganic, there may be purpose ; but the fact 



THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 49 

of observation is that the latter is usable by the 
former, not that it was made for it. If the intel- 
ligence of the world-ground were otherwise and else- 
where demonstrated, there is much in the relation of 
these two worlds which would illustrate that intel- 
ligence ; but there is not much that can be used as 
original proof. It is in the organic world that we 
find unambiguous marks of adaptation ; yet even here, 
unfortimately, the most of the ends realized do not 
seem worth realizing. They have no manifest value 
or reason, but are just such meaningless things as we 
should expect if an irrational power were at work. 
Had not our idea of God been otherwise determined, 
these things would prove less a help than an em- 
barrassment. Again, allowing the existence of design 
in nature, this argument by no means justifies us in 
afiirming a single cause of the world. A polytheistic 
conception remains possible; and, considering the 
antitheses of good and evil, of sense and nonsense, in 
nature, such a view would accord only too well with 
experience. Christianity has accustomed us to mon- 
otheism, but in strict logic the design argument, on 
the basis of experience, would have difficulty in mak- 
ing it out. The argument seems sufficient because, 
in its common use, it is not a deduction of the theistic 
idea, but only an illustration of the theistic faith 
that we already possess. 

Neither of these arguments furnishes a satisfactory 
starting point. The same is true of the cosmological 
argument in its traditional forms. It speaks a strange 
language which is not adapted to produce conviction, 
until translated into the speech of to-day. The aim 
in this argument is to pass from the cosmos as a con- 



50 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

tingent and conditioned existence to the affirmation 
of a necessary and unconditioned existence. The 
form of the argument lias been various. Sometimes 
the argument has been from motion to an unmoved 
prime mover ; sometimes from secondary causes to 
an uncaused first cause ; sometimes from contingent 
existence to necessary existence, or from dependent 
existence to independent existence. In its traditional 
forms the argument is open to many objections. 

It seems well, then, to abandon the traditional 
classification of arguments as unedifying in any case ; 
since the value of an argument depends on its matter 
and not on its name. Concrete problems may be so 
abstractly treated that no one exactly knows just 
what is going on. We purpose, therefore, to work 
our way into the problem from the standpoint of the 
thought of to-day ; and instead of seeking to establish 
the full religious conception of God at once, we con- 
tent ourselves with the humbler aim of showing that 
the ground of all reality, or the fundamental reality, 
or the world-ground, must be one and not many. 

In this claim we are in harmony with the great 
majority of thinkers, both of ancient and modem 
times. Even theistic and non-theistic thinkers have 
agreed in rejecting a fundamental pluralism in favor 
of a basal monism. The most pronounced non- 
theistic and atheistic schemes of our time label them- 
selves monism, although not always showing the 
clearest appreciation of what true monism means and 
requires. Even Kant, who will not allow any 
objective validity to knowledge, insists that monism 
is the deepest demand of the reason. For the en- 
couragement of timid souls, and because monism has 



INTERACTION 51 

kept bad company at times, we point out that in this 
discussion it does not mean pantheism or materiahsm, 
but the substantial imity of the world-ground. 

But while there is agreement in the fact, there is 
much diversity in the modes of reaching it. And here 
it is that we need to find the best point of departure, 
and one which will command universal assent. This 
is found in the postulates of objective cognition. 

That things form a system, and that this system 
is one, is the deepest conviction of reflective intelli- 
gence and the supreme presupposition of organized 
knowledge. Within this system all things are deter- 
mined in mutual relations, so that each thing is 
where and as it is because of its relations to the 
whole. This system is not revealed in experience 
but is an implication of cognition. Primarily it is a 
reflection of the unitary nature of the reason, but 
analysis shows that it is implicit in any scheme of 
objective knowledge. The assumption of system 
clearly appears in such expressions as the world, the 
universe, the cosmos, the system of things. 

But while reason is unitary and systematic, sense 
experience is manifold and pluralistic. Hence arises 
a need for mediating between the rational demand 
for unity and the experienced fact of plurality. The 
current solution of this problem, both for science and 
common sense, consists in positing a dynamic inter- 
action among things whereby the many are united 
into one system, and their logical relations are set in 
real existence. 

Without raising any question at present as to the 
fact of interaction, we proceed to show that such an 
interacting system is impossible without a coordinat- 



52 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

ing one. Let our first question be, What is involved 
in an interaction which will serve the purposes of 
cognition ? 

The first implication is that things mutually affect 
or determine one another. Without this assumption 
any event would be an absolute and unrelated 
beginning. The universe would fall asunder into 
unconnected and uncaused units, and the individual 
consciousness would be shut up within itself. Again, 
it implies that all things interact ; for if there were 
anything out of all relations of causation, it would be 
for us a figment of the imagination. 

But interaction at random would not meet the de- 
mands of cognition. For this we must next add the 
idea of law and uniformity, or that under the same 
circumstances the same thing occurs. And this im- 
plies further a universal adjustment of everything to 
every other, such that for a given state of one there 
can be only a given state of the rest fixed both in 
kind and degree. Without this assumption unlike 
causes might have like effects, and like causes 
might have unlike effects, and there could be no 
thought of theoretical cognition. There must be, 
then, interaction and law among things ; and these 
things cannot be and do what they choose, but all 
must be bound up in a common scheme ; that is, 
there must be system. And in so far as there is sys- 
tem, everything must be related to every other in an 
exact and all-embracing adjustment. 

Reserving the right to interpret interaction among 
the many as really immanent action in the One, we 
may say that these postulates command universal 
assent as the basis of all objective cognition. They 



INTERACTION 53 

are not doubted like the assumption of design, but 
are implied in the very structure of knowledge. The 
specific nature of the laws and the system is, indeed, 
a problem for solution ; but the existence of rational 
law and system is implicitly assumed. 

Our starting point, then, is the conception of things 
interacting according to law, and forming an intelli- 
gible system. The advantage, however, lies in its 
general acceptance, and not in its being speculatively 
demonstrated. Critically considered, the universe, or 
nature, as system is an ideal of the cognitive nature, 
as God is an ideal of the religious nature, while nei- 
ther admits of proper demonstration. But for one 
reason or another, cognitive ideals are more easily ac- 
cepted than religious ideals, and hence we start with 
the former, and proceed to develop their implications. 

Our first question concerned the implications of 
interaction ; the second concerns its possibility. How 
is a unitary system of interacting members possible ? 
This is the problem. Only through a unitary being 
which posits and maintains them in their mutual 
relations. This is the solution. We borrow from 
metaphysics an outline of the argument. 

Spontaneous thought posits all its objects as real, 
and finds no reason for not thinking them mutually 
independent. They all seem to exist together in 
space, and no one seems to imply any other. In this 
stage of thought it is easy to believe that things are 
mutually indifferent and independent, so that any 
one would continue to exist if all the rest should fall 
away. Then the attempt is made to bring these 
mutually indifferent things together by having them 
act upon one another. 

THEISM — 5 



54 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

The attempts to explain interaction are manifold, 
but they all fail so long as the things are left inde- 
pendent. Most of the attempts, indeed, are only 
figures of speech or products of the imagination. For 
instance, a thing is said to transfer its state or condi- 
tion to the thing acted upon ; and this transference 
is the act. Here action is conceived as a thing which 
may be passed along from one thing to another. 
This fancy meets at once the fatal objection that 
states or conditions are adjectival in their nature and 
cannot exist apart from a subject. The facts which 
have led to this notion of transferred conditions are 
chiefly those of transmitted heat and motion ; but 
even here the phrase is only an inexact description 
of the fact, for what is really given is propagation 
rather than transmission. The necessarily adjectival 
nature of states, qualities, conditions, vacates all notions 
of transference. 

A similar verbal explanation is found in the notion 
of a passing influence which, by passing, affects the 
object. This is open to the same objections as the 
preceding view. If by influence we mean only an 
effect, we have simply renamed the problem ; and if 
we mean anything more, we make the influence into 
a sort of thing, thus increasing our difficulties with- 
out gaining any insight. For now we must tell what 
this new thing which passes between things is, in 
what it differs from the other things, what the rela- 
tion of the passing thing is to the things between 
which it passes, where the acting thing gets the store 
of things it emits, and how the passing thing could 
do any more than the thing from which it comes. 
An attempt to answer those questions will convince 



INTERACTION 55 

one of the purely verbal character of this explanation. 
Its origin in the imagination is manifest. Things 
are conceived as separated in space, and the imagina- 
tion plays between them and calls this interaction. 

Akin to this view is that current among physi- 
cists, according to which forces play between things 
and produce effects. But this view also is a device 
of the imagination, and solves nothing. Forces are 
only abstractions from the activities of things, and 
are nothing between things or apart from them. If 
they were things, all the questions asked about the 
influence would return. If they are not things, then 
we only rename the problem without solving it. 

The difficulty of these notions has led some to 
dispense with force and occult influences altogether, 
and explain all interaction as the result of impact, 
as if action at a distance were the great difficulty. 
This view limits the problem to the physical field, 
and is a double failure even there. 

First, the theory of impact cannot be carried 
through in physical science ; and secondly, action by 
impact is no more intelligible between independent 
things than action at a distance. The separation in 
space does not make the difficulty, but only enables 
the imagination to grasp it. But if things be inde- 
pendent, that is, be what they are without reference 
to anything else, there is no reason why one thing 
should in any way be affected by any other. Such 
beings, if in space, would be as indifferent when in 
the same point as when separated by the infinite void. 
There is nothing in spatial contact to explain the 
results of impact, unless there be a deeper meta- 
physical relation between the bodies, which generates 



56 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

repulsion between them. For reason, the difficulty is 
not to act across empty space but to act across the 
separateness of mutually independent individuals ; 
and this difficulty would remain if there were no 
spatial world whatever, but only a society of personal 
spirits. 

Possibly some reader, unpracticed in speculation, 
may be weary and impatient by this time, and say 
that we know that there is interaction, whatever 
puzzles may be raised about it. In that case we 
should have to remind him, first, that interaction is 
really no fact of experience. The fact of observation 
is simply concomitant variation among things. When 
A changes, B, C, etc., change in definite order and de- 
gree. This order of reciprocal change exhausts the 
fact of observation and of science itself. To explain 
this fact we posit forces, but this is an addition to the 
fact, not the fact itself. Moreover, the forces of 
d3raamical reasoning are purely equational relations, 
and have nothing causal in them. 

We should have next to remind the objector that 
the certainty that causality is in play by no means 
decides the form under which it is to be thought. 
Without doubt, the system of reciprocal changes 
among things demands a causal explanation, but this 
does not decide that the causality is to be parceled 
out among many mutually independent things. It 
may be that this view is essentially impossible, and 
that we shall have to replace it by another. 

And this is the case. A necessary interaction of 
mutually independent things is a contradiction. We 
have before pointed out the exact and detailed adjust- 
ment of every member of an interacting system so 



INTERACTION 57 

far as interacting. Such things have not their prop- 
erties or powers absolutely and in themselves, but 
only in their relations or as members of the system. 
The causality of each is relative to the causality of 
all. The law for the activity of any one must be 
given in terms of the activities of all the rest. But 
this implies that the being of each is relative to the 
being of all, for the being itself is implicated in the 
activity. Hence, in addition to saying that things do 
what they do because other things do what they do, 
we must say that things are what they are because 
other things are what they are. Both the being and 
the activity are implicated in the relation ; and it 
would be impossible to define the being except in 
terms of the relation. Such being is necessarily rela- 
tive. It does not contain the grounds of its deter- 
mination in itself alone, but also in others. And this 
must be the case with all things which are included 
in a scheme of necessary interaction. Each is a 
function of all and all are functions of each, as in an 
algebraic equation. Mutually independent quantities 
are equally absurd in both cases. 

Thus we see the contradiction in the notion of the 
necessary interaction of mutually independent things. 
The notion of interaction implies that a thing is de- 
termined by others, and hence that it cannot be all 
that it is apart from all others. If all its activities 
and properties are conditioned, it implies that the 
thing cannot exist at all out of its relations. Its 
existence is involved in its relations, and would van- 
ish with them. The notion of independence, on the 
other hand, implies that the thing is not determined 
by others, but has the ground of all its determinations 



68 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

in itself. These two notions are distinct contradic- 
tions. No passage of influences or forces will avail 
to bridge the gulf as long as the things are regarded 
as independent. The farthest we could possibly go in 
affirming their independence would be to maintain 
their mutual independence, while they all depend on 
a higher reality, which is the ground both of their 
existence and of their harmonious coordination. This 
is the view of Leibnitz as expressed in his monadology 
and preestablished harmony ; and this view rejects 
both fundamental pluralism and the reality of inter- 
action. 

And, on the other hand, if we assume that things 
are really comprised in an order of interaction or 
reciprocal determination, we cannot allow that they 
are absolutely or mutually independent. The popular 
view, in which things exist in a hard and fast self- 
identity and self-sufficiency, must be given up. Such 
things exist only in relation to one another within 
the system. They are relative and dependent exist- 
ences. What then is independent? A dependent 
which depends on nothing is a contradiction; and 
equally so is an independent made up of a sum of 
dependents. If A, JB, C, D are severally depend- 
ent, then A -\- B -{- C-\- D are likewise dependent. 
There is nothing in the sign of addition which can 
turn dependence into independence. 

A first thought would likely be that the system 
itself is independent. Though the members depend 
on each other within the system, the system itself de- 
pends on nothing. But this is only a logical illusion 
so long as A, B, C, D are supposed to be the only 
substantial existences. In that case the system would 



INTERACTION 59 

be only a sum or conceptual product, and would be 
ontologically nothing. And such it would remain 
unless we reversed the order, and, instead of trying 
to construct the system from things as true units of 
being, rather constructed things from the system as 
their source and ground. In that case the system 
would be the true ontological fact, and things would 
be only its dependent products or implications. The 
seK-centered, the true ontological fact would be the 
system ; and all else would depend upon it. But sys- 
tem is not a good term for this conception. The idea 
is that of a basal reality which only is truly self- 
existent, and in and through which all other things 
have their being. 

The reciprocal and concomitant changes in what 
we call things are the fact of experience. The 
explanation of these changes is a speculative problem 
whose solution is not immediately obvious. But one 
thing is clear. We cannot, explain them by the 
things alone. In order to escape the contradiction 
involved in the necessary interaction of mutually 
independent things, and also that involved in reach- 
ing an independent being by summing up dependent 
things, we must transcend the realm of the relative 
and dependent, and affirm a fundamental reality 
which is absolute and independent, and in the unity 
of whose existence the possibility of what we call 
interaction finds its ultimate explanation. The inter- 
action of the many is possible only through the 
unity of an all-embracing One, which either coor- 
dinates and mediates their interaction, or of which 
they are in some sense phases or modifications. 

Thus the pluralism of spontaneous thought is 



60 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

replaced by a fundamental monism ; and the popular 
conception of interaction is transformed. The de- 
mand for a causal ground for the mutual changes of 
things is entirely justified, but the conception which 
finds that ground in interaction, or the transitive 
causality of independent things, is untenable. We 
replace the transitive causality playing between things 
by an immanent causality in an all-embracing, unitary 
being. 

Of the general relation of the many to the basal 
One, two conceptions are possible. We may think of 
the many as dependent on the One, which, however, is 
distinct from them, and coordinates them, and medi- 
ates their reciprocal relations or interaction. The 
real ground of their coordination is not anything 
which the many themselves do, but rather that which 
is done for them and with them by the coordinating 
One. They do not reciprocally determine, they are 
reciprocally determined. Or we may think of them, 
not as dependent on something outside of them, but 
on some one being in them, which is their proper 
reality, and of which they are in some sense but 
phases or modifications. Things in the common use 
of the term would be only h3rpostasized phenomena, 
and would have only such thinghood as belongs to 
grammatical substantives. The decision between 
these two views must be left for future study ; but 
both alike deny the self-sufficiency of things and 
affirm a unitary world-ground. 

This being, as the foundation of all existence, we 
call the basal or fundamental reality. As self-suffi- 
cient, or having the ground of its determinations in 
itself, we call it absolute and independent. As not 



INTERACTION 61 

limited by anything beyond itself, we call it infinite. 
As the explanation of the world, we call it the world- 
ground. These terms are not to be taken in a 
dictionary sense, but always with regard to the 
meaning they are chosen to express. The infinite is 
not the all, but the independent ground of the finite. 
The absolute does not exclude all relation, but only 
all restrictive relations. Relations which are restric- 
tions imposed from without contradict absoluteness, 
but relations freely posited and maintained by the 
absolute do not. 

The argument thus outlined is open to many scru- 
ples, but to no vahd objection. The scruples are 
largely born of our general bondage to the senses. 
For one who supposes that the senses give immediate 
and final metaphysical insight, the argument will 
have no force. But philosophy is not the affair of 
such a person. In other and more hopeful cases, 
when we become familiar with the terms and their 
meaning, and also with the inner structure of reason, 
we shall see that the mind can rest in no other con- 
clusion. The idealist also may object that no true 
unity can be found in this way, that true unity is 
possible only in thought and through thought, and 
that these dynamic considerations as they stand do 
not lead us to unity. With this we largely agree. 
Metaphysics shows that ontological unity is possible 
only on the personal plane, and that no regressive 
thought according to the law of the sufficient reason 
will ever pass from plurality to unity. But while we 
admit this, we still maintain that our argument is 
good so far as it goes. We have shown the necessity 
of affirming unity, but we have not decided the form 



62 THE UNITY OF THE WORLD-GROUND 

under which the unity must be thought. Our argu- 
ment has been doubly hypothetical. If there be 
things, and if there be interaction, we argued, we 
cannot think the thought through on a pluralistic 
basis. This we still maintain ; but we hope to make 
the modifications necessitated by a more idealistic type 
of thought when the time comes. Not everything 
can be said at once ; and there are pedagogical con- 
siderations that may not be ignored. 

We replace, then, the pluralism of spontaneous 
thought by a basal monism. Of course this view 
does not remove all difficulties, nor answer all ques- 
tions. On the contrary, it leaves the mystery of 
being as dark and opaque as ever. Its only value 
lies in giving expression to the mind's demand for 
ultimate unity, and in removing the contradiction 
that lies in the assumption of interaction between 
independent things. But we cannot pretend to pic- 
ture to ourselves the relations of the infinite and the 
finite, nor to construe the possibility of the finite. 
We come here to a necessity that meets us every- 
where when we touch the frontiers of knowledge — 
namely, the necessity of admitting facts which, while 
they must be recognized and admitted, cannot be 
deduced or comprehended. 

Of the nature of the infinite as yet we know only 
that it is one, and metaphysics compels us to regard 
it also as active. But this is so far from being the 
complete idea of God that both atheism and panthe- 
ism might accept it. Still we have made some 
progress. We have reached a point to which the 
design argument alone could not bring us. It is 
plain that polytheism is untenable ) and that, if any 



INTERACTION 63 

kind of theism is to be afiirmed, it must be monothe- 
ism. We have also made some provision for the 
unity of nature, which has become an article of sci- 
entific and speculative faith without any very satis- 
factory exhibition of its speculative warrant. That 
warrant is found in the substantial unity of the 
ground of nature. 

We next attempt some further determinations of 
our thought of this fundamental being. We hope at 
least to be allowed, if not compelled, to identify the 
One of speculation with the God of religion. 



CHAPTER II 

THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

Many questions might fitly be raised at this point, 
but we postpone them for the central question of 
theism — the intelligence of the world-ground. Our 
present aim is to show that there can be no rational 
interpretation of experience except on a theistic basis. 
We promise, however, a pair of principles from meta- 
physics : — 

1. This world-ground, by its independent position, 
is the source of the finite and of all its determina- 
tions. Whether we view it as blind or seeing, ne- 
cessitated or free, none the less must we hold that 
no finite thing has any ground of existence in itself, 
but that it owes its existence, nature, and history 
entirely to the demands which the world-ground makes 
upon it. If not in the plan, then in the nature of 
this fundamental reality, we must seek the condition- 
ing ground of things. 

2. This world-ground is not to be regarded as stuff 
or raw material, but as cause or agent. It is not 
something out of which the world is made, but the 
agent by which the world is produced. Metaphysics 
finds the essential meaning of substantiality not in 
an inert and resting being, but in active causality. 
Causality is the essence of substantiality. 

64 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 65 

The arguments for intelligence in the world-ground 
fall into two great classes^ inductive and speculative. 
The former infer intelligence from its indications in 
the order of the world, in the combinations of natural 
processes apparently for ends, and in the existence 
of the various forms of finite intelligence. The latter 
argue from the structure of reason itself, from the 
nature and implications of knowledge, and from the 
results of metaphysical criticism. We have, then, 
the inductive argument and the epistemological 
and metaphysical argument. We consider them 
separately. 

The inductive argument is the favorite with 
popular thought ; indeed, popular thought is inaccess- 
ible to any other. Arguments drawn from epistemol- 
ogy and metaphysics are highly abstract and demand 
some measure of training and reflective power for 
their comprehension. Hence, while they may be the 
most satisfactory of all from a logical standpoint, 
they will never be popular. The leading difficulties 
of popular thought lie in the inductive field, and 
concern the interpretation of what is there found. 
In the conviction that these difficulties are largely 
due to misunderstanding, we begin with the induc- 
tive argument and reserve the more metaphysical 
considerations for later discussion. Pedagogically, 
this is more effective than a more abstract and specu- 
lative treatment. 

In popular thought the leading motive in theistic 
argument is the desire for explanation. The orderly 
movement of the world, the purpose-like products in 
nature, the existence of finite intelligence, present 
themselves as facts to be explained ; and the conclu- 



66 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

sion is drawn that only intelligence in the world- 
ground will explain them. Or perhaps the opposite 
conclusion is drawn, that the mechanism and forces 
of nature serve to explain them, and that we need 
not go behind or beyond them. But in either case ; 
the thought moves within the sphere of explanation. 

And here we borrow from logic the insight that 
the human mind has only two principles of causal 
explanation, mechanism and intelligence. Verbal 
phrases can be constructed to represent other prin- ^ 
ciples, but there is no corresponding thought.. Later 
reflection may convince us that mechanism can never 
really explain anything; but for the present we 
accept the two types of explanation, that by neces- 
sary mechanical agency which is driven from behind, 
and that by intelligence which foresees the future and 
freely realizes its purposes. In the former case we 
explain the fact by exhibiting it as the necessary 
resultant of its antecedents ; in the latter we explain 
it by viewing it as the work of intelligence. The 
question then becomes. Which of these two principles 
offers the better ultimate explanation of the world and 
life, man being included ? 

The inductive argument appeals to certain prom- 
inent facts as the warrant for a theistic conclusion. 
These are the system of order, the purpose-like 
products that abound in nature, and the existence 
of finite intelligence. Each of these, it is held, 
necessitates the afiirmation of intelligence in the 
world-ground as its only sufficient explanation. To- 
gether they constitute a cumulative argument which 
cannot be resisted. We pass to the exposition. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER 67 



The Argument from Order 

This argument is drawn chiefly from the physical 
system, for it is there we find the most obvious and 
impressive illustrations of the changeless laws of the 
world. To many this argument is the supreme one. 
The facts of design are minute and limited to a rela- 
tively small field, and are by no means unambiguous 
even there, but the steadfast ordinances of the world 
abide unchanged from age to age. Order, then, is 
the great mark of intelligence, they hold, and the 
one fact from which its existence may be safely 
inferred. The fact itself deserves illustration. 

We shall see hereafter that the knowability of the 
world implies its orderly, rational, and systematic 
structure ; here we content ourselves with referring 
once more to the accurate and all-embracing adjust- 
ment of e^h thing to every other involved in a sys-- 
tem of interaction. We have seen that a real system, 
in order to be anything for us, must be a system of 
law, so that definite antecedents shall have the same 
definite consequents, and this in turn demands an 
exact adjustment or correspondence of each of the 
interacting members to all the rest. Otherwise any- 
thing might be followed by everything or by nothing. 
The numerical exactness of natural processes illus- 
trates the wonder of this adjustment. The heavens 
are crystallized mathematics. All the laws of force 
are numerical. The interchange of energy and chem- 
ical combination are equally so. Crystals are solid 
geometry. Many organic products show similar 
mathematical laws. Indeed, the claim is often made 



68 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

that science never reaches its final form until it be- 
comes mathematical. But simple existence in space 
does not imply motion in mathematical relations, or 
existence in mathematical forms. Space is only the 
formless ground of form, and is quite compatible with 
the irregular and amorphous. It is equally compat- 
ible with the absence of numerical law. The truly 
mathematical is the work of the spirit. Hence the 
wonder that mathematical principles should be so 
pervasive, that so many forms and processes in the 
system represent definite mathematical conceptions, 
and that they should be so accurately weighed and 
measured by number. 

If the cosmos were a resting existence, we might 
possibly content ourselves by saying that things exist 
in such relations once for all, and that there is no 
going behind this fact. But even this is very doubt- 
ful. For similarity and equality are rational rela- 
tions which find no explanation apart from intelligence. 
Accordingly Clerk Maxwell, in his famous "Discourse 
on Molecules," finds in the equality of the molecules 
and their properties a proof that they are " manufac- 
tured articles " which cannot be accounted for by any 
natural processes. " Each molecule therefore bears 
impressed upon it the stamp of a metric system as 
distinctly as does the meter of the Archives at Paris 
or the double royal cubit of the temple of Karnac." 
But however this may be, the cosmos is no rigid 
and unchanging thing ; it is, rather, a process accord- 
ing to intelligible rules, and in this process the 
rational order is perpetually maintained or restored. 
The weighing and measuring continually go on. In 
each chemical change just so much of one element is 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER 69 

combined with, just so much of another. In each 
change of place the intensities of attraction and 
repulsion are instantaneously adjusted to correspond. 
Apart from any question of design, the simple fact of 
qualitative and quantitative adjustment of all things 
according to fixed law is a fact of the utmost signifi- 
cance. The w^orld-ground works at a multitude of 
points, or in a multitude of things throughout the sys- 
tem, and works in each with exact reference to its 
activities in all the rest. The displacement of an 
atom by a hair's breadth demands a corresponding 
readjustment in every other within the grip of gravi- 
tation. But all are in constant movement, and hence 
readjustment is continuous and instantaneous. The 
single law of gravitation contains a problem of such 
dizzy vastness that our minds faint in the attempt to 
grasp it ; and when the other laws of force are added 
the complexity defies all understanding. In addition 
we might refer to the building processes in organic 
forms, whereby countless structures are constantly 
produced or maintained, and always with regard to 
the typical form in question. But there is no need to 
dwell upon this point. 

Here, then, is a problem which is a perennial won- 
der to the thoughtful. The power that founds the 
world, and from which the world perpetually proceeds, 
fainteth not, neither is weary ; therefore the faithful 
ordinances of the world stand fast. And for the 
solution of the problem we have only the two prin- 
ciples of intelligence and non-intelligence, of self- 
directing reason and blind necessity. The former is 
adequate, and is not far-fetched and violent. It as- 
similates the facts to our own experience, and offers 

THEISM — 6 



70 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

the only ground of order of which that experience 
furnishes any suggestion. If we adopt this view, all 
the facts become luminous and consequent. 

If we take the other view, then we have to assume 
a power which produces the intelhgible and rational, 
without being itself intelligent and rational. It 
works in all things, and in each with exact reference 
to all, yet without knowing anything of itself or of 
the rules it follows, or of the order it founds, or of 
the myriad products, compact of seeming purpose, 
which it incessantly produces and maintains. If we 
ask why it does this, we must answer, Because it 
must. If we ask how we know that it must, the 
answer must be. By hypothesis. But this reduces to 
saying that things are as they are because they must 
be. That is, the problem is abandoned altogether. 
The facts are referred to an opaque hypothetical 
necessity, and this turns out, upon inquiry, to be the 
problem itself in another form. There is no proper 
explanation except in theism. 

It IS something of a surprise to find the atheistic 
explanation of order so empty upon inspection. The 
reason is found in crude sense metaphysics and corre- 
sponding logic, which will be more fully discussed 
later on. Meanwhile we point out two causes which 
have served to conceal the weakness of the atheistic 
claim. 

First, we fancy that we see causes, and especially 
that we see matter to be a real cause. Spirit, on the 
other hand, is a purely hypothetical cause, and is 
assumed only to explain that which the undoubted 
cause, matter, cannot account for. Hence theism is 
presented as maintaining a hypothetical cause, God, 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER 71 

against a real cause, matter ; and as matter is daily 
found to explain more and more, there is less and less 
need of God. Here, then, necessity and non-intelli- 
gence are manifestly united in most effective causa- 
tion ; and who can set bounds to their possibilities ? 

This thought was a leading factor in the atheistic 
renascence of the last generation. The answer must 
be that it is an echo of an obsolete theory of knowl- 
edge. We know directly nothing of causes. We 
experience certain effects, which we refer to causes ; 
and the nature of the causes is learned by inference 
from the effects. Matter is not seen to cause any- 
thing; nor is spirit seen to cause an3rfching. The 
cause of cosmic phenomena is hidden from observa- 
tion ; and the only question possible is, How must we 
think of that cause ? Our answer is equally specula- 
tive and metaphysical in every case. The theist, 
observing the law and order among the phenomena, 
refers them ultimately to a power which knows itself 
and what it is doing. The atheist refers them to a 
power which knows nothing of itself or of what it is 
doing. 

The second cause that conceals the weakness of 
this position is found in the notion of law. The 
human mind is especially prone to hypostasize ab- 
stractions, and subject things to them. The reign of 
law is a phrase that has thus acquired a purely 
factitious significance. Law appears as something 
apart from things, which rules over them and deter- 
mines all their doings. Thus the law of gravity is 
conceived of as something separate from things, and 
to which things are subject; and the mystery of 
gravitation is removed by calling it a law. The mis- 



72 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

take is palpable. Laws have no thing-like existence, 
but are simply general expressions either of fact, or 
of the rule according to which some agent proceeds. 
Things do not attract one another because the law of 
gravitation calls for it ; but they attract, and from a 
comparison of many cases we find that the intensity 
of this attraction varies according to a certain rule. 
But this rule does not found the fact ; it only 
expresses it. The same is true for all the other laws 
of nature. They neither found nor compel the facts, 
but simply express them. Yet, misled by our persist- 
ent tendency to mistake abstractions for things, we 
first give a kind of substantive character to the laws, 
and then we carry them behind the things as pre^ 
existent necessities, which explain everything, but 
which themselves are in no more need of explanation 
than the self-sufficient and eternal truths of the rea- 
son. The untaught mind tends to think under the 
form of necessity ; and this necessity, which is but 
the mind's own shadow, forthwith passes for an ex- 
planation. Thus we reach the grotesque inversion of 
reason which makes the very fact of rational order a 
ground for denying a controlling reason. 

In truth, however, the laws form a large part of 
the problem. When we have said that the world- 
ground coordinates things by fixed rules of quantity 
and quality, and with perfect adaptation and numer- 
ical adjustment, we have but stated the problem, not 
solved it. That the adjustment takes place with con- 
sciousness is not seen ; that it takes place by neces- 
sity is also not seen. Both the consciousness and 
the necessity are added to the observation. Change 
according to rule is all that is given. If we ask how 



THE ARGUMENT FROM ORDER 73 

this can be, we can only appeal either to intelligence 
or non-intelligence. Comte says that it is a mark of 
immaturity to raise this question ; but if we will raise 
it, theism is the only answer. The atheist he pro- 
nounces to be the most inconsequent of theologians, 
since he raises theological questions and rejects the 
only possible way of dealing with them. 

The passage from Comte is a striking one, and 
worthy of quotation. He says : — 

" If we insist upon penetrating the unattainable mys- 
tery of the essential Cause that produces phenomena, 
there is no hypothesis more satisfactory than that 
they proceed from Wills dwelling in them or outside 
them, — an hypothesis which assimilates them to the 
effect produced by the desires which exist within our- 
selves. Were it not for the pride induced by meta- 
physical and scientific studies, it would be inconceiv- 
able that any atheist, modern or ancient, should have 
believed that his vague hypotheses on such a subject 
were preferable to this direct mode of explanation. 
And it was the only mode which really satisfied the 
reason, until men began to see the utter inanity and 
inutility of all search for absolute truth. The Order 
of Nature is doubtless very imperfect in every respect ; 
but its production is far more compatible with the 
hypothesis of an intelligent Will than with that of a 
blind mechanism. Persistent atheists therefore would 
seem to be the most illogical of theologists : because 
they occupy themselves with theological problems, 
and yet reject the only appropriate method of hand- 
ling them." ^ 

The only thing that could justify us in adopting 

1 " A General View of Positivism," p. 50. 



74 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

non-intelligence as the ground of the cosmic order, 
would be to show that the system and all its laws 
and members are rational necessities, or implications 
of the basal reality. The truths of mathematics are 
implications of our intuitions of space and number ; 
and for these truths we ask no ground, they being 
able to stand alone. It is conceivable that in like 
manner the cosmos, in all its features, should be 
shown to be an implication of the independent 
reality which underlies all. In that case teleology 
would be as needless in physics and biology as it is in 
mathematics. 

This was once a dream of speculation, and the 
attempt was made to realize it. Of course it failed. 
No reflection on the bare notion of independent being 
gives any insight into the actual order. The basal 
distinction of matter and spirit we discover, not 
deduce. The modes of cosmic activity are of the 
same kind. Any of the cosmic laws, from gravita- 
tion on, might conceivably have been lacking or alto- 
gether different. And, allowing the laws, their 
outcome might have been in all respects different. 
For the laws alone do not determine the result, but 
only when taken along with the conditions under 
which they work. Had the conditions been different, 
the same laws would have produced other results. 
The laws of physics and chemistry are ever the same, 
but their resultants vary with the circumstances of 
their application. But these circumstances are all 
contingent. No trace of necessity can be found in 
the cosmos or its laws. They are simply facts which 
we recognize without pretending to deduce. Meta- 
physics might also try to show that this notion of 



THE ARGUMENT FROM TELEOLOGY 75 

necessity, when pushed to its results, would cancel 
the unity of the basal One, and, instead of landing us 
on the solid rock, would leave us in the abysses. But 
we rest the argument. Here is a power which works 
intelligibly and according to law, by which everything 
is adjusted to everything else with nicest balance and 
adaptation, and by which this balance is incessantly 
reproduced. The theist concludes that this power is 
intelligent, the atheist concludes that it is not. The 
theist holds that the rational and intelligible work 
points to reason and intelhgence. The atheist con- 
cludes that the rational and intelligible work points 
to unreason and non-intelligence. Between these two 
views each must decide for himself. 

Underlying this atheistic reasoning as the source, 
not only of its plausibility, but also of its possibility, 
is the sense realism of uncritical thought. Accord- 
ingly there is not the least suspicion that this solid- 
looking world of matter, force, and law may itself be 
only a function of intelligence. This point will 
come up further on. It suffices here to show the 
emptiness of the argument on its own principles. 

The Argument from Teleology 

The argument from order is cosmic ; it concerns 
the structure of the universe in itself. But the laws 
of the system bear no certain marks of purpose. If 
we ask how they can be, we are referred to intelli- 
gence as their explanation. If we ask what they are 
for, the answer must be that we do not clearly see 
that they are for anything. Movement and com- 
bination according to rule are all we see. But this 



76 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

uncertainty vanishes when we come to the organic 
world. Here we find not only activity according to 
rule, but activity with reference to future ends. In 
the inorganic world we deal mainly with antecedents 
of which the facts are resultants. In the organic 
world there is not only a backward but also a for- 
ward look. The cosmic activity from being orderly 
becomes also teleological. Here results are not 
merely products, they also seem to be purposes. 
Here there are adjustments that look like contriv- 
ance, and combinations apparently for ends. The 
backward look toward antecedents seems adequately 
to explain the rounded stone on the beach; but the 
egg implies a forward look as well. These facts are 
the data of the teleological or design argument, the 
second of the inductive arguments. 

These two arguments do not admit of sharp separa- 
tion ; and a perfect knowledge might well find them 
one. Certainly if there be a supreme intelligence we 
cannot suppose that the laws of nature and its ele- 
mentary factors were fixed without reference to the 
world of life, and that the organic world is an after- 
thought or mere appendix to the inorganic world, 
which is complete in itself. If there be any purpose, 
it must embrace both realms. A theist would be apt 
to find in the domestic animals, the cereal grains, the 
metallic ores, and the coal beds a provision for man 
and civilization. Kant attempted to distinguish 
between the teleology of the organism, and the mere 
usableness of the inorganic world ; but the distinction 
cannot be rigorously maintained for the reason just 
given. From the inductive standpoint, however, we 
find sufficient difference to warrant separate discus- 



THE ARGUMENT FROM TELEOLOGY 77 

sion. We find the most striking marks of design 
and contrivance in the organic world ; and the reign 
of law, as such, does not imply purpose-like products. 
The reign of law is as absolute in the amorphous 
rock as in the crystal or in the living form. It is as 
absolute in the barren desert as in the fertile plain. 
But the results differ greatly in their power of 
suggesting intelligence. Finally, the argument from 
order has even been opposed to that from design, 
many fancying that the existence of fixed laws ex- 
cludes the possibility of specific and detailed purposes. 
We may, then, consider the argument separately. 

The design argument has had varying fortunes. 
Verbal inaccuracies of statement have made room for 
floods of verbal criticism ; and it has at times fallen 
into complete speculative disfavor. Nevertheless it 
will always be a great favorite with common sense. 
Kant speaks of it with respect ; and Mr. J. S. Mill 
regards it as the only theistic argument of any force 
whatever. It has been over and under estimated. It 
does not give us the full idea of God ; but with the 
non-speculative mind it will always be the main 
argument for the intelligence of the First Cause. 

In stud3dng this argument the following points are 
to be noted : — 

1. The argument is not : Design proves a designer. 
Here is design. Hence these things have had a de- 
signer. This would, formally at least, beg the ques- 
tion; for the very point is to know whether the 
minor premise be true. No one ever doubted that 
design implies a designer ; but many have questioned 
whether the facts referred to design really justify 
this reference. The argument rather runs : Here are 



78 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

facts which have such marks of design and contriv- 
ance that we cannot explain them without referring 
them to purpose. The point is to solve the problem 
contained in the purpose-like adaptations and combi- 
nations found in the system ; and the theist refers 
them to design or purpose as the only adequate solu- 
tion. And whatever the verbal failings of the expo- 
sition may have been, this has always been the real 
meaning of the argument. The aim is not to demon- 
strate a speculative theorem, but to solve a concrete 
problem ; and the value of the argument depends on 
the success of the proposed solution. 

2. The design argument need assume nothing as 
to the way in which effects are produced. It claims 
only that adaptation in a complex product to an ideal 
end points to design somewhere. Intellect acts for 
the future ; hence its causality is final or teleological, 
that is, purposive. When, then, processes are found 
in nature which apparently look toward future re- 
sults, those results are viewed as ends, and the activ- 
ity is regarded as intellectual and purposive. This 
is all that is essential to the argument. When more 
is brought in, it is a piece of extraneous metaphysics 
or an echo of popular tradition. 

3. Design is never causal. It is only an ideal con- 
ception, and demands some efficient cause, or system 
of efficient causes, for its realization. If the stomach 
is not to digest itself, there must be some provision 
for protecting it against the gastric fluid. If ice is 
not to sink and freeze out life, there must be some 
molecular structure which shall make its bulk greater 
than that of an equal weight of water. There are 
two quite distinct questions which may be raised 



THE AEGUMEI^T FROM TELEOLOGY 79 

about every event. We may ask how it comes about 
in an order of law ; and we may ask what it means 
in a scheme of purpose. In the former case we seek 
to trace the event as the resultant of its antecedents 
according to the laws which govern them ; in the 
latter case we try to fix its teleological significance. 
These two points of view are entirely distinct and 
should never be confoimded. When we are studying 
the order of production, we must not expect to find 
the design as an agent in the causal series ; and con- 
versely, when we are asking for the purpose of an 
event, it is quite irrelevant to tell us how it is 
brought about. All events come about in some way 
in accordance with an order of law ; and we may 
study this order without raising any other questions. 
And after we have found out all about the order and 
form of occurrence, it is still permitted to believe that 
the movement is informed with purpose. The fact 
that men die from diseases which have their estab- 
lished course does not forbid us to think that God's 
will is being done at the same time. The description, 
then, of the event as an occurrence in the spatial and 
temporal order is quite distinct from its teleological , 
interpretation. The difficulty felt at this point is 
entirely due to the naive realism which erects nature 
into a rival of God. 

The distinction between the two points of view 
contains the answer to the objection often urged, that 
design is not a scientific hypothesis. This claim is 
quite true if we restrict science to the study of the 
uniformities of coexistence and sequence among phe- 
nomena. It is equally unimportant. For science in 
that case hmits itself to a single aspect of experience, 



80 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

and says nothing respecting other matters. It neither 
affirms nor denies design, but traces the general laws 
of phenomena in perfect neutrality, so far as this 
question is concerned. 

4. Hence, the study of the order of production can 
never logically conflict with the belief in purpose. 
The former tells us how an effect has come about, and 
leaves us as free as ever to believe that there was pur- 
pose in the doing. This is self-evident in our human 
activities. The two points of view just discriminated 
are never confounded in the human sphere. Human 
inventions exist only as the design is realized in some 
physical combination which by its essential laws pro- 
duces the designed effect. In the working of an 
engine, design does not appear at all in the causal 
series, but only natin'al laws and the properties of the 
component parts. In a compensating pendulum the 
end is reached through the expansion and contraction 
of different metals, which are so arranged as to keep 
the pendulum at a constant length. Design is di- 
rectly responsible only for the combination ; but it 
nowhere appears among the working factors of the 
combination. In the order of causation everything is 
effect or product ; in the order of conception that 
which in the causal series appears as product pre- 
existed as the idea according to which the causal 
series was predetermined. 

In our human teleology, then, efficient and final 
causes are so far from being mutually exclusive that 
final causes imply efficient causes for their realization. 
And in cosmic teleology, if efficient causes were com- 
missioned to realize design, or, rather, if an ideal con- 
ception were impressed upon a system of efficient 



THE ARGUMENT FROM TELEOLOGY 81 

causes, so that the latter should work in accordance 
with the former, and realize the former, we should 
expect to see the products resulting with necessity 
from the nature of the agents at work. In that case 
we should have mechanism itself working as the serv- 
ant of purpose, and in forms prescribed by purpose. 
If metaphysics suggests that there are no mechanical 
efficient causes, we reach the same result by remark- 
ing that the order of production is distinct from the 
teleological interpretation of the thing produced, and 
that the two are so far from incompatible that the 
latter presupposes the former. We might, then, 
allow that " the whole course of Nature, considered 
as a succession of phenomena, is conditioned solely by 
antecedent causes " without in any way affecting the 
teleological conclusion. No one will find any diffi- 
culty in recognizing the double aspect of the facts, 
except those who have taken the crude metaphysics 
of mechanical thought for granted and have naively 
transformed the assumed mechanism into an eternal 
and seK-sufficient necessity. But this is less a logical 
than a pathological procedure. 

5. The teleological argument has often been con- 
ducted in a piecemeal way. This, that, and the other 
thing have been specially designed. The effect of 
this is to present design as a sporadic thing limited 
to small and unimportant matters. Conducted in 
this way, the argument can hardly fail to scandalize 
any one who wishes to look at the world as a whole, 
and who must therefore find intelligence everywhere 
or nowhere. The very words, design and contrivance, 
easily lend themselves to petty and unworthy inter- 
pretation ; and when they are pilloried in quotation 



82 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

marks they seem especially contemptible. But this 
also is no essential part of the argument, but only an 
accident of exposition, or of mental limitation, or a 
device of polemics. The essential thing is the for- 
ward look, the cooperant toil, whether seen in special 
organic details, or the whole biological system, or the 
great cosmic movement itself. 

Where these points are duly regarded, the argument 
from teleology or design is seen to be by no means the 
weak thing it is often proclaimed to be. And yet, 
historically, the study of efficient causes, or of the 
order of production in space and time, has often tended 
to weaken the belief in purj)ose or final causes. This 
fact has many grounds : anthropomorphic interpreta- 
tions of design, unclear notions of what mechanism 
can do, crude metaphysics concerning nature, and 
logical confusion in general. A few specifications 
will be in place : — 

The design argument has been supposed to teach 
an external making, and not an immanent guiding. 
Human designs are external to the material on which 
they are impressed ; but this externality is in no way 
essential to the design. If the human maker, instead 
of adapting his plan to given material, could create 
his material outright and impress his plan upon its 
very being, the design would be quite as real and 
quite as apparent as it is now. The essential thing, 
as just said, is the forward look, the " toil cooperant 
to an end " ; and this is quite independent of the ques- 
tion of immanent or external design. 

Under the influence of this anthropomorphic fancy, 
the design argument has been much belabored. It 
has been called the carpenter theory — a phrase which. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM TELEOLOGY 83 

while missing the true nature of the argument, does 
most happily reveal the wooden character of the cri1> 
icism. But the argument itself is quite compatible 
with immanent design, with design legislated into the 
constitution of things, so that in their fixed order of 
unfolding they shall realize a predetermined plan or 
purpose. When this fact is borne in mind one can 
listen without dismay, though not without weariness, 
to reflections on the carpenter theory. Of course 
such reflections are entirely in place when design is 
conceived in a carpenter fashion, or when some 
anthropomorphic accident is made the essence of the 
doctrine. But triumph over such superficiality or 
misunderstanding has no attraction for persons in 
earnest. They know, as Mr. Mill has said, that no 
doctrine is overthrown until it is overthrown in its 
best form. 

A similar anthropomorphic difficulty is found in 
our doubt respecting purpose when it is slowly real- 
ized. The forward look of purposive activity is es- 
pecially revealed in the convergence of various factors 
toward an end; and when the convergence is slow 
and the mental range is limited, the end is apt to be 
missed. In our human activities as soon as the pur- 
poses become at all complex or take on the character 
of plans, the aim can be discerned only from a com- 
prehensive survey of the whole. To one standing in 
the midst of the work, and especially in its chaotic 
beginnings, or to one studying the details singly and 
not in their relations, the end may easily be missed 
altogether. From the nature of the case we must be 
largely in this position with regard to the purpose in 
nature. Our own brevity makes it hard to believe in 



84 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

purpose when it is slowly realized, as we fail in such 
cases to get any vivid impression of movement con- 
verging toward an end. The distress which many 
theists have felt at the doctrine of the slow develop- 
ment of cosmic forms is mainly due to this fact. In 
the same way, and with the same logic, an ephemeron 
would miss, and might deny, the purpose in the mass 
of human activity, because its range of knowledge 
and rate of temporal change would not enable it to get 
any vivid impression of movement toward an end. 
Against this anthropomorphism we must be on our 
guard. Time and temporal rate have naught to do 
with the pure intellectual relation of finality ; but if 
we do bring them into connection, the purpose which 
moves steadily across ages toward its realization is 
more impressive than the purpose of a day. So much 
for anthropomorphic confusion. 

The result of the error about external design is a 
second, namely, the fancy that whatever can be ex- 
plained by physical laws and agents is thereby res- 
cued from the control of mind. Not even Kant is 
free from this confusion. In the " Critique of the 
Judgment*' he suggests that the notion of purpose 
may have only a regulative value ; and that possibly 
everything may have a mechanical explanation. Here 
he falls into the confusion of making design an 
efficient cause among causes, and seems to think that 
we must not know how effects are produced if we 
are to believe them intended. Many have openly 
espoused this notion. The discovery that the stomach 
does not digest itself, because its walls secrete a var- 
nish impervious to the gastric fluid, would be held to 
remove all wonder from the fact. Purpose is not 



THi ARGUMENT FROM TELEOLOGY 85 

supposed to be purpose when it works through an 
order of traceable law. 

This fancy, which recognizes purpose only where 
causation cannot be traced, had great influence in the 
revival of atheism in the generation just passed. 
Wherever natural laws could be traced, purpose was 
ruled out. This view first assumes that design is a 
cause, and then attributes to the elements and laws 
of nature a metaphysical self-sufficiency which excludes 
purpose. Both assumption and attribution are errors. 
As we have already seen, design is no factor in the 
productive series, but rather its predetermining 
norm. It cannot be sensuously presented in space 
and time, but must be intellectually perceived. And 
we have further seen in the previous chapter that 
the system of impersonal things represents no self- 
sufficient existence, but only the way in which 
the world-ground proceeds. Whether there be any 
purpose in the proceeding can be known only by 
studying the outcome. And if such study reveals a 
forward look in the cosmic processes, it is pure irrele- 
vance, to say the least, to object in the name of spa- 
tial and temporal laws. We must not expect to find 
purpose doing anything, but we may find things done 
according to purpose. 

The chief ground for distinguishing between the 
system of law and specific design lies in what appears 
as the contrivances of nature. Here we have combi- 
nations of laws for the production of effects, which 
the laws taken singly do not involve. In organic 
forms, especially, we have a union of natural processes 
which, taken singly, would destroy the organism, but 
which together work for the maintenance of the 

THEISM — 7 



86 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

whole. This class of facts has led many to think of 
design as something interjected into, or superinduced 
upon, a system essentially unrelated to it. But this 
fancy is reached by unlawful abstraction. It is in- 
deed conceivable that there should be a system in 
which the elementary physical and chemical processes 
should go on without any purpose-like products ; but 
in the actual system they are not thus resultless. 
When, then, we make the law into an abstract rule 
and separate it from its actual working and product, 
we merely analyze the complex reality into several 
factors for the convenience of our understanding; 
we need not regard them as in any way representing 
the constituent factors from which the reality was 
produced. But this question goes too deeply into 
the question of the formal and the objective signifi- 
cation of logical method to be discussed to advantage 
here. 

These are specimens of the misunderstandings 
which underlie the current distrust of the design 
argument. But there is danger of losing sight of 
the argument itself through occupation with these 
detailed objections. It is well to return to the argu- 
ment again for a new departure. 

The positive argument for design begins by show- 
ing that many processes in nature are determined by 
ends. The aim of the eye is vision, that of the ear 
is hearing, that of the lungs is the oxygenation of the 
blood, that of the manifold generative mechanisms is 
the reproduction of life. In all of these cases there 
is concurrence of many factors in a common result ; 
and this result, toward which they all tend, is viewed 
as the final cause of their concurrence. Here, then. 



4 THE ARGUMENT FROM TELEOLOGY 87 

is action for an end. But an end, as such, cannot act 
except as a conception in the consciousness of some 
agent which wills that end. The end, as result, is 
effect, not cause. Hence activity for ends demands a 
preconceiving intelligence as its necessary implication 
or condition. * 

This argument is valid. There is first an inductive 
inquiry whether there be activity for ends in nature, and 
then the speculative question how such finality is to be 
explained, is answered by referring it to intelligence. 

There is no need to adduce instances of apparent 
finality. They may be found in endless profusion in 
the. various works on the subject. Besides, all admit 
that in the organic realm the world-ground proceeds 
as if it had plans and purposes. It is well known 
that the language of biology is prevailingly teleo- 
logical, even when the speculator denies teleology. 
Thus nature, when driven out with a fork, ever comes 
running back. The great mass of activities within 
the organism are teleological. The great mass of the 
activities of living individuals in their interaction 
with one another and with the environment, are like- 
wise teleological. There is no possibility of under- 
standing them, or even of describing them, without 
resorting to teleology. Thus, as atheists, we have to 
avail ourselves of the language of fiction in order to 
express the truth. We condense a single passage 
from M. Janet's classical work on " Final Causes " in 
illustration of finality in natural processes in the 
building of the organism : — 

" In the mystery and night of incubation or gesta- 
tion by the collaboration of an incredible number of 
causes, a living machine is formed which is absolutely 



88 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

separated from the outer world, yet accords with it, 
and of which all the parts respond to some physical 
conditions of that outer world. The outer world and 
the inner laboratory of the living being are separated 
from each other by impenetrable veils, and neverthe- 
less they are united by an incredible harmony. With- 
out is light, within, an optical machine adapted to 
it. Without is sound, within, an acoustic mechanism. 
Without is food, within are organs of assimilation. 
Without are earth, air, and water, within are motor 
organs adapted to them. Imagine a blind workman, 
confined in a cellar, who simply by moving his limbs 
should be found to have forged a key adapted to the 
most complex lock. That is what nature does in 
making the living being." 

Without some demurrer of extraordinary force, the 
conclusion is irresistible that here is activity which 
looks toward the future, which foresees and prepares, 
and which therefore must be viewed as intelligent. 
Of course the standing answer to this argument is 
that the apparent aims are not real ones -, that they 
result from their antecedents by necessity, and were 
never intended. Eyes were not made for seeing ; but 
we have eyes, and see in consequence. The propa- 
gation of life was never purposed; but reproductive 
processes and mechanisms exist, and life is prop- 
agated. This view, in this naked form, has always 
scandalized the unsophisticated mind as a pettifogg- 
ing affront to good sense. But when it is variously 
disguised by bad metaphysics and confused logic, it 
sometimes becomes acceptable. 

The theistic conclusion is disputed on the following 
groimds : — 



.^ 



MECHANICAL EXPLANATION 89 

1. The mechanism of nature explains the fact, and 
we need not go behind it. 

2. The fact that the world-ground works as if it 
had plans does not prove that it has them. 

3. There is no analogy between human activity 
and cosmic activity. We know that purpose rules in 
himian action, but we have no experience of world- 
making, and can conclude nothing concerning cosmic 
action. The distance is too great, and knowledge is 
too scant to allow any inference. 

All atheistic objections fall under some one of these 
heads. We consider them in their order. 



Mechanical Explanation 

On this point we observe that the mechanism of 
nature is here assumed as an ontological fact about 
which there can be no question. There is no sus- 
picion that this mechanical ontology is open to the 
very gravest doubt ; and equally no suspicion that in 
any case this mechanism is no self-running system, 
but only the phenomenal product of an energy not its 
own. But we postpone these considerations for the 
present and point out that mechanism, and systems 
of necessity in general, can never explain teleological 
problems. These can find a real explanation only in 
a self -directing intelligence. All other explanations 
are either tautologies, or they implicitly abandon the 
problem. We have already pointed out that the gen- 
eral laws of the system explain no specific effect. 
Like the laws of motion, they apply to all cases, but 
account for none. The specific effect is always due 
to the peculiar circumstances under which the laws 



90 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

work. Hence, in order to explain the effect, we jnust 
account for not only the general laws, but also the 
special circumstances which form the arbitrary con- 
stants of the equation. But these cannot be explained 
by any and every antecedent, but only by such as contain 
implicitly the effect. In that case we do not explain 
the peculiar nature of the effect, but only remove it 
one step further back. By the law of the sufficient 
reason, when we pass from effects to causes, we have 
to attribute them, not to any and every cause, but to 
causes that implicitly contain all the mystery and 
peculiarity of the effects. Thus the problem ever pre- 
cedes us. We refer a to -a, and -a is referred to -2a, 
and so on to -7ia. If -na is given, then in the course 
of time a will appear ; but at the farthest point, -^a^ 
we have a implicitly and necessarily given. In such 
a system we reach no resting-place and no true ex- 
planation. A given fact, a, is because -a was ; and 
-a was because -2a went before ; and so on in endless 
regress. But as all later orders and collocations were 
implicit in -na, it follows that we deduce the present 
fact, a, from its antecedents by constructing our 
thought of those antecedents so as to contain the 
fact to be deduced. Of course it does not follow that 
a was given as a, but only in those antecedents which 
must lead to it ; so that whoever could have read the 
system at any point in the past would have seen a as 
a necessary implication. In a system of necessity 
there can be no new departures, no interjection of 
new features, but only an unfolding of the necessary 
implications. If we make a cross-section of such a 
system at any point, we find everything given either 
actually or potentially, and when an apparently new 



MECHANICAL EXPLANATION 91 

fact appears, it is not something chanced upon, but 
something that always must have been. Arrivals 
and non-arrivals, survivals and non-survivals, uni- 
formities and new departures, heredities and varia- 
tions — all are determined from everlasting. In such 
a scheme we do not come to the thought of a begin- 
ning, but of a self-centered system, or world-order, 
which rolls on forever, infolding and unfolding all. 
This view might involve us in sundry very grave 
metaphysical difficulties, but we pass them over. 
The point to be noticed here is that it does not 
solve, but only postpones, the teleological problem. 
If the facts themselves call for explanation, just as 
much do these hypothetical grounds demand it, for 
we have simply carried the facts in principle into 
them. But we conceal the fact from ourselves by 
casting the shadow of necessity over the whole, and 
this stifles further inquiry. Reference has already 
been made to the grotesque inversion of reason which 
finds in the rational order a ground for denying a 
basal reason ; the same thing meets us here. We con- 
struct our thought of the cosmic mechanism by an 
inverted teleology. The mechanism is simply tele- 
ology read backward. But the notion of necessity 
so blinds us that the cosmic mechanism, which is but 
an incarnation of all cosmic products, is made the 
ground for denying purpose therein. 

This utter barrenness attaches to every system of 
explanation of a mechanical or necessary character, 
and can never be escaped. In all inference from the 
present to the past we are bound to find the present 
in the past, or we cannot infer it. If we could exhaus- 
tively think the past without finding the future in it, 



92 THE WOKLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

the future would be groundless and would not be ex- 
plained by the past. But if we find the future in the 
past, the past that explains the future is one that 
contains the future ; and there is no logical progress or 
insight. Likewise in all inference from effect to cause, 
we must determine the thought of the cause by the 
effect ; and we can infer neither more nor less than 
the cause of just that effect. If we infer more, we are 
guilty of illicit process ; if we infer less, the effect is 
unprovided for. The A which explains B must be 
so related to B that the exhaustive thought of A con- 
tains B. The explanation consists in conceiving events 
as potential in their causes ; and the deduction con- 
sists in conceiving these potentials as passing into 
realization. As we go backward, we potentialize the 
actual ; as we come forward, we actualize the potential. 
Of the inner nature of the process we have not the 
slightest conception or experience ; we have only 
words for counters. In a necessary system we can 
never escape this barren verbalism. 

This is the hopeless deadlock of all mechanical 
thinking. The necessary logical equivalence of cause 
and effect in such a scheme makes escape impossible. 
If we begin with the simple, we never reach the com- 
plex ; if we begin with the complex, we never reach 
the simple. Necessity contains no principle of progress 
or differentiation. Indeed, simple necessity is alto- 
gether motionless, unless we surreptitiously intro- 
duce change into it ; and then the notion breaks 
up into a plurality of necessities whose inner rela- 
tions are inscrutable. But not to press this point, it 
is plain that necessity, if it exist, can only unfold its 
eternal implications; it can reach nothing new, nor 



MECHANICAL EXPLANATION 93 

make any new departure. If anything apparently 
new is reached, it has always been implied in the sys- 
tem. If any differentiation manifests itself, it has 
always been implicit. The present grows out of the 
past only on condition of being in the past. The 
high emerges from the low only as it is implicit in 
the low. The homogeneous that is to develop into the 
heterogeneous must itself be implicitly heterogeneous 
from the start. The heterogeneity that appears in 
the development is nothing essentially new, but has 
always been at least potential. 

In such thinking of course there is no progress, 
even if its fundamental conceptions were not other- 
wise obnoxious to criticism — which is far from being 
the case. 

But our eyes are holden in this matter because of 
certain easy oversights. The leading one is the mis- 
taking of verbal simplifications for simplifications of 
things. The complexity, plurality, and differences of 
things disappear in the simplicity and identity of the 
class term ; and then we fancy that the things them- 
selves have been simplified and unified. In this way 
we reach the abstractions of matter and force, from 
which all the peculiarities and differences of material 
things and their energies have disappeared. This 
gives us a species of unity and simplicity of concep- 
tion which is forthwith mistaken for a unity and sim- 
plicity of real existence. By this purely verbal 
process the last terms of logical abstraction are 
mistaken for the first and essential forms of real 
existence ; and the problem receives a fictitious sim- 
plification. Of course there are no such things as 
matter and force, simple and homogeneous, but if 



94 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

there be any ontological reality in the case, the fact 
is an enormous multitude of individuals, each with its 
peculiar powers, laws, and relations, and each such 
and so related to every other that it must do its part 
in the tremendous whole. But the problem being 
fictitiously simplified through this fallacy of classifi- 
cation, we miss its wonder altogether. As the basal 
conceptions, matter and force, have no contents be- 
yond bare being and causality, there is nothing about 
them to start questions or awaken surprise. Indeed, 
they seem well fitted to get on by themselves ; and 
when we duly reflect on the indestructibility of mat- 
ter and energy, it becomes doubtful if they have not 
always got on by themselves. And as all physical 
facts, at least, are only specifications of matter and 
force, it is easy to mistake this logical subordination 
for ontological implication. 

The illusion is finally completed by our failure to 
recognize the shorthand character of language in gen- 
eral. We think in symbols, and fill out the thought 
only so far as may be necessary. Hence the causes 
to which we refer effects are thought only in a vague 
way, and thus we overlook the fact that in concrete and 
complete thinking, in distinction from shorthand and 
symbolic thinking, we can never escape from complex- 
ity into simplicity, or pass from simplicity into com- 
plexity, or reduce our problem to lower terms by 
logical manipulation, so long as we remain on 
the mechanical and necessary plane. The peren- 
nial attempts to deduce the world from some origi- 
nal state of simplicity and insignificance all rest at 
bottom on these oversights. The indefinite, inco- 
herent, undifferentiated homogeneity, matter or what 



MECHANICAL EXPLANATION 95 

not, with which they begin, is a product of logical 
confusion. 

Yet under the influence of this confusion, we even 
claim to illustrate the process. We trace the outlines 
of our system to some state of apparent homogeneity, 
say a nebula ; and then conclude that any vague and 
formless matter must develop into fixed and definite 
purpose-like products. In our regress we forget the 
definite outcome, and thus we seem to reach the 
indefinite and meaningless. Then in our progress we 
remember the definite outcome again, and this passes 
for a deduction. Hence the nebular theory and that 
of natural selection have been often adduced as show- 
ing how, by a kind of mechanical necessity in a sys- 
tem of trial and rejection, purpose must result from 
non-purposive action. But here we fail entirely to be 
true to the principle of the sufficient reason, and mis- 
take indefiniteness for the senses for indefiniteness 
for the reason. Those homogeneities which looked 
all alike were very far from being all alike. The 
whole system of difference was implicit in them. 
And those vague and formless conditions were such 
only to sense and imagination. For the understanding 
the reign of law was as universal and exact then as 
at any later date. But atheistic thought has always 
been in curious oscillation between chance and neces- 
sity at this point. At times everything is absolutely 
determined ; but when the design question is up, an 
element of indeterminateness appears. Some chaos, 
which contained nothing worth mentioning, or some 
raw beginnings of existence, which were so low as to 
make no demand for an intelligent cause, begin to 
shuffle into the argument. Being so abject, it excites 



96 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

no question or surprise. Being indeterminate, it 
does not seem to beg the question against teleology 
by implicitly assuming the problem ; and then, by a 
wave of the magic wand of necessity, together with 
a happy forgetfulness of the laws of mental procedure, 
the nothing is transformed into an all-explaining 
something. We find the same confusion underlying 
the argument from the " conditions of existence," and 
the earlier fancy that, as in infinite time all possible 
combinations must be exhausted, the actual order 
must be hit upon. The superficial character of 
these notions need not be dwelt upon, as the very 
nature of scientific method has rendered them obso- 
lete. They must be looked upon as survivals of a 
period when thought was groping blindly without any 
knowledge of its own aims and methods. In a nec- 
essary system there is no possible beyond the actual 
and its necessary implications. All else is the im- 
possible. There never was, then, a period of indefi- 
niteness out of which the present order emerged by a 
happy chance. Notions of this sort are finally and 
forever excluded by the exact determinism on which 
mechanical reasoning is based. As soon as we say 
mechanism, our original data imply all that can ever 
be. Time, however long, and natural selection and 
the survival of the fittest, can produce nothing which 
was not already fully predetermined in the earliest 
arrangement of things. 

These illusive simplifications of language and sym- 
bolic thinking are perpetually thrusting themselves be- 
tween us and the problem, veiling at once the unman- 
ageable complexity of the concrete problem and the 
verbal and empty nature of our explanation. We 



MECHANICAL EXPLANATION 97 

refer things to matter and force in a general way, 
without troubling ourselves to think out the problem 
in its concrete nature. But if we should think the 
matter through, we should see not only the tautolo- 
gous and unprogressive character of our theorizing, 
but also that we are using terms for which there are 
no corresponding conceptions. When we think con- 
cretely, matter and force, if anything more than logi- 
cal counters, become only formal concepts, of which 
the reality is the multitudinous elements and their mul- 
titudinous activities, comprehended in an order of infi- 
nite complexity of relations. And these elements, 
without knowing anything of themselves or of one 
another or of any laws, must each incessantly respond 
to changes in every other in accordance with a com- 
plicated system of physical, chemical, structural, and 
organic laws, so as to produce and maintain the 
orderly system of things with all its wonderful variety 
and essential harmony. Now in addition to the 
strictly tautologous character of this performance, we 
have absolutely no means of representing to ourselves 
the mechanical possibility of all this ; and when we 
attempt it, we merely amuse or confuse ourselves with 
words and abstractions. 

This is shown as follows : In our mechanical system, 
considered as dynamic, we have two factors, — the 
system of spatial changes and combinations, and the 
dynamic system which causes them. The former ex- 
plains nothing ; it is rather the problem itself. The 
latter defies all representation and all concrete con- 
ception. If the elements are to combine organically, 
they must be the seat of organic forces with all the 
complexity of their possible combinations. As soon 



98 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

as we renounce the fallacy of the universal and think 
concretely and completely, the problem is seen in its 
unmanageable complexity and insolubility. Spatial 
combination we can picture -, volitional and intellec- 
tual causality we experience ; but what that is which 
is more than the former and less than the latter, is 
past all or any finding out. We cannot see it in 
space, and we cannot find it in consciousness. But 
such a thing is a figment of abstraction and no possi- 
ble reality. We merely shuffle the abstract category 
of cause and ground, and fail to note that, while our 
thought is formally correct, it is really moving in a 
vacuum. We have the well-founded conviction that 
there must be a sufficient reason for the spatial group- 
ings and changes, and without further ado we locate 
it in the assumed elements, and leave it to find out for 
itself how to be sufficient. And all this is perfectly 
clear, because we tacitly assume that there is nothing 
in play but the elements in space ; and there is noth- 
ing mysterious about them. 

If we were planning the construction of a locomo- 
tive which should run without an engineer, yet should 
do all that a locomotive does under an engineer's con- 
trol — back up to the train, ring the bell for starting, 
whistle at crossings, put on the breaks on down 
grades, stop at scheduled stations, attend to signals, 
wait on sidings, make up for lost time - — it would not 
be a sufficient solution to say that we only need to 
make the locomotive such, that all this would follow. 
Formally, indeed, that would suffice ; but concretely 
we should have to inquire what kind of a " such" this 
would be, and whether we could form the slight- 
est notion of this mechanical such. The only such 



MECHANICAL EXPLANATION 99 

that would meet this case would be an engineer. 
And if a locomotive were found thus running without 
visible direction, it would be no answer to the sugges- 
tion of an invisible engineer to say that the " nature " 
of the locomotive explained its running in this way ; 
for we should be equally at a loss to form any concep- 
tion of this " nature." We should have a word, but 
no idea. And what is true of this "such," this 
" nature," is equally true of the dynamism of the 
physical world, so far as any positive conception is 
concerned. It is purely verbal, having a certain 
formal correctness, but empty of concrete meaning. 
It must be lifted to the plane of volitional causation, 
or dismissed altogether as fictitious. 

A reference to Kant will help to make the meaning 
clear. He claimed that the categories have no appli- 
cation beyond the field of experience, actual or possi- 
ble, and that when we apply them beyond this field 
we merely shuffle empty abstractions. In this respect 
they are like the grammatical forms of subject and 
predicate. These are the universal forms of speech, 
but of themselves they say nothing. The subject- 
matter must come from beyond them. When experi- 
ence is properly defined this claim is strictly true. 
Indeed, the meaning of the categories, as metaphysics 
shows, is revealed only in the living self-experience of 
intelligence ; and here their only concrete reality is 
found. This is especially the case with the dynamic 
category of causation. It is easy to talk about it ; 
and because the category is formally necessary it is 
easy to fancy we have some real conception in the 
case. But when we enter into ourselves, we find that 
the conception can be realized only under the voli- 






100 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

tional form in which we experience it. Apart from 
this we have only the bare form of thought without con- 
tents and without the possibihty of contents. We may 
talk as we will of the " unpicturable notions of the 
understanding," it still remains true that these notions 
which cannot be pictured in spatial forms, nor realized 
in self-experience, are simply illusory phantoms and 
not proper notions at all. Cause and ground we must 
have, but metaphysics shows that only active intelli- 
gence can be a real cause or ground. The whole sys- 
tem of physical dynamics, except as a set of formal 
mathematical relations, is empty of any positive con- 
tent, and is pure illusion. As a consequence of this 
commonly unsuspected fact, we find physical specu- 
lators oscillating between the formal mathematical 
conception, and the abandonment of the whole sub- 
ject of physical causation as unknowable. 

In addition to these logical oversights in atheistic 
reasoning, we have the metaphysical assumption 
referred to in speaking of the argument from order. 
It is tacitly assumed that we directly and undeniably 
know the proximate causes of phenomena, and know 
them to be material and unintelligent. It is further 
assumed that, for the present at least, these causes^*, 
run of themselves, and possibly always have done so. 
Hence as we know the proximate causes, and find 
them daily explaining more and more, when we come 
to any new manifestation, instead of going outside of 
them for a cause apart, we need only enlarge our 
notion of these causes themselves. Be it far from us 
to tell what matter can or cannot do. How can we 
learn what it can do except by observing what it does ? 



MECHANICAL EXPLANATION 101 

The illusion here is double. We assume, first, that 
we know causes in immediate perception, and, sec- 
ondly, that their nature is at once mysterious and 
known. Mysterious, because we are going to de- 
termine it by studying what they do; and known, 
because the term " matter " carries with it certain im- 
plications which exclude intelligence. Thus, in great' 
humility and self-renunciation, and with an air of 
extreme logical rigor, we build up a scheme of thought 
around a materialistic core, and fail to notice the trans- 
parent trick we are playing upon ourselves. 

This assumption that the causes of phenomena are 
immediately given we have seen to be false. Causes 
are not seen. Their nature is a matter of specula- 
tive inference. Again, we have seen that even if we 
should find the proximate cause in material elements, 
we cannot regard them as independent, but must 
view them as dependent for all their laws and prop- 
erties on an absolute world-ground. We cannot rest, 
then, in a system of things interacting according to 
mechanical laws, but must go behind the system to 
something which acts through it. The mechanical 
system is not ultimate and self-sufiicient. It repre- 
sents only the way in which the world-ground acts 
or determines things to act. If we ask why it thus 
acts, either we must regard it as a self-directing in- 
tellect, and find the reason in purpose ; or we must 
affirm some opaque necessity in the world-ground 
itself, and say, It does what it does because it must. 
Of course we do not find the necessity when we look 
for it, but for all that we may assume it. And the 
assumed necessity will of course be adequate, because 
it is the necessity of the facts themselves. We de- 

THEISM — 8 



102 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

duce nothing from necessity, but we call the facts 
necessary ; and then all is clear. 

Thus we have illustrated at length and somewhat 
repetitiously the barrenness and tautology of all me- 
chanical explanation of teleological problems. If one 
should say, given a multitude of elements of various 
powers and in complex relations, and in general such 
that they imply to the minutest detail all they will 
ever do, we can then explain whatever they do, no 
one would think it a very edifying or progressive 
performance. Similarly, it would not help to much 
insight to explain the order of the world by assuming 
an impersonal being of such a sort that by the inner 
necessity of its being, of which necessity, moreover, 
we could not form the slightest conception, it must 
do what it does. Yet this is the exact nature of all 
mechanical explanation which does not appeal to 
mind. The explanation consists in forming a 
mechanism to fit the effects, and then drawing out 
what we put in. But when the complexity is hidden 
by the simplicity of our terms, and the implicit 
implications of our first principles are overlooked 
through the deceit of the universal, and the vacuous 
nature of the whole performance is concealed by our 
uncritical dogmatism, then we advance with the ut- 
most ease from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity 
to any desirable definite, coherent heterogeneity ac- 
cording to the familiar formula, — itself a nest of con- 
tradictions. 

It has long been apparent to- the critical reader 
that, for the explanation of teleological problems, the 
alternative is intelligence or nothing ; and he might 
well have a feeling of impatience at a proposition to 



EVOLUTION 103 

show that the current doctrine of evolution has not 
in the least affected this conclusion. Nevertheless, 
while this is true in logic, it is not the case in popu- 
lar thought ; and a paragraph may be devoted to this 
matter. Here as elsewhere confusion has been the 
source of error. 

Evolution 

It is not surprising that evolution for a time dis- 
turbed theistic faith. Uncritical minds tend to con- 
fuse a doctrine with a particular mode of conceiving 
it; and when a new conception is found necessary, 
they think the doctrine itself gone. Time and further 
reflection are needed to disengage the essential doc- 
trine from the traditional conception, to see that a 
new conception may better express the doctrine than 
the old one, and to adjust oneself to the new way of 
thinking. All of this found illustration in the case of 
evolution. It necessitated a new conception of the way 
in which purpose is realized, and this seemed to be a 
denial of purpose. Again, as it indefinitely lengthened 
the time of natural processes, it seemed to many to can- 
cel the traditional proofs of purpose altogether : for, 
as we have already said, the inductive proofs of pur- 
pose consist largely in the convergence of many 
activities and agencies to a common end ; and when 
this convergence is slow and complex, we often fail 
to get any clear impression of purpose. But this is a 
result of the brevity of life and our short mental range. 
In fact, a purpose moving faithfully and steadily across 
ages is far more impressive than one which is realized 
in a day ; but uncritical thought only slowly appre- 



104 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

ciates this fact, and hence much mental uncertainty 
and distress arose. In addition, the doctrine of evolu- 
tion, as popularly understood, involved a deal of bad 
logic and metaphysics, and was often viewed by friend 
and foe alike as a new form of materialism and atheism. 
Fortunately the progress of reflective thought has 
changed all this, and has taken the doctrine out of 
the region of hysteria and misunderstanding. First 
of all, it is seen that evolution as a cosmic formula may 
have two distinct meanings. It may be a description 
of the genesis and history of the facts to which it is 
applied, and it may be such a description, plus a 
theory of their causes. In other words, it may be a 
description of the order of phenomenal origin and 
development, and it may be a theory of the meta- 
physical causes that underlie that development. 
The former is evolution in a scientific sense; the 
latter is a metaphysical doctrine. In the scientific 
sense evolution is neither a controlling law nor a 
producing cause, but simply a description of a phe- 
nomenal order, a statement of what, granting the 
theory, an observer might have seen if he had been able 
to inspect the cosmic movement from its simplest stages 
until now. It is a statement of method, and is silent 
about causation. And it is plain that there might be 
entire unanimity concerning evolution in this sense 
along with utter disharmony in its metaphysical 
interpretation. In such cases we have, at bottom, not 
a scientific difference but a battle of philosophies. 
The theorists agree on the facts, but interpret them by 
different schemes of metaphysics. This is the reason 
why some thinkers find in evolution a veritable aid 
to faith, while others see in it nothing but atheism. 



EVOLUTION 105 

In cruder thought the chief source of confusion in 
this matter was the fallacy of the universal. This 
led to all those fanciful reductions of the complex to 
the simple and evolutions of the simple into the com- 
plex, which are so large a part of evolution literature. 
In the biological realm the fallacy wrought much 
picturesque confusion. Here attention was fixed on 
species altogether ; and as these were said to be trans- 
formed, there arose the fancy that earlier and lower 
species produced the later and higher ones. But 
because the higher were produced by the lower, they 
were really not higher after all, but were essentially 
identical with the lower. Hence though man came 
from the monkey by virtue of transformation or 
evolution, he was really a species of monkey because 
of his simian origin. 

In all this the verbal illusion is manifest. In 
reality a species is only a group of more or less simi- 
lar individuals, and is nothing apart from them. 
The transformation of a species could only mean the 
production of dissimilar individuals along lines of 
genetic descent, thus forming a new group. The sole 
and simple fact in such a case would be that the 
power which produces individuals produces them in 
such a way that they may be arranged on an ascend- 
ing scale of growing complexity and heterogeneity. 
But there would be nothing in such a fact to identify 
individuals, or higher and lower forms; it would 
rather suggest the relativity of our systems of classifi- 
cation. Apart from our logical manipulation, the 
fact is the individuals and the power which produces 
them, through the processes of generation, in such a 
way that they admit of being classed according to an 



106 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

ascending scale. All else is the shadow of our own 
minds. Metaphysics locates the producing power in the 
world-ground itself ; and epistemology shows that our 
classifications produce nothing. They make no identi- 
ties and abolish no differences. To keep this steadily 
in view would reduce the doctrine in question to a subor- 
dinate significance, and would deprive it entirely of those 
fearful implications which it has for popular thought. 
The polemic against " special creation," which one 
often meets in this discussion, and which has become 
a standing feature of the debate, has its main root in 
the same fallacy of the universal. All concrete ex- 
istence is, and must be, special ; and all creation of the 
concrete must be as special as the product. Special 
facts can be produced only by correspondingly special 
acts. We may gather them up in a single class, but 
they remain separate and distinct as ever. This is 
the necessary antithesis of the individual and the uni- 
versal. But by overlooking it, vast confusion has 
been wrought and much barren polemic occasioned. 
The only thing which clear thought abhors is illogical 
chaos, things unrelated, or produced at random and 
without subordination to any plan for the whole. 
Only in the sense of the unrelated and unassim liable 
is thought opposed to " special creation." But when 
it comes to realizing the general plan in a multitude 
of concrete individuals, coexistent or successive, the 
work is possible only through a multitude of acts, 
each as specific and special as its product. In this 
sense all individuals are special creations. A little 
knowledge of the debate between nominalism and 
realism would have reduced the evolution discussion 
to very moderate dimensions. 



EVOLUTION 107 

In further illustration of this aspect of the subject, 
consider the production of a piece of music, say a 
S3mQphony. The later parts are neither made out of 
the earlier parts nor produced by them; but both 
earlier and later parts are subject to a common musi- 
cal conception and law, and root in a causality beyond 
themselves. If now we should ask respecting any 
particular note whether it be a special creation or not, 
the answer must be both yes and no, according to the 
standpoint. It is not a special creation in the sense 
of being unrelated and lawless, for each note is sub- 
ject to the plan of the whole. It is a special creation 
in the sense that, without a purpose and activity in- 
cluding the special note, it would not exist. Again, 
in such a production, nothing would be evolved out of 
anything, but a musical conception would be succes- 
sively realized. The antecedent notes would not 
imply the later as their dynamic resultants, but both 
antecedents and consequents would be produced by 
the composer and player in accordance with the idea. 
The continuity of the performance would be only in 
the idea and the will and purpose of the performer. 
The same conclusions hold for any conception of the 
universe as phenomenal. In that case its evolution is 
but the successive manifestation of the causality be- 
yond the series ; and the phases of the evolution have 
no dynamic connection among themselves, any more 
than the successive musical notes. Each, however, is, 
or is not, a special creation, according to the stand- 
point. As subject to the law of the whole, it is not 
special. As a specific and concrete fact, it is special. 
In the phenomenal system, nothing is really evolved, 
but an idea is successively manifested by the succes- 



108 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

sive production of phenomena that have their con- 
tinuity and meaning only in the power that produces 
them. 

These considerations show how vague and uncer- 
tain popular thought is on this subject, and how am- 
biguous the alleged fact of evolution is. It was 
assumed as a matter of course that the cosmic causal- 
ity lies within the cosmic series, so that the tem- 
poral antecedent dynamically determines and produces 
the temporal consequent. This view metaphysics 
definitely sets aside. The causality of the series lies 
beyond it ; and the relations of the members are logi- 
cal and teleological, not dynamic. In that case much 
evolution argument vanishes of itself. Survivals, 
reversions, atavisms, and that sort of thing become 
only figures of speech, which are never to be literally 
taken. In a phenomenal system these things can 
literally exist as little as they can in a piece of music ; 
for in such a system only laws and ideas abide. We 
may be puzzled by them when we attempt to classify 
things to our satisfaction ; but we are not permitted 
to talk nonsense to escape being puzzled. 

But not to press these scruples, the important point 
in the evolution discussion concerns the nature of 
the individuals and the power that produces them. 
Many difficulties vanish as soon as we recall the 
nominalism of the doctrine. Questions concerning 
the limits of evolution lose all significance when we 
remember that in any case evolution does nothing 
but is only a name for a form of procedure. To make 
it more is to hypostasize words and abstractions, or 
to mistake the order of doing for the agent itself. 

Returning now to the general question, it is mani- 



EVOLUTION 109 

fest that theism has no interest in one method or 
order of production rather than another, provided 
always the facts are duly regarded. It is satisfied to 
maintain divine causality and leave experience to find 
the method of procedure. It is concerned, therefore, 
not with evolution in the scientific sense, but only 
with evolution as a theory of causality. In this 
sense evolution is simply a piece of bad metaphysics 
produced by bad logic. All that we have said about 
the barrenness of mechanism in general applies here. 
We can reach neither the one from the many nor the 
many from the one, neither the high from the low 
nor the low from the high, neither the indefinite from 
the definite nor the definite from the indefinite. If 
we seem to do so, we merely fall a prey to the fallacy 
of the universal, and mistake the simplifications of 
logical manipulation for the order of concrete fact. 
Free intelligence is the condition of any real progress ; 
and progress itseK, if it be anything more than a 
meaningless stir of the world-substance, cannot be 
defined without reference to teleology. Apart from 
free intelligence as the source of the world-movement, 
we can only talk cloudily about potentialities, without 
any possibility of concretely representing our mean- 
ing. When thought is clear, it is plain that evolution, 
while modifying our conceptions of the method and 
history of creation, leaves the argument for purpose 
in nature just where and what it always has been. 
Least of all does it make it possible to equate time, 
however long, with intelligence. The complete deter- 
mination of every thing and event in a mechanical 
system, and the necessary logical equivalence of cause 
and effect in such a system, forbid this notion forever. 



110 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

Intelligence is still the only explanation of the appar- 
ent teleology of the world. Of course that evolution 
of popular thought, religious and irreligious alike, 
according to which something, which was not much 
of anything, began to evolve through differentiation 
and integration, etc., is sheer confuvsion and illiteracy. 
It closely resembles reUance on " that blessed word 
Mesopotamia." 

The " As If " Objection 

The second general objection was, that the fact 
that the world-ground proceeds as if it had aims does 
not prove that it really has them. We have in this 
objection a relic of the ancient fancy that atheism is 
sufficiently established by disputing theism. Let us 
allow that the fact that the world-ground proceeds as 
if it had purposes does not prove that it really has 
them ; it is still clear that this fact is even farther 
from proving that it does not have them. 

To the general objection a first reply must be that 
all objective knowledge is based on an " as if." Not 
to refer to the scruples of idealism concerning the ob- 
jects of perception, the whole of objective science is 
based on a certain assumed truth of appearances. We 
do not know that there is an ether, but only that 
optical phenomena look as if there were. We do not 
know that atoms exist, but only that material phe- 
nomena look as if they did. We do not know that the 
fire rocks were ever molten, but only that they look 
as if they had been. We do not know that the sedi- 
mentary rocks were ever deposited from water, but 
only that they look so. That the present land was 



THE "AS IF" OBJECTION 111 

once under the sea is not known, but only a belief 
resting on certain appearances. But none of these 
conclusions could stand a minute if the principle of 
this objection were allowed. If the nature of things 
can produce the appearance of intelligence without 
its presence, it ought to be able to mimic igneous and 
aqueous action without the aid of either fire or water. 
If the hypothetical necessity of the system is compe- 
tent to bring organic matter into a living form, it 
could certainly produce a fossil imitation at first hand ; 
or, better, if the nature of things includes the produc- 
tion of living forms, it might also include the direct 
production of fossils. We cannot, then, conclude 
anything from fossil remains concerning the past 
history of our system ; for this would be to conclude 
from an "as if " ; and this is forbidden. If one 
should say, " Well, how did they get there, anyhow ? '* 
the answer would be that they are there because they 
must be there, and that no more can be said. If the 
questioner persisted, we should say that it is the height 
of absurdity to insist that things can be explained in 
only one way. Possibilities are infinite ; and of these 
we can conceive only one ; but it must be viewed as 
infinitely improbable that our little way of accounting 
for things is the way of the universe itself. It is, 
then, unspeakably rash to infer anything beyond what 
we see. It is curious that this argument should seem 
so profound, so judicious, so indicative of mental 
integrity when applied to theistic problems, and so 
unsatisfactory elsewhere. Without waiting to solve 
this psychological and logical puzzle, we point out 
that the theistic " as if " is as good as the scientific " as 
if." We cannot reject the one and retain the other. 



112 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

But we are not yet clear of the " as if." In general 
we know what a force is only by observing what it 
does. This is especially the case with mind, which 
is never seen in itself, but only in its effects. And 
this is true not only of the divine mind, but of the 
human mind as well. A mistake that flows directly 
from our general bondage to the senses leads us to 
fancy that we see our neighbors' minds ; and it has 
generally been argued against theism that we see 
mind in man, but none in nature. This claim the 
rudiments of psychology dispel. We know that our 
fellow-beings have minds only because they act as if 
they had ; that is, because their action shows order 
and purpose. In short, the argument for objective 
intelligence is the same whether for man, animals, or 
God. But no one will claim that the system of things 
shows less order and purpose than human action. 
If, then, we deny mind in nature because we have 
only an " as if " to reason from, we must deny it also 
in man ; for an " as if " is all we have here. And 
yet we are wonderfully ready to find objective intelli- 
gence, if only it is not referred to God. The scantiest 
marks prove the presence of intellect in man and 
brute, or in human and brute action ; but nothing 
proves intelligence back of nature. The ground of 
this queer logic must be sought in a profound study 
of the philosophy of prejudice and confusion. 

The point just dwelt upon deserves further notice. 
The belief in personal coexistence has never been 
questioned by the extremest idealists ; and we find it 
in full strength in our earliest years. To explain 
this fact some have called it an instinct, while others 
have preferred the more distinguished title of an 



THE "AS IF" OBJECTION 113 

intuition. And there are the best of reasons why 
this belief should be made an absolute certainty in 
advance of all argument, and even against it. The 
certainty of personal coexistence constitutes the chief 
condition of a moral activity ; and if it were in any 
way weakened, the most hideous results might fol- 
low. Nevertheless, the logical ground of the belief 
consists entirely in the fact that our neighbors act as 
if they were intelligent. And upon reflection one 
must confess that the activities from which we 
infer intelligence are not very striking, but rather 
such as the organism might well execute of itself. 
Human movements look intelligent only because we 
have the key in ourselves. When considered in ab- 
straction from personality they seem almost grotesque 
in their insignificance. And in all of these cases, 
even in the use of speech, if we should study the 
effect, which is always some form of ph^^sical move- 
ment, we should doubtless find a physical explana-^ 
tion. In the case of speech we should find no thought 
in the effect ; that would be an addition of our own. 
We have simply vibrating air, which can be traced 
to vibrating membranes, which in turn are set in 
motion by currents of air ; and these are forced along 
by the contraction of muscles producing a contraction 
of the thorax. If we care to pursue it further, we 
soon lose ourselves in the mystery of nervous cur- 
rents, and the subject escapes us. Nowhere in 
the series do we come in sight of a mind. We 
have, to be sure, an outcome which happens to be 
intelligible ; but the atheist has instructed us that 
intelligibility in the outcome is far enough from prov- 
ing an intelligent cause. Besides, the outcome, so 



114 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

far as we can trace it, has a purely mechanical ex- 
planation, and need be referred to no mind. It 
would be a highly suspicious circumstance and a 
grave infraction of the law of continuity to conclude 
that a series which is physical so far as we can trace 
it, becomes something else where we cannot trace it ! 
It has been customary to say that we know that 
watches are designed, but not that eyes are designed. 
This is a mistake. In the case of a watchmaker we 
do not see the workman any more than in the case 
of the eye. We see only a physical organism in com- 
plex interaction with surrounding matter, and we see 
that the work goes on as if for an end ; but we see 
nothing more. The living, thinking workman is an 
inference from an " as if." But in nature, too, the 
work goes on as if for an end ; and the " as-ifness " is 
at least as marked as in the former case. If, then, 
watches point to an unseen workman who knows 
what he is doing, nature also points to an unseen 
workman who knows what he is doing. Any doubt 
of the one must extend to the other. But if we may 
be practically sure of our neighbors' intelligence, and 
that because they act intelligently, we may be sure 
that the world-ground is intelligent for the sanie 
reason. 

But we must go a step further. The last para- 
graph showed that the same argument which dis- 
credits mind in nature throws equal doubt upon mind 
in man. And further reflection shows that if there 
be no controlling mind in nature there can be no con- 
trolling mind in man. For if the basal power is 
blind and necessary, all that depends upon it is neces- 
sitated also. In that case all unfolding is driven from 



THE "AS IF" OBJECTION 115 

behind, and nothing is led from before. Thought and 
feeling also come within this necessary unfolding. 
As such they are products, not causes. The basal 
necessity controls them in every respect, yet without 
being in any sense determined by them. Thought 
as thought counts for nothing. The line of power is 
through the mechanical antecedents that condition 
thought, and not through the thought itself. Hence 
any fancy of self-control we may have must be dis- 
missed as delusive. Human life and history, then, 
express no mind or purpose, but only the process of 
the all-embracing necessity. Thought and purpose 
may have been there as subjective states ; but they 
must be put outside of the dynamic sequence of 
events, and be made a kind of halo which, as a 
shadow, attends without affecting the cosmic move- 
ment. Indeed, so far from solving, thought rather 
complicates the problem. It offers no guidance, and 
is so much more to be accounted for. The basal 
necessity has not only to produce the physical move- 
ments and groupings which we mistakenly ascribe to 
intelligence, but it has also to produce the illusion of 
conscious thought and self-control. This extremely 
difficult and delicate task is escaped by denying the 
human mind outright ; and this is not difficult, as we 
affirm objective mind only from the conviction that 
its guidance is necessary. When this conviction is 
lacking, there is no ground for affirming objective 
thought. 

The claim, then, that we know watches are de- 
signed, but do not know that eyes are designed, 
appears to be doubly untenable. First, we have the 
same proof that eyes are designed that we have that 



116 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

watches are designed ; and second, if eyes are not 
designed, then watches are not designed. Both alike 
result from necessity, and if any thought attends the 
process, it does not affect it. 

The truth is, the design argument derives its force 
from the consciousness of our own free effort. We find 
that combinations for ends arise in our experience only 
as they first exist in conception, and are then made 
the norms of our action. And wherever we find 
combination apparently for ends, we at once supply 
the preexistent conception and the self-determination 
which experience has shown to be its invariable con- 
dition. We have already seen that in a system of 
necessity, teleological questions can never be answered ; 
it is further plain that in such a system they could 
never logically arise. Such questions imply that 
things might have been otherwise, and hence involve 
a denial of the complete determination of all exist- 
ence. When such determination is consciously af- 
firmed, to ask why anything is as it is, is like asking 
why a straight line is the shortest distance between 
two points. Spinoza is the only leading necessitarian 
who has clearly seen the opposition between necessity 
and teleology. Most necessitarians have oscillated 
between this insight and attempts at mechanical ex- 
planation which should satisfy the teleological crav- 
ing. This inconsequence would seem to show that 
the cosmic necessity itself is somewhat illogical. In 
treating of the mechanical objection we found that it 
is barren at best and leads to no insight. We now 
see that the principles of this argument when carried 
out end in skepticism and denial of the human mind 
as well as of the divine mind. 



THE "AS IF" OBJECTION 117 

This result shows once more the superficiality of 
the whole scheme of naturalistic thought on which 
atheism rests. When thought is shallow and criti- 
cism asleep, it is easy to take spatial and temporal 
phenomena as self-sufficient facts revealed by the 
senses and beyond all question. Then it is gravely 
announced that " Nature " knows nothing of mind 
and purpose, and goes its own mechanical way. It 
somewhat relieves our dismay to perceive that 
" Nature," in this sense, knows as little of man as it 
does of God — a fact which reduces the argument to 
harmlessness, except in cases where the naturalistic 
obsession has made critical thought impossible. Our 
relief is completed by the further discovery that this 
" Nature " itself is a fiction, an idol of the sense den. 

The third general objection, that the difference 
between human action and cosmic action is too great 
to allow any conclusion from one to the other, is only 
a verbal intimidation. All knowing presupposes some- 
thing universal in human intelligence, and the validity 
of the laws of our intelligence for all cosmic reality. 
But it is easy to overlook this fact and to seek to 
measure intellect by its physical attendants. Of course 
the human body and our earth itself are vanishing 
quantities compared with the great stellar masses, and 
the conclusion is drawn that the mind must abandon 
its rational nature in the face of physical vastness. 
Only passive minds will be affected by such considera- 
tions. The objection, such as it is, lies against the 
theory of knowledge, and only indirectly against 
theism. Epistemology, when it understands itself, 
must assume the validity of thought for the entire 

THEISM — 9 



118 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

universe, and theism is only an implication of this 
assmnption. Theism argues from intelligible effects 
to an intelligent cause. The rational and intelligible 
work is referred to reason and intelligence. Size has 
no bearing on the validity of this inference. Mere 
bigness in space or time has nothing in it to change 
the laws of logic. As well might we suppose that the 
laws of number are valid for small numbers but are 
overawed by large ones. The suggestion that we have 
a knowledge in objective human action which we do 
not have in cosmic action is mistaken. The further 
demurrer that while intelligibility in 'human action 
points to intelligence, intelligibility in cosmic action 
does not point to intelligence, is an act of caprice, not 
of reason. If it be further suggested that there may 
be untold transcendental possibilities, any one of which 
might produce the effects, this is only to return to the 
unreason of abandoning reason in order to revel in 
inarticulate imaginings, none of which can be con- 
structed in thought. 

As a result of all these considerations, we hold that 
the design argument, when the unity of the world- 
ground is given, proves far more conclusively the 
existence of mind in nature than it does the existence 
of mind in man. The two stand or fall together. 

Whether the purpose-like combinations and proc- 
esses of nature constitute a problem for which we 
are justified in seeking a solution, every one must 
decide for himself. We claim only that if we are 
allowed to seek a solution we can find it only in intel- 
ligence. The appeal to chance is vacated by all the 
principles of rational thinking. The explanation by 
law and mechanism is tautological. The atheistic 



THE ARGUMENT FROM FINITE INTELLIGENCE 119 

solution has no positive value whatever. It dis- 
appears into nothingness when critically examined, as 
bubbles when they are touched. The only possible 
question concerns the source of the illusion ; and this 
we have answered already. We erect matter into 
something self-sufficient. We next furnish it with 
various forces. In this way the being and causality 
of the universe are provided for. We next find a 
principle of order in the notion of law, and nothing 
more seems needed. By the help of the fallacy of 
the universal we reduce the system to very low and 
simple terms, so that we do not seem to be assuming 
the entire problem from the start ; and then, by turn- 
ing loose the terminology of evolution, we cause the 
system to evolve to order. Thus the reign of matter, 
force, and law, is set in antithesis to the reign of mind ; 
and the realm of the former is ever growing. Mind 
at best is only a provisional hypothesis to explain 
what the undoubted reality, matter and force, does not 
yet account for ; and as it daily accounts for more and 
more, mind is less and less necessary. The limit of 
this movement must be to make matter and force all 
sufficient, so that science will at last fulfill Comte's 
prediction and conduct God to the frontier and bow 
him out with thanks for his provisional services. 
This is the natural history of popular atheism. 



The Argument from Finite Intelligence 

The third inductive argument for the intelligence 
of the world-ground is based on the existence of 
finite intelligence, or, more specifically, of human 



120 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

intelligence. This forms an additional problem, and 
there is no solution except in cosmic intelligence. 

There has been a very general oversight of this 
problem by atheistic reasoners, or at least a failure 
to discern its deep significance. The speculator, in 
curious self-forgetfulness, fixes his thought on the 
physical system and forgets himself. He assumes a 
monopoly of intellect in the universe and forgets that 
this rare and lonely endowment must still have its 
roots in the universe. For man and mind are a part 
and outcome of the universe, and any explanation 
which left them out would miss one of its greatest 
wonders. The problem then arises how to deduce 
the conscious from the unconscious, the intelligent 
from the non-intelligent, the purposive from the non- 
purposive, and freedom from necessity. But psy- 
chology shows the hopelessness of such a task. There 
is absolutely no thoroughfare here except a verbal one, 
no analysis of unconscious things or processes reveals 
that, at a certain point or phase of complication, con- 
sciousness and thought must emerge. On the con- 
trary, the more clearly we conceive physical elements 
or processes, the more clearly we perceive the im- 
possibility of such a transition. This insight has led 
to the modern device of a double-faced substance. 
This view, while stopping short of afiirming an 
independent creative intelligence, does still insist 
upon intelligence as one of the original factors of the 
world-ground. Both the metaphysics and logic of 
this view are somewhat open to suspicion, but it is 
correct in concluding that there is no way from non- 
intelligence to intelligence. Only verbal transits are 
possible. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM FINITE INTELLIGENCE 121 

And this is only the beginning of the difficulty. 
If we should suppose the qualitative gulf between 
material mechanism and mentality transcended, we 
should still have to provide for knowledge and its 
complex processes. We should have to produce not 
merely mental states, but true thoughts; that is, 
thoughts which rightly reproduce the physical environ- 
ment; and then, in addition, we should have the 
problem of error on our hands. So far as atheistic 
reasoners have considered this subject at all, they 
have generally been content with affirming some 
ground for sentiency in the physical system, and 
falling back on sensationalism for the rest. But this 
is worse than a broken reed ; for epistemology shows 
that sensationalism is inadequate to the work assigned 
it, and that it destroys the physical foundations of 
atheism altogether. For the present we forbear to 
press these difficulties. 

Apart from the impassable gulf between the 
assumed cause and the alleged effect which psychology 
reveals at this point, a peculiar logical difficulty 
emerges from the necessity in a mechanical system 
of assimilating either the effects to the cause or the 
cause to the effects ; and in either case the doctrine 
is in unstable equilibrium. For if everything is to 
be mechanically explained, then human life, thought, 
and action must be phases of the all-embracing ne- 
cessity. But man can form purposes and determine 
himself accordingly. Hence it follows that in the 
department of human life, at least, the cosmic mech- 
anism does form purposes and execute them. Here 
design actually appears as real and controlling. 
Hence, by the necessity of including man, we are 



122 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

forced to admit that the cosmic mechanism is not 
incompatible with purpose. But if it act purposely 
in the human realm, there is no theoretical objection 
to admitting that it acts purposely in the physical 
realm if the facts call for it. The only escape from 
this conclusion is to deny our consciousness that pur- 
pose rules at all in our mental life. But as long as this 
is allowed, the so-called cosmic mechanism must be 
viewed as one which can form plans and determine 
itself for their execution ; that is, it must be what we 
mean by mind. The alternative, as we shall see, is 
to wreck knowledge in skepticism. 

The problem of order and the problem of teleology 
we found to be insoluble on atheistic principles. The 
problem of finite intelligence is now seen to be equally 
insoluble for atheism. 

Popular thought about theism, we have said, moves 
on the inductive plane, and with the general aim of 
explanation. That is, it aims to give some rational ac- 
count of things in which the mind can rest. Popular 
theism maintains that the facts of experience cannot be 
explained without affirming intelligence in the world- 
ground. Popular atheism, on the other hand, main- 
tains that the facts may well be explained otherwise. 
This latter claim is baseless. It rests upon verbal 
illusions and on ignorance both of logical principles 
and of the problems to be solved. When the questions 
are cleared up so as to be seen in their true nature, 
the atheistic argument vanishes into nothingness. In 
so far, then, as the discussion aims at reaching an ex- 
planation of the world, the decision must be in favor 
of theism. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM EPISTEMOLOGY 123 



The Argument from Epistemology 

The arguments previously outlined proceed on the 
basis of common-sense realism. Knowledge is taken 
for granted, and the substantial existence of a system 
of material things is assumed as a matter of course. 
There is no knowledge of the rational implications 
of epistemology, and no suspicion of the doubt which 
metaphysics throws upon the very existence of the 
things upon which atheism relies. Popular thought 
is inaccessible to considerations of this kind, and 
hence we have dealt thus far with the more familiar 
arguments. But from a logical standpoint the most 
effective theistic argument lies in this more abstract 
and speculative field. We proceed to its development. 

And first we call attention to a negative aspect of 
the question, the suicidal bearing of atheism on the 
problem of knowledge. It is to be shown that athe- 
ism and all systems of necessity destroy the trust- 
worthiness of reason, which is the presupposition of all 
speculation, and are hence self-condemned. We argue 
as follows : — 

Beliefs can be viewed in two ways : as produced by 
causes, or as deduced from grounds. That is, beliefs 
may be merely mental events due to certain psycho- 
logical antecedents, or they may be logical convic- 
tions which rest on logical grounds. The distinction 
of rational from irrational beliefs is that the former 
have grounds which justify them, while the latter are 
only effects in us, deposits of habit, prejudice, tradi- 
tion, caprice, etc. They have their sufficient psycho- 
logical causes, but have no justifjdng rational groimds. 



124 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

Now every system of necessity cancels this distinction. 
It gives us causes, but removes the grounds, of belief. 
The proof is as follows : — 

In every mechanical doctrine of mind there are no 
mental acts, but only psychological occurrences. Even 
the drawing of a conclusion is not an act of the mind, 
but an occurrence in the mind. The conclusion is 
not justified by its antecedent reasons, but is coerced 
by its psychological antecedents. If we deny the 
substantiality of mind, the conclusion is only the men- 
tal symbol of a certain state of the physical mechan- 
ism. If we allow the mind to be real, but subject to 
necessity, then the conclusion is but the resultant of 
the preceding mental states. In both cases we must 
replace the free, self-centered activity of reason by a 
physical or mental mechanism which determines all 
our ideas and their conjunctions. This determination 
takes on in consciousness the appearance of reflection, 
reasoning, concluding, etc., but these are only the 
illusive symbols in consciousness of a mechanical pro- 
cess below it. Nothing, then, depends on reason, but 
only on the physical or mental states ; and these, for 
all we know, might become anything whatever with 
the result of changing the conclusion to any other 
whatever. But this view is the extreme of skepticism. 
Beliefs sink into effects ; and one is as good as an- 
other while it lasts. The coming or going of a belief 
does not depend upon its rationality, but only on the 
relative strength of the corresponding antecedents. 
But this strength is a fact, not a truth. When a 
given element displaces another in a chemical com- 
pound, it is not truer than that other, but stronger. So 
when a psychical element displaces another in a men- 



THE ARGUMENT FROM EPISTEMOLOGY 125 

tal combination, not truth, but strength, is in ques- 
tion. On the plane of cause and effect, truth and 
error are meaningless distinctions. Proper rationality 
is possible only to freedom ; and here truth and error 
first acquire significance. The rational mind must 
not be controlled by its states, but must control 
them. It must be able to stand apart from its ideas 
and test them. It must be able to resist the influ- 
ence of habit and association, and to undo the irra- 
tional conjunctions of custom. It must also be able 
to think twice, or to reserve its conclusion until the 
inner order of reason has been reached. Unless it 
can do this, all beliefs sink into effects, and the dis- 
tinction of rational and irrational, of truth and error, 
vanishes. 

We reach the same conclusion from another stand- 
point. No system of necessity has any standard of 
distinction between truth and error. If all beliefs are 
not true, and as contradictory they cannot be, it fol- 
lows that error is a fact. But how can error be 
admitted without canceling truth? On the one 
hand, we must admit that our faculties are made for 
truth, and that we cannot by volition change truth. 
On the other, we cannot allow that we are shut up by 
necessity to error, as then our faculties would be es- 
sentially untrustworthy. This difficulty can be 
resolved only in the notion of freedom. If we have 
faculties which are truthful, but which may be care- 
lessly used or willfully misused, we can explain error 
without compromising truth ; but not otherwise. If 
truth and error be alike necessary, there is no stand- 
ard of truth left. If we make the majority the 
standard, what shall assure us that the majority is 



126 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

right? And who knows that the majority will al- 
ways hold the same views ? Opinions have changed 
in the past, why not in the futm-e? There is no 
rational standard left, and no power to use it if there 
were. We cannot determine our thoughts ; they 
come and go as the independent necessity determines. 
If there were any reason left, the only conclusion it 
could draw would be that knowledge is utterly impos- 
sible, and that its place must be swallowed up by an 
overwhelming skepticism. 

The bearing of this upon theism is plain. There 
can be no rationality, and hence no knowledge, upon 
any system of necessity. Atheism is such a system, 
and hence is suicidal. It must flout consciousness, 
discredit reason, and end by dragging the whole 
structure of thought and life down into hopeless ruin. 
Eationality demands freedom in the finite knower; 
and this, in turn, is incompatible with necessity in the 
world-ground. This freedom does not, indeed, imply 
the power on the part of the mind to coerce its 
conclusions, but only to rule itself according to pre- 
conceived standards. Pure arbitrariness and pure 
necessity are alike incompatible with reason. There 
must be a law of reason in the mind with which voli- 
tion cannot tamper ; and there must also be the power 
to determine ourselves accordingly. Neither can dis- 
pense with the other. The law of reason in us does 
not compel obedience, else error would be impossible. 
Rationality is reached only as the mind accepts the 
law and determines itself accordingly. 

Thus atheism appears as a mental outlaw. Instead 
of being, as it often fondly imagines, the last and 
highest result of reason and science, it is rather the 



THE ARGUMENT FROM EPISTEMOLOGY 127 

renunciation and destruction of both. We pass now 
to the positive side of the argument from episte- 
mology. 

In the previous chapter we pointed out that all 
study of objective reality assumes the fact of law and 
system, or a universal adjustment of each to all in a 
common scheme of order. Here we next point out 
that all study assumes that this system is an in- 
telligible or rational one. A rational cosmos is the 
implicit assumption of objective cognition. The im- 
plications of this fact we have now to unfold. 

Common sense naturally begins with the supposi- 
tion that a world of material things exists in space 
and time, and apart from any intelligence whatever. 
Before criticism has taught us to discriminate, this 
view seems so self-evident that any question of it is 
an affront to good sense, and a mark of mental frivol- 
ity. And this view, when a stage of superficial 
reflection has been reached, readily lends itself to 
atheistic inferences. In this stage of thought the 
world, or nature, is always on the point of declaring 
its independence, especially when written with an ini- 
tial capital. This extra-mental world of things 
and forces, however, turns out upon inquiry to be 
an extremely questionable hj^othesis, if not a down- 
right contradiction. 

When thought becomes critical, it appears that the 
basal certainties in knowledge are not the ontological 
existence of material and mechanical things, but 
rather the coexistence of persons, the community of 
intelligence and the system of common experience. 
And these are not given as speculative deductions, 



128 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

but as unshakable practical certainties. We cannot 
live intellectually at all without recognizing other 
persons than ourselves, and without assuming that 
the laws of intelligence are valid for all alike, and 
that all have the same general objects in experience. 
Solipsism is absurd to a pitch beyond insanity. The 
one law of intelligence for all is the supreme condi- 
tion of mutual understanding ; and the community of 
the world of experience is only less necessary for the 
mental life. These are the deepest facts and presup- 
positions, and they involve some profound mysteries ; 
but they cannot be questioned without immediate 
practical absurdity. And they never are questioned. 
The skeptic and the dogmatist, the idealist and the 
materialist, alike practically agree on these facts and 
postulates. What lies beyond them is a matter of 
speculation and no datum of experience. Thus, 
whether that system of Common experience is to be 
explained by a system of material and mechanical 
bodies in space and time is a speculative problem, and 
must be handed over to speculation for solution. 
Hence, the imdeniable certainties with which atheism 
begins must take their place among metaphysical 
hypotheses, and be tested accordingly. Reflection on 
this point will do much to remove that illusive ap- 
pearance of matter of fact which lends a certain 
plausibility to atheistic reasoning. It will also show 
the naive character of that naturalism which erects 
mathematical and mechanical abstractions into the 
supreme reality, and then in their name proceeds to 
deny all the realities of experience, allowing them, if 
at all, only as " epiphenomena " of the truly real. 
The history of speculative thought shows no more 



THE ARGUMENT FROM EPISTEMOLOGY 129 

remarkable obsession. Relief is found by observing 
that experience is first and law-giving, and that theo- 
ries which make no place for it are thereby ruled 
out. 

Again, common sense begins by taking knowledge 
as well as things for granted. In the beginnings of 
mental development knowledge is not even a problem. 
Things are there, and are reflected by the mind as 
a matter of course. Of the complex and obscure 
processes and postulates of cognition, spontaneous 
thought has no suspicion. Atheism agrees with it 
in this respect, and thus escapes some of its own most 
grievous difficulties by being unconscious of them. 
But epistemology shows that the existence of things 
is by no means the same as our knowledge of them. 
It points out that if things existed precisely as they 
appear to us, the knowledge of them could arise 
only as the mind by its own action reproduces the 
contents of things for thought. Knowledge is noth- 
ing which can be imported ready-made into a passive 
mind, but the mind must actively construct knowledge 
within itself. In conversation no ideas pass from one 
mind into another, but each mind for itself constructs 
the other's thought, and only thus apprehends and 
comprehends it. The knowledge is indeed objectively 
conditioned, and yet each mind has to construct it 
for itself. Of course such personal communion pre- 
supposes that both minds are made on a common pat- 
tern, and are subject to the same laws. Only in a 
figurative sense does either get anything from the 
other ; but each works out of itself. 

This expresses the fact in all knowing. To know 
things is to think them ; that is, to form thoughts 



) 



130 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

which truly grasp the contents or meaning of the 
things. The thoughts do not pass ready-made into 
the mind ; they do not pass into the mind at all ; but 
upon occasion of certain action upon the mind, the 
mind unfolds within itself the vision and knowledge 
of the world. And this it does, according to the 
physiologist's report, without pattern or copy, and in 
consequence of certain nervous changes, of which, 
moreover, it knows nothing directly, and commonly 
knows nothing whatever. This being the case, it is 
manifestly idle to think of knowledge as impressed 
on a passive mind, or as carried ready-made into the 
mind. The knowledge originates within; and the 
laws and forms of knowledge must primarily be laws 
and forms of thought itself. In a very real sense the 
mind in knowing things is simply manifesting itself 
by putting its own laws and forms into and upon its 
experience. 

But if knowledge is to be valid, thought and things 
must have the same laws. Otherwise there would be 
a parallax between the thoughts built up by the mind 
and the things which are supposed to exist apart from 
it. Thought can only speak its own language, and 
things must be forever unknowable by us unless they 
also speak thought language ; that is, unless they 
are cast in the forms and molds of thought. In that 
case we have, from the human point of view, a dual- 
ism and a harmony implicit in knowledge for which 
atheism has no explanation. We are at a complete 
deadlock unless we assume that the thing world is 
essentially a thought world, or a world which roots in 
and expresses thought. The suggestion that things 
have produced thought in their own image calls for 



THE ARGUMENT FROM EPISTEMOLOGY 131 

no consideration, as metaphysics shows that there is 
no thoroughfare in that direction. 

This conclusion must stand, even on the supposition 
that we simply apprehend or read off things in sense 
perception without modification. But most of our 
objective knowing is not reception but interpretation. 
The world as it is for sense is very different from the 
world as it is for thought. In looking at a picture, 
the colored surfaces and outlines are in the sense, the 
meaning is in thought. In reading a book, the printed 
page is in the sense ; the signification is in thought, 
and only in thought. One who does not know how 
to read would look in vain for meaning in a book, and 
in vain would he seek to help his failure by using 
eyeglasses. Language has no meaning except for one 
who furnishes the meaning out of himself. 

The same is true also for our knowledge of the 
world. That which is in sense is very different 
from that which is in thought. The sense world is 
flitting, fleeting, discontinuous. Epistemology shows 
that it is all an inarticulate, phantasmagoric flux or 
dissolving view until thought brings into it its rational 
principles, and fixes and interprets it. The sense 
world, so far as it is articulate, or anything we can 
talk about, is already a thought world. Its perma- 
nences and identities are products of thought. The 
complex system of relations, whereby it is defined 
and articulated, is a thought product which can in no 
way be given to sense. The far-reaching inferences of 
science, whereby our spontaneous thought of the 
world is so profoundly transformed, are something 
which exists for neither eye nor ear, but for thought 
only. The sense world is the same from age to age, 



132 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

but the thought world grows from more to more. 
The world of science differs from the world of sense 
as widely as the conceptions of the astronomer differ 
from the algebraic signs by which he expresses them. 
Thus again we see the complex thought activity 
involved in knowledge. If the thing world be com- 
plete in itself, then knowledge involves the building 
up of a thought world which shall be the double of the 
thing world and rightly reproduce it for us ; and this 
thought world must be unfolded within thought itself 
as an expression of the rational nature. 

The problem of human knowledge, then, involves 
(1) a knowable, that is a rational, universe ; (2) a know- 
ing human mind ; (3) the identity of the categories of 
human thought with the principles of cosmic being ; 

(4) such an adjustment of the outer to the inner that 
the mind, reacting according to its own nature against 
external stimulus, shall produce in itself thoughts 
which shall truly reproduce the objective fact, and 

(5) an identity of rational nature in hiunan beings. 
If human reason were many, and not one, there would 
be an end to thought. These implications are so 
involved in the very structure of knowledge that we 
take them for granted without thought of their sig- 
nificance ; whereas they are the perennial wonder of 
existence. 

And herein is a marvelous thing for any one, and 
especially for an atheistic speculator. Things which 
are to be known must exist in intelligible, that is, 
rational, order and relations. The world as we grasp 
it is a world of thought relations ; for thought can 
grasp nothing else. Now if the real world were an 
expression of thought, this would be quite intelligible. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM EPISTEMOLOGY 133 

The world without exists through a mind analogous 
to the mind within. Thus the thing world and the 
thought world would be commensurable, both being 
founded in the nature of reason. But on the atheistic 
scheme the thing world has no thought whatever in it. 
It just exists in its own mechanical way, independent 
of all thought and the negation of all thought. But 
in that case there is no way to thought at all, and 
still less is there any provision for knowledge. A 
speech made up of inarticulate noises could never be 
imderstood, because there is in it no thought to 
understand. Just as little could the world be known, 
unless there were thought in it to be apprehended by 
the knower. The materialistic fancy that things, by 
being very small and very numerous, and moving 
very rapidly in some mysterious way, could generate 
knowledge and get themselves known, is set aside by 
the rudiments of psychology and metaphysics. Hence 
on the supposition that things exist in the most real- 
istic fashion, and we have only to read off what is 
there, we have to affirm an elaborate dualism and 
parallelism of human thought and cosmic thing which 
remain an insoluble mystery, except on the theistic 
doctrine which makes things expressions of thought. 
Both psychology and epistemology absolutely refuse 
to assimilate thoughts to things ; it only remains to 
assimilate things to thoughts by making them the 
products or expressions of thought. 

The matter becomes still more complicated when 
we remember how much of knowledge is interpreta- 
tion, not reception. As long as we confuse the sense 
fact with the thought fact, there is a kind of plausi- 
bility in the fancy that the sense fact may be passively 

THEISM — 10 



134 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

reflected by thought. But this notion disappears as 
soon as we note the incommensurability between 
what is in sense and what is in thought. To recur 
to the illustration of language, speech apart from 
meanings is mere noise; and noise becomes speech 
only as it is informed with meanings. But the 
meanings are not in the sound objectively considered. 
The sound is the medium for conveying meanings 
which exist only for the minds at each end. Lan- 
guage must begin in thought if it is to end in thought. 
Any one can see the impossibility of understanding 
noise, and also the impossibility of noise generating 
understanding. The same is true of objective knowl- 
edge. The meaning is not found in the sense fact 
at all. The spatial and temporal fact in itself con- 
tains no meaning, but is simply a medium for express- 
ing a meaning. And as with language, so with the 
knowledge of nature. There is no interpreting the 
process unless we have a thinker at both ends. 
Nature is speech, not existence. If nature expresses 
the thought of a thinker beyond it, it is quite credible 
that we should find thought in it. Otherwise all is 
opacity and darkness. We are trying to understand 
noises which mean nothing. 

The Argument from Metaphysics 

We have had frequent occasion in this chapter to refer 
to the realistic notion of a world of things existing by 
themselves apart from all thought, as a prolific source 
of atheistic fancies. We have now to show that this 
notion is very questionable. Here metaphysics takes 
up and completes the argument from epistemology 
by showing that the self-existent mechanical world 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 135 

on which atheism builds is a product of superficial 
sense thinking which understands neither itself nor 
its problem. 

If we allow space and time to be real existences of 
some sort, no intelligible world can exist in them 
without the work of thought. The intelligible world, 
as we have said, is a world of thought relations and 
related objects; and as such implies intelligence as 
the condition of its possibility. As the world of 
sense qualities exists only in and for the sensibility, 
so the world of relations and related objects exists 
only in and for thought, and not in space and time 
alone. Or the intelligible world is a world of mean- 
ings and thought contents, and these are impossible 
except with reference to intelligence. 

To the uninitiated this will have a somewhat ideal- 
istic sound, owing to a natural illusion. Popular 
thought is rightly convinced that knowledge has 
objective vahdity, and it confuses this conviction 
with the lumpish existence of things in an extra- 
mental space and time, as it knows no other way of 
securing the reality of the things. But epistemology 
shows that the ultimate meaning of objectivity is the 
universality of the object in our common experience, 
or the vahdity of our conceptions for common ex- 
perience. Such objects and conceptions are real or 
objective, in distinction from individual illusions 
which are private possessions, and hence errors. 
But this universality is primarily in experience, 
and on reflection it is plain that it cannot be 
an3rwhere else. It is not a question of the validity 
or truth of the experience, but rather of its con- 
tents and location. When these points are borne in 



136 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

mind it will not seem so strange when we say that 
the intelligible world cannot exist in space and time. 

Illustrations abound. Thus, in the case of speech, 
all that can exist in space and time is noise, succes- 
sively propagating itself across spaces in time; but 
noise is not speech. Only meanings are speech, and 
meanings are not in space or time, and can neither be 
seen nor heard. Meanings exist only for mind and 
through mind. Again, where does a symphony exist ? 
Not in space or time, but only in mind. Apart from 
the qualitative transformation of vibration into sound 
by the sensibility, the symphony can exist as such only 
through the unifying and relating activity of conscious- 
ness. Apart from this activity, every phase of the 
sound would lie loose and unrelated, each one in its 
own space and time, and nowhere united in a common 
consciousness. The symphony would nowhere exist. 
All that can take place in the most realistic space and 
time is but the means for translating the symphony 
from idea to act, or from one mind to another ; but 
the symphony exists as anything apprehensible only 
in and through thought. The place of music is in 
the mind ; and music is an impossibility conceived as 
existing in space and time. 

So with the world of literature, of discourse, of 
government — none of these things can exist extra- 
mentally in space and time. The world of discourse 
is not a matter of ears only or mainly, but rather of 
thought. The volitional interaction of moral beings, 
which is the essence of government, can never be 
spatially exhibited ; and one would present a humor- 
ous spectacle who should set out to see the govern- 
ment with his physical eyes. Literature also does 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 137 

not exist in libraries but only in and for minds. It 
is indeed conceivable that some person of posi- 
tivistic tendencies should decide that meanings are 
too airy and impalpable to be the subject of science, 
and should insist that letters and their groupings are 
the essence of literature. Under the influence of this 
notion he might make elaborate studies of the various 
forms of the letters and of their " coexistences and 
sequences/' and also of the various kinds of paper 
and binding ; and this he might proclaim to be the 
scientific method of literary study. But literature is 
not a matter of letters or paper or binding after all. 
In like manner the intelligible v^orld exists only for 
and through thought. All that takes place in space 
or time is at best only the movement for translating 
the world of ideas into act and making it accessible 
to finite minds; but in itself, and apart from this 
teleological function, the spatial and temporal fact is 
nothing articulate or intelligible. 

Again, we may reach the same conclusion by 
another way. Epistemology shows that nothing can 
exist for the mind except through fixed and timeless 
ideas. Everything as occurring passes away with its 
date and can by no possibility recur. The temporal 
flow is ceaseless and admits of infinite division. Hence 
every event breaks up into an indefinite nimaber of 
events corresponding to the temporal division; and 
each infinitesimal increment vanishes irrevocably with 
its temporal instant. If this were all, thought and 
even existence would be impossible; and Kronos 
would devour both his offspring and himself. But 
the mind grasps and fixes the temporal flow by time- 
less ideas which give the abiding meaning of which 



138 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

the temporal movement is the bearer or expression. 
On no other condition can we escape the Heraclitic 
flux and the complete overthrow of knowledge. But 
these timeless ideas, as such, are incapable of temporal 
existence. They represent the meaning, the rational 
contents, but they are a purely ideal world. And 
here again is a problem which demands solution. We 
might say that the ideas are arbitrary impositions of 
our own, and have no essential connection with reality ; 
but this would not long command assent. It would 
be like saying that we have ideas in connection with 
another's speech or writing, but we have no reason 
for thinking that he had ideas. It can hardly be that 
ideas are necessary for the expression and understand- 
ing of things to which they are essentially unrelated ; 
neither is it likely that things essentially unrelated to 
ideas can ever be comprehended through ideas. The 
only alternative to these impossible views is to say 
that the world in space and time is a movement 
according to ideas and for the setting forth of ideas 
behind the movement, or immanent in it. As such 
an incarnation of thought, it is intelligible and possi- 
ble ; but apart from thought, as a thing by itseK, it 
is neither intelligible nor possible. 

Thus we see once more that the intelligible world is a 
thought world, and exists only in and through thought. 
It may be manifested under the form of space and time ; 
but it cannot exist in space and time as extra-mental 
realities, any more than the world of music, or of lit- 
erature, or of language. 

But we must go still further in the direction of 
idealism, and point out that space and time themselves 
are no proper existences apart from mind, but only 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 139 

forms of experience. They are not real somewhats 
in which things exist or events run oft', but are only 
general forms of experience. Metaphysics shows that 
when they are made more than this they become ab- 
surd, and make existence itself impossible. Thus the 
endless divisibility of space and the mutual external- 
ity of all its parts make it impossible that anything 
should exist as an ontological reality in space. 
Everything would break up into an indefinite plural- 
ity; and all unity, and thus all reality, would disap- 
pear. The mutual externality of successive moments 
has the same effect in time. Nothing that really 
exists in succession can exist at all. Time itself 
cannot exist. For only the present can exist, and the 
present is simply the plane of division between past 
and future. Hence nothing can exist, if time be 
ontological. Metaphysics shows that considerations 
of this kind compel us to reduce space and time to 
forms of experience only. Things are not in space 
and time, but experience has the spatial and temporal 
form. The spatial and temporal laws are valid for 
experience, but they become absurd and impossible 
when they are abstracted from experience and made 
into independent existences. 

Thus all that exists in space and time, together 
with space and time themselves, must be viewed as 
having only phenomenal existence, that is, as existing 
only for and through intelligence. 

Real existence must be conceived either under the 
form of space and time, or under the form of con- 
scious intelligence. There is no third possibility. 
But on analysis all spatial and temporal being becomes 
phenomenal. As spatial it can have no unity; as 



140 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

temporal it can have neither unity, identity, nor 
permanence. Such unity, identity, and permanence 
as it may seem to have, are entirely the work of the 
intelligence which produces or apprehends it. It has 
such unity as any spatial or temporal measure may 
have — a unity which is purely formal, and is imposed 
by the mind. What is the unity of a minute, or a mile, 
or a degree of the circle ? Unless there be something 
non-spatial and non-temporal, nothing whatever can 
exist. And only intelligence meets this demand. 
Metaphysics shows that active intelligence alone fills 
out the true notion of being, unity, identity, and 
causality. On the impersonal and mechanical plane 
these categories all vanish or contradict themselves. 
The spatial and temporal disappear in the dissolving 
view, and impersonal causality loses itself in the 
infinite regress, and finally cancels itself. 

Moreover, causality in time must either sink to 
mere sequence in which the notion of causality dis- 
appears, or else fall back on the notion of potentiahty 
to keep past and present from falling asunder. If 
there be no dynamic connection between them, we 
fall into a groundless becoming and reason perishes. 
Logic also demands that the past which is to explain 
the present shall in some way contain the present. 
But we cannot carry the present bodily and actually 
into the past, for that would confound all distinctions. 
Hence the notion of potentiality; the present was 
potential in the past. But this notion also is empty 
of any real meaning on the impersonal plane. What 
a metaphysical potentiality, in distinction from a 
metaphysical actuality, might be, cannot be told. On 
the personal plane it refers to the possible determina- 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 141 

tions of free intelligence, and here it means some- 
thing; but on the impersonal plane it is simply the 
recognition of a problem to which it gives only a 
verbal solution. The real solution must be sought 
in free intelligence. Such are some of the puzzles 
which emerge when we think under temporal con- 
ditions. 

Thus the metaphysical apparatus of sense thought, 
on which atheism depends, disappears altogether. 
Its alleged foundations all turn out to imply mind 
as their presupposition, or to exist only under the 
form of living intelligence. Of course the categories 
which sense thought employs are all formally neces- 
sary ; the mistake lies in supposing that they can be 
realized in the sense form. The conviction that there 
must be reality, unity, identity, and causality is correct, 
but it does not of itself decide the form under which 
they are possible. Reflection shows that they are 
possible only under the form of intelligence or in 
relation to intelligence. When we conceive the world 
as having intelligible meaning we come down to a 
supreme intelligence, not only as its source, but as 
that without which it would be not merely impossible 
but absurd and meaningless. A world of meanings 
presupposes mind. A system of relations implies 
intelligence as its source and seat. When we con- 
ceive the world in its causality, we are brought down 
to active intelligence by which it exists and from 
which it forever proceeds. The world has its form 
and meaning in the divine thought, and its reality in 
the divine will. 

In a previous paragraph we have pointed out that 
the basal certainties of knowledge are not the onto- 



142 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

logical existence of material and mechanical things, 
but rather the coexistence of persons, the community 
of intelligence, and the system of common experience. 
We are now better able to appreciate this fact. This 
system of experience which is there for all of us is 
itself a function of intelligence and no extra-mental 
fact. And it is this system of experience, and the 
coexistent minds which share in it, that philosophy 
has to interpret. And in both the experience and 
the interpretation, thought remains within the intel- 
lectual sphere. Thought can neither reach nor use 
things lying beyond thought and unrelated to thought ; 
and if we seem to reach such things it is only by mis- 
taking the common to all in experience for a fact un- 
related to intelligence, or by abstracting the categories 
from experience, in which alone they have meaning, 
and projecting them as extra-mental facts. As such 
they contradict themselves as soon as reflection begins ; 
and the perennial antinomies of realism emerge. If, 
on the other hand, we refer the world of intelligible 
experience and intelligent spirits to intelligence as their 
source, our thought system remains homogeneous with 
itself throughout, and we escape the chronic contra- 
dictions which haunt, in spite of all exorcisms, every 
reaUstic system of the impersonal and mechanical 
type. As soon as realism is seen to be, not experi- 
ence, but an interpretation of experience, its untena- 
bility becomes manifest. 

For the sake of warding off misunderstanding, so far 
as possible, we present the argument again in brief out- 
line. Of course it does not commend itself to the natural 
man nor even to the natural theist, because of sundry 
easy misconceptions. Both alike are sure that the 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 143 

world of facts wliich they perceive is independent of 
their own intelligence, and of their neighbors' intelli- 
gence. This world did not begin when they first 
became aware of it, nor did it grow with their grow- 
ing knowledge, nor will it vanish with their conscious- 
ness of it. This fact, which is admitted by all except 
some lively person who takes pleasure in airing con- 
ceits arid paradoxes, is supposed by the natural man 
to show that the universe which exists apart from 
our intelligence exists apart from all intelligence. 
The natural theist, of course, would insist that the 
universe began in intelligence, but he would also in- 
sist that it now exists external to all intelligence. 
The atheist would claim that the universe is now, 
and always has been, external to intelligence. Both 
alike would be sure that the meaning of this ex- 
ternality is sun-clear, and that its reality is self- 
evident. 

But there is a great di:fference between existing 
apart from our intelligence, and existing apart from 
all intelligence. The world of sense qualities may 
exist apart from the sensibility of A or B, but it can- 
not exist apart from all sensibility. The world of 
literature also may exist apart from the intelligence of 
few or many, but it exists nevertheless only for and in 
intelligence. Now the universe as we know it is essen- 
tially a vast system of relations under the various cate- 
gories of the intellect ; and such a universe would have 
neither meaning nor existence apart from intelligence. 
It does not avail against this conclusion to say that, 
besides the relations, there are real things in rela- 
tions ; for these things themselves are defined and 
constituted by their relations, so that their existence 



144 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

apart from a constitutive intelligence becomes an 
absurdity. If, with Locke, we declare that relations 
are the work of the mind, and then attempt to find 
some unrelated reality in the object which can exist 
apart from mind, our quest is soon seen to be bootless 
and hopeless. In that case we should have to admit 
that the real in itself is unknowable, and that the 
real as known exists only in and for intelligence. 
But as this intelligence in and for which the universe 
, exists is not ours, there must be a cosmic intelligence 
as its abiding condition, and in reference to which 
alone the affirmation of a universe has any meaning. 

Since the time of Kant it has been clear to those 
who could estimate his work that we can never know 
anything outside of the thought sphere. Mind and 
the products of mind comprise the whole sphere of the 
knowable. This Kant made plain once for all. What- 
ever lies within the range of knowledge must be either 
mind or a mental product. But Kant had not com- 
pletely emancipated himself from the assumptions of 
uncritical realism, and admitted a reality beyond the 
thought sphere, which he rightly pronounced unknow- 
able. It was reserved for later philosophers to point 
out that this extra-mental reality is just as unaffirm- 
able as it is unknowable. The affirmation itself was 
seen to be empty, so that it affirmed nothing. Thus 
all possible knowledge and affirmation fell back into 
the thought sphere again. 

Two points Kant felt compelled to secure : first, the 
constructive action of the mind in knowledge, so that 
knowledge is primarily an expression of the mental 
nature rather than of the object ; and secondly, the 
objective reality of something independent of us and 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 145 

our thinking. These two points Kant never succeeded 
in properly adjusting to each other. When he thought 
of the constructive mental activity involved in knowl- 
edge, Kant tended to make all objects only represen- 
tations in us ; that is, purely subjective and human, 
if not individualistic. When he thought of the inde- 
pendent reality he maintained some sort of transcen- 
dental something which he refused to let us know or 
even to think, as it lay outside of the range of thought. 
In this way arose the continuous contradiction which 
runs through Kant's exposition. And we can escape 
the contradiction and save the truth of the system 
only by giving up the extra-mental things altogether, 
and making the thing world the expression of a 
thought world behind it or immanent in it; which 
thought world, again, is the expression of a supreme 
intelligence which founds and coordinates both the 
thing world and the world of finite spirits. In this 
way things are at once independent of our thought 
and commensurate with thought. They are not illu- 
sions of the individual ; and yet, as the products and 
expressions of thought, they lie within the thought 
sphere. Thus we escape the impossibilities of crude 
realism, and also the intellectual scandal of the un- 
knowable things in themselves. And this is possible 
only on the plane of idealistic theism. The dualism 
of our human knowing is founded and transcended in 
a monism of the infinite, the source of both the finite 
spu*it and the cosmic order. 

But this does not imply that the world is merely 
a conception without other reality. The world is not 
merely an idea, it is also a deed. The contents of the 
world are given in the idea, but the world becomes 



146 THE AVORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

real only as it passes into act. It is not merely a 
conception in the divine understanding, it is also a 
form of divine activity. Both factors are needed to 
express our full conviction with regard to the world. 
It is not a lumpish existence out of all essential rela- 
tion to thought ; for it is simply thought made con- 
crete. Neither is it a passive conception in an inert 
mind ; it is rather a forthgoing of energy according 
to rational ideas. Thus it is at once real and rational, 
and being the work of intelligence, it is forever open 
to the comprehension of intelligence. Our thought of 
the world has two poles. When we approach the 
world from the standpoint of meaning, we come 
down to the divine idea. When we approach it from 
the side of causality, we come down to the divine 
wiU. 

To this result epistemology and metaphysics must 
come ; to this they are fast coming. Both of these 
sciences when they understand themselves must be 
theistic. The trustworthiness of reason and the 
validity of knowledge can be maintained only on a 
theistic basis. Any scheme of mechanical necessity 
makes shipwreck on the problem of error ; and no 
such scheme knows any way of deducing or evolving 
valid knowledge. Free intelligence in the world- 
ground and in the finite knower is the only solution 
of the problem which really solves it. And since 
the trustworthiness of reason and the validity of 
knowledge are the presupposition of all science and 
philosophy, we must say that God as free and intelli- 
gent is the postulate of both science and philosophy. 
If these are possible, it can be only on a theistic basis. 

In the beginning of this chapter we treated of the 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 147 

inductive argument for affirming purpose. We now 
see that a theoretical and speculative argument of 
wider range is possible. We have seen the teleologi- 
cal character of our fundamental postulates as related 
to the self-realization and self-preservation of the mind 
itself. We have also seen the universality of the te- 
leological craving, and the impossibility of satisfying 
it by any impersonal mechanism. We have further 
seen that reason can reach no equilibrium in episte- 
mology and metaphysics until it rises to the conception 
of intelligent and purposive causality as the supreme 
category of reality. On the impersonal plane thought 
is in unstable equilibrium, and is sure to fall into con- 
tradiction with itself. The categories vanish or cancel 
themselves. But some intellectual range and flexibil- 
ity are needed for the appreciation of such an argu- 
ment ; although it is the best argument when 
understood. The inductive argument at best has the 
disadvantage of resting on picked facts ; while great 
masses of facts seem neutral, if not opposed to it. 
This gives the impression that purpose in any case 
applies to only a few things, and the surmise is not 
far away that it does not apply to anything. Such 
argument is effective rather as illustration than as 
proof. But the argument has a very different stand- 
ing when it is seen that purpose, as the essential form 
of intellectual action, enters into the very structure of 
reason and knowledge. Thus the necessity of tele- 
ology is theoretically established ; and experience has 
only the function of tracing and illustrating it. 

Of course this epistemological and metaphysical 
argument is highly abstract and can never find favor 
except in speculative circles. It is valuable as show- 



148 THE WORLD-GROUND AS INTELLIGENT 

ing theism, or a cosmic intelligence to be a necessary 
implication of the essential structure of thought and 
knowledge. From this standpoint atheism would 
appear as the crude misunderstanding of a mind not 
yet in full possession of itself, but rather in hopeless 
bondage to the senses and their spontaneous preju- 
dices. It vanishes of itself as soon as it is brought 
into relation to the general problem of knowledge. 
Then its superficiality and self-destructive character 
become apparent. Atheism is philosophic illiteracy. 

Thus the arguments from induction and from epis- 
temology and metaphysics agree in enforcing the 
claim of theism. If we suppose the world is founded 
in intelligence, we find the facts in their great outlines 
agreeing thereto. There is a rational work according 
to rational methods, for intelligible ends. To be sure, 
our knowledge is limited, but, so far as we can under- 
stand, we find the marks of transcendent wisdom. In 
such a case it is not hard to believe that a larger 
knowledge would make this more and more apparent ; 
just as we believe that a deeper insight would reveal 
the reign of law in realms apparently lawless. 

If we next make the opposite assumption, that the 
world is founded in non-intelligence, we find nothing 
that we should expect. We find a non-rational 
power doing a rational work. An unconscious power 
produces consciousness. Non-intelligence produces 
intelligence. Necessity produces freedom or at least 
the illusion of freedom. The non-purposive works 
apparently for purpose. The unexpected meets us at 
every turn. Such is the atheistic account of things. 
The light that is in it is darkness. 

There is no need to pursue these considerations. 



THE ARGUMENT FROM METAPHYSICS 149 

It seems plain that the belief in a free and intelligent 
ground of things is as well founded as any objective 
belief whatever, and that this belief is one which 
enters so intimately into our mental life that philoso- 
phy and science, and even rationality itself stand or 
fall with it. For these reasons we hold that the uni- 
verse is founded in intelligence. The conception of 
necessary mechanical agency as first and fundamental 
leads to no true insight, and ends in hopeless mental 
collapse. Self -directing rational agency is the only 
principle that gives any light, or that can be made 
basal without immediate self -stultification. 

On all these accounts the intelligence of the world- 
ground is affirmed. 



THEISM — 11 



CHAPTER III 

THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

The direct argument for the intelligence of the 
world-ground is conclusive ; and unless counter-argu- 
ment can be found, the conclusion must be allowed to 
stand. But there is a very general agreement among 
speculators that such argument exists, and of such 
force withal as greatly to weaken, if not to over- 
throw, the theistic conclusion. In particular the 
objection is made that personality, and hence intelli- 
gence, cannot be attributed to an absolute and infinite 
being ; as these notions are distinctly incompatible. 
While, then, we are shut up on the one side to the 
belief in an intelligent, and hence personal, world- 
ground, we are shut out on the other by the contra- 
dictory character of the conception. This might be 
called the antinomy of the theistic argument. Appeal, 
then, is taken from the judgment in favor of theism, 
and the case must be further argued. 

The arguments now to be considered are not rea- 
sons for atheism but rather objections to theism ; and 
their bearing is more agnostic than atheistic. That 
atheism has no rational standing is plain, but is theism, 
when closely considered, much better off ? It may be 
that its advantages are only superficial, and that over- 
whelming difficulties, which make theism also unten- 

160 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 151 

able, appear on profounder reflection. There is some 
warrant for these suggestions. Popular theistic thought 
is crude in conception and cruder still in expression ; 
and its anthropomorphism readily lends itself to criti- 
cism. The limitations of the finite are thoughtlessly 
transferred to the infinite. Hasty and over-confident 
interpretations of the divine purposes scandalize more 
careful thought. Such facts have produced a variety 
of objections of some plausibility and currency. These 
we proceed to consider. 

We have argued that there is no explaining the 
order of the. world without intelligence, and the re- 
joinder is made that there is no explaining it with 
intelligence. The enormous complexity of the cosmic 
order is described, and we are asked if we can con- 
ceive that all this is carried on by intelligence. This 
objection, though urged by one who is said to be a 
great philosophical pillar, is simply an appeal to the 
weakness of our imagination. Of course we cannot 
picture the process in detail, or represent to ourselves 
how the infinite mind can conduct the ceaseless and 
infinitely complex processes of nature without weari- 
ness or confusion. To do that we must ourselves be 
equal to the task. But if it be hard to see how intel- 
ligence could do it, it is at least equally hard to see 
how non-intelligence could do it. For us the alterna- 
tive must always lie between the two, with the ad- 
vantage ever in favor of the former. For when we 
ascribe to the world-ground omnipotence and omnis- 
cience, we make at least a formal provision for the 
case. We can see that such a being would be ade- 
quate to the task, and we are under no obligation 
to tell how he would get on with it. That is his 



152 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

own affair. But with the assertion of the world- 
ground as non-intelligent, we fail to make even this 
formal provision, and the facts remain opaque and 
unintelligible. This, apart from the claim of episte- 
mology that the facts themselves are non-existent 
and impossible apart from intelligence. 

But the further question may be raised whether all 
the objections to mechanical explanation as logically 
empty do not lie equally against explanation by intel- 
ligence. Must we not carry all effects into the intel- 
ligent cause as well as into the mechanical cause; 
and is not the result equally tautological in either 
case ? This would indeed be true if intelligence were 
mechanically conceived and subjected to the imper- 
sonal principle of the sufficient reason. On that view 
intelligence itself would become a part of the univer- 
sal mechanism, and thought would collapse. We 
should have to posit an inscrutable sub-conscious 
mechanism within intelligence, and the infinite regress 
would swallow us up. But in truth intelligence is 
intelligence only as free; and explanation in any 
fundamental sense consists in exhibiting facts as the 
work of intelligence. We do not carry the facts into 
intelligence in any spatial or dynamic sense ; we refer 
them to intelligence as their source. And when 
we can thus refer them, or can find intelligence 
expressed in them, we regard them as explained 
and are satisfied. We have here a relation that 
can be expressed in no other terms, and that can be 
known only in experience. To attempt to trace the 
facts into intelligence in any other sense is unintelli- 
gible in the first place, and finally ends in the abyss 
of the infinite regress. Free intelligence is the only 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 153 

true explanation of anything, and the explanation 
consists entirely in viewing the fact as the work of 
intelligence. But intelligence itself is never to be 
explained; it is rather the principle of all explana- 
tion. It explains other things, but it accepts itself.^ 
It knows itself not by deduction from something 
more ultimate, nor by reduction to something 
more ultimate, but by the living experience of itself.' 
Here experience is the only test of both reality and 
possibility. The thing is possible because it is a fact. 
How mind can be and work there is no telling, and 
for the simple and sufficient reason that there is no 
how in the case. The ultimate fact, whatever it may 
be, simply is, and we only contradict ourselves when 
we seek to refer it to something else. But mind can 
be and work, and the intelligible order of things re- 
sults. Whether we are better satisfied, or have more 
insight into the nature and genesis of events, when 
we trace them to their origin in living intelligence, 
than when we leave them phases of a mechanical 
movement, is simply a question of fact which admits 
of little doubt. 

We have also said that the world-ground must be 
intelligent or non-intelligent. This also has been dis- 
puted on the ground that intelligence and non-intelli- 
gence do not form a complete disjunction, so that 
there may be a third something, higher than either 
and transcendental to both. Is it not possible, 
indeed, considering our littleness and brevity, is it 
not probable, that there may be something as much 
higher than intelligence as intelligence is higher than 
mechanism ? 

This claim has often been set forth as something 



154 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

especially profound, and as vacating both theism and 
atheism. The true explanation of the cosmos is to be 
found in neither intelligence nor non-intelligence, but 
in the inscrutable transcendental. This doctrine has 
a swelling sound, but in its obvious sense it is empty 
of the slightest substance. The speculative fancy 
has been prolific in the production of words for its 
expression, but they are purely logical sound and 
fury, signifying nothing. For this transcendental 
somewhat is not a thought but a phrase. It exists 
solely by the grace of language, which has the 
unfortunate property of making it possible to talk 
without saying anything. To appeal to it is not to 
explain, but to abandon explanation. Explanation 
must always be in intelligible terms ; and as in our 
thought the intelligent and the non-intelligent com- 
prise all existence, any true explanation must be 
in terms of one or the other. X Y Z may be a 
very profound truth in the realm of the inscrutable, 
but in the realm of intelligence it is only a meaning- 
less group of letters. 

As usual, however, with these objections, there is an 
ambiguity here which makes possible a permissible 
meaning, but one which reduces the objection to a 
commonplace. Our thought contains two elements : 
a certain rational content or insight, and a variety of 
processes by which this insight is reached. The 
former is the universal and objective element of 
thought, the latter may be formal and relative to us. 
Thus in geometry the universal element consists in 
the propositions, which may be true for all intelli- 
gence. The formal element consists in the forms of 
proof and ways of approaching the problems. This 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 155 

element is relative to ourselves, and can lay no 
claim to universality. If now by intelligence we 
mean our methods of procedure, the devices of our 
discursive reason, the shifts of our imperfect insight, 
there may well be something higher than intelligence. 
The community and universality of intelligence or of 
reason do not consist in methods or processes, but 
in the rational contents. But this conception does 
not give us something above intelligence as the power 
of rational insight, but only above the human limita- 
tions of intelligence. And this claim is no novelty, 
for it has long been maintained by theism. The 
Supreme Person has generally been regarded as 
intuitive, in distinction from the discursiveness of the 
human reason. 

But admitting the intelligence of the world-ground, 
its personality, it is said, does not follow. Many 
have held that the world-ground is intelligent and 
rational but not personal. This view has found 
expression in many poetical, or rather imaginative 
utterances of pantheism. These have some attrac- 
tion for the fancy, but most of them offer nothing to 
the intellect. Their warrant, such as it is, lies partly 
in popular anthropomorphism and partly in misunder- 
stood speculative principles. 

Some have proposed to conceive the world-ground 
as a double-faced substance ; on the one side exten- 
sion and form, and on the other side life and reason. 
These two sides constitute the reality of the outer 
and inner worlds respectively. Here the implicit aim 
is to escape the dualism of crude realistic thought by 
bringing the world of thought and the world of things 
together as modes of one substance. 



156 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

This conception finds expression in Spinoza and in 
many modern monistic systems, but it is equally a 
failure in all. It is based upon the antiquated notion 
of substance as extended stuff, and upon the fictitious 
abstraction " Thought." No one has ever succeeded 
in forming any conception of what a double-faced sub- 
stance might mean. The imagination, indeed, masters 
the problem without difficulty. A thing is conceived 
with two sides, and one side is called thought; but 
this performance is not finally satisfactory. Again 
the relation of the two faces, the physical and the 
mental, is a problem that has not received its solu- 
tion. If the two go along in complete indepen- 
dence, there is nothing in the physical world, on 
the one hand, to suggest thought ; and there is noth- 
ing in thought, on the other hand, to suggest the 
physical world. An outright denial of the latter 
would be the immediate result. The relation of the 
two faces, thought and extension, to the thoughts 
and extended things subsumed under them is left 
equally obscure. There is no way of passing from 
thought and extension in general to particular thoughts 
and things, except by the fallacy of the universal. 
In short, this doctrine must retreat into the affirma- 
tion of a transcendental something above thought 
and extension; and this is only the well-known 
phrase to which there is no corresponding thought. 
It belongs to the picturings of the imagination 
rather than to the conceptions of the under- 
standing. 

Insight into the emptiness of the doctrine of a 
transcendental X, and into the impossibility of 
founding the system in simple material existence, has 



THE AVORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 157 

led many to give another form to their non-theistic 
views. The world-ground has been called pure will, 
unconscious intelligence, impersonal reason, imper- 
sonal spirit, universal life, etc. But these too are 
empty phrases, obtained by unlawful abstraction. 
For Schopenhauer the world-ground is pure will 
without intellect or personality. But pure will is 
nothing. Will itself, except as a function of a con- 
scious and intelligent spirit, has no meaning. When 
the conscious perception of ends and the conscious 
determination of self according to those ends are 
dropped, there is nothing remaining that deserves to 
be called will. We may befog ourselves with words, 
but the conception of a blind and necessary force is 
all that remains. The sole advantage of the psycho- 
logical term is that, by force of association, it is 
easier to overlook the purely mechanical nature of 
the doctrine and to fancy we have transcended 
mechanism. 

Unconscious intelligence is an oft-recurring notion 
in speculation. The anima mundi of the Platonic 
physics and the plastic principle of Cudworth are 
examples. This conception has often found a place 
in theistic systems from a desire, first, to recognize 
something higher than corpuscular mechanics in the 
world of life, and, secondly, to free God from the 
onerous duty of administering the details of the uni- 
verse. Cudworth' s plastic force has a " drowsy, 
unawakened, or astonished cogitation." " Whereas 
human artists are often to seek and at a loss, and 
therefore consult and deliberate, as also upon second 
thoughts mend their former work, nature, on the con- 
trary, is never to seek what to do, nor at a stand," 



158 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

"it never consults nor deliberates, never repents 
nor goes about, as it were, on second thoughts, to alter 
and mend its former course." At the same time this 
nature is no rival to God, but simply a subordinate, 
commissioned to look after the execution of what God 
has decreed. 

Hartmann, in his " Philosophy of the Unconscious," 
has extended this notion of unconscious intelligence 
to the world-ground itself. Against atheism he af- 
firms its intelligence ; against theism he affirms 
its unconsciousness. The lack of consciousness is 
declared to be an advantage ; and many things are 
said about the " clairvoyance " of the absolute as it 
moves unerringly to its unconscious goal. But this 
is only rhetorical ambiguity. Consciousness has a 
social use which makes it the equivalent of embar- 
rassment. In habitual activities also we often say 
we are unconscious, when all that is meant is that we 
act without analytic reflection upon our work. Such 
reflection again would often be a hindrance. But all 
this is irrelevant to the psychological use of the term 
as the antithesis of non-consciousness. In this sense 
we must declare the phrase, unconscious intelligence, 
a contradiction. Only one clear thought can be 
joined to it, namely, that of blind forces which are 
not intelligent at all, but which, nevertheless, work 
to produce intelligible results. 

The same is true of the phrase, impersonal reason. 
Reason itself is a pure abstraction which is realized 
only in conscious spirits ; and when we abstract from 
these all that constitutes them conscious persons there 
is nothing intelligible left. By impersonal reason 
also we could only mean a blind force which is not 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 159 

reason, but which is adjusted to the production of 
rational results. In this sense any machine has 
impersonal reason. 

As with Schopenhauer's pure will, so with uncon- 
scious intelligence and impersonal reason, it is simply 
the use of psychological terms with their associations 
that leads us to fancy we have advanced beyond 
mechanical atheism. 

Instinct is the standing illustration of imconscious 
intelligence and impersonal reason, but it fails to 
illustrate. For in the first place no one knows 
what instinct is. It is no positive conception what- 
ever, but rather the union of two negations. It is 
not conscious intelligence, on the one hand, and it 
is not mere mechanism, on the other. If we ask 
what it is, we get no answer. If we ask for some 
proof that it exists at all, we still get no answer. 
The real problem is to explain the so-called instinctive 
acts of the lower animals, and there is no explanation 
in referring them to something we know not what. 
Here as elsewhere we have only the two principles of 
intelligence or mechanism by which to account for 
the facts. If, then, instinctive acts are not performed 
with purpose and consciousness, they are not outcomes 
of intelligence at all, but of a mechanical necessity 
which mimics intelligence. This necessity may lie 
in the constitution of the agent, or in its physical 
structure, or in the relations of both to surround- 
ings ; but in any case there is no intelligence in 
play, unless it be the intelligence of the Creator 
upon which the necessity itself depends. On this 
view the so-called instinctive acts would be simply 
the resultant of the highly complex adaptation of 



160 



THE WOKLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 



the creature to its environment. Instinct itself 
would be nothing. 

To a mind which has not learned that all fruitful 
thinking must be in intelligible terms, this must seem 
very dogmatic. Who can fix the limits of the awful 
Possible ? The answer is that our affair is not with 
the awful Possible, but with the much humbler prob- 
lem of finding that conception of the world-ground 
which will make the universe most intelligible to us. 
And for this sane state of mind, intelligence and rea- 
son are such only as they are guided by ends ; and 
a guidance by ends means nothing except as those 
ends are present in consciousness as ideal aims. When 
this is not the case, we have neither reason nor intelli- 
gence, but only necessary agency which may mimic 
rational activity. 

The meaning of the previous doctrines may be 
summed up in the notion of an impersonal spirit, 
which is the ground of all existence, and which comes 
to consciousness only in finite spirits. But this, too, 
is more easily said than understood. In fact it is 
simply atheism under another name. What the athe- 
ist calls persistent force or the fundamental reality, 
is here called impersonal spirit ; but the meaning is 
in both cases the same. Both alike understand by 
the terms that blind and necessary reality which 
underlies all phenomena, and which, in its necessary 
on-goings, brings to life and death. But as the new 
phrase implies the old thing, we need not consider 
it further. We conclude that if the world-ground be 
intelligent and rational, it must also be conscious and 
personal. 

And this brings us to the alleged antinomy of 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 161 

theistic thought. These theistic predicates of con- 
sciousness, intelligence, and personality, are appar- 
ently incompatible with the absoluteness and infinity 
of the world-ground on which speculation insists. 
The former involve finitude and otherness and can 
never be combined with the latter without mutual 
destruction. 

In such straits the first thing to do is to define 
our terms. Intelligence has been defined as an 
adjustment of inner relations to outer relations, thus 
making it a developing and finite thing. In this 
sense of course intelligence could not be affirmed of 
an infinite and absolute being. But intelligence as 
the power to know, which is the real gist and essence 
of the matter, might well be thus affirmed. This 
power to know is not a limitation but a perfection. The 
inability to know would be the real limitation and 
imperfection. When, then, intelligence is denied of 
the world-ground on the score of the latter's abso- 
luteness, we assent if by intelligence we mean the 
partisan definition of a philosophical sect as the ad- 
justment of inner relations to outer relations ; but we 
demur if by intelligence be meant the simple power 
to know. \ 

In affirming personality also, we must distinguish 
it from corporeality and from form of any sort. Pop- 
ular religious thought always seeks to picture its con- 
ceptions, and popular religious speech always falls 
back on spatial and corporeal elements as aids to 
expression. Hence there will always be a need of 
wise pedagogical counsel to restrain the undue anthro- 
pomorphism of uncritical thinking; and the critics 
themselves have not yet outgrown the need. For a 



162 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

large part of their objections are directed against a 
crude anthropomorphism of speech without penetra- 
ting to the essential meaning. The confusion of per- 
sonality with corporeality underlies the traditional 
criticism, dating back to Xenophanes, that speculat- 
ing cattle would infer a God like themselves. Oxen, 
buffaloes, and even watches have been used to illus- 
trate this profound objection. Yet if a speculative 
watch should conclude, not to springs, levers, and 
escapements, but to intelligence in its maker, it would 
not seem to be very far astray. By personality, then, 
we mean only self-knowledge and self-control. Where 
these are present we have personal being ; where they 
are absent the being is impersonal. Selfhood, self- 
knowledge and self- direction are the essence of per- 
sonality; and these have no implication of corporeality 
or dependent limitation. 

In like manner the terms absolute and infinite need 
definition. Some of the most extraordinary verbal- 
isms in the history of philosophy are found in con- 
nection with these terms. Thus it has been maintained 
that the world-ground is no object of thought what- 
ever, and hence cannot be thought of as personal or 
impersonal, as intelligent or non-intelligent. The 
reason is found in the mutual contradictions alleged 
to exist between the necessary attributes of the fun- 
damental being. Thus we must regard it as self- 
centered, and hence absolute; as unlimited by anything 
beyond itself, and hence infinite ; and as world-ground, 
that is, as first cause. But while w^e are shut up by 
thought to these admissions, we are equally shut out 
from them by their mutual contradiction. For the 
first cause, as such, exists only in relation to the effect. 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 163 

If it had no effect, it would not be cause. Hence the 
first cause is necessarily related to its effect; and 
hence it cannot be absolute ; for the absolute exists 
out of all relations. The absolute cannot be a cause, 
and the cause cannot be absolute. Nor can we help 
ourselves by the idea of time, as if the world-ground 
first existed as absolute, and then became a cause ; 
for the other notion of the infinite bars our way. 
That which passes into new modes of existence either 
surpasses or sinks below itself, and in either case can- 
not be infinite, for the infinite must always comprise 
all possible modes of existence. Hence we have in 
these necessary attributes a disheartening, and even 
sickening, contradiction which shatters all our pre- 
tended knowledge. 

If this argument had not passed for important, we 
should refer to it only with expressions of apology. 
In itself it is mainly a play on words. Etymologi- 
cally the above meanings may be tortured out of the 
terms. The infinite may be taken as the quantitative 
all ; the absolute may be taken as the unrelated ; 
and then the conclusions follow. The infinite as 
quantitative all mu s t, of course, be all-embracing . Out- 
side of the all there can be nothing ; and if the all 
must comprehend all possible modes of existence at 
all times, it cannot change; and the universe is 
brought to the rigid monotony of the Eleatics. It is 
equally easy to show that the absolute cannot be 
related when we define it as the unrelated. But all 
this wisdom disappears when we remember the 
philosophical meaning of the terms. Both absolute 
and infinite mean only the independent ground of 
things. Relative existence is that which exists only 



164 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

in relation to other things. Both the ground and 
form of its existence are bound up in its relations. 
Such relations are restrictions, and imply dependence. 
But absoluteness denies this restriction and depend- 
ence. The absolute may exist in relations, provided 
those relations are freely posited by itself, and are 
not forced upon it from without. The infinite, again, 
is not the quantitative all. This "all" is purely a 
mental product which represents nothing apart from 
our thought. The world-ground is called infinite, 
because it is believed to be the independent source of 
the finite and its limitations, yet without being bound 
by them except in the sense of logical consistency. 
But in this sense the notions of the absolute and 
infinite are so far from incompatible that they mutu- 
ally imply each other, or are but different aspects of 
the same thing. The infinite would not be infinite if 
it were not absolute ; and neither infinite nor abso- 
lute would be anything if it were not a cause. 

Here, then, we have an absolute and independent 
being, the source of all finite things, and of all power 
and knowledge. Now that the ability to know itself 
and what it is doing should be denied to this source 
of all power and knowledge is a denial so amazing as 
to require the best reasons to support it. It is really 
one of the most extraordinary inversions in specula- 
tion, and a striking example of the havoc which can 
be wrought by using words without attending to 
their meaning. 

And first it is said that all consciousness involves 
the distinction of subject and object, and hence is 
impossible to an isolated and single being. It is, 
then, incompatible with both the infinity of the 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 165 

world-ground and with its singleness. As infinite it 
can have nothing beyond itself, and as only it can 
have no object. But this claim mistakes a mental 
form for an ontological distinction. The object in 
all consciousness is always only our presentations, and 
not something ontologically diverse from the mind 
itself. These presentations may stand for things, 
but consciousness extends only to the presentations.^ 
In self -consciousness this is manifestly the case. Here 
consciousness is a consciousness of our own states, 
thoughts, etc., as our own. The Infinite, then, need 
not have something other than himself as his object, 
but may find the object in his own activities, cosmic 
or otherwise. 

This fact contains the answer to another form of 
objection. The ego and non-ego are said to be two 
correlative notions, neither of which has any meaning 
apart from the other. Hence the conception of the 
self can arise only as the conception of the not-self 
arises with it; and hence, again, self-consciousness 
is possible only for finite beings who are limited 
by a not-self. 

It is only with effort that one can believe the first 
part of this claim to be seriously made. Two notions 
whose meaning consists in denying each other are 
pure negations without any positive content. Thus, 
A is not-^, and B is not-JL ; and hence A is not-not- 
A, and B is not-not-^. We end where we began. 
To make any sense one of the notions must have a 
positive meaning independent of the other. And in 
the case of ego and the non-ego, it is plain which is 
the positive notion. The ego is the immediately 
experienced self, and the non-ego is originally only 

THEISM — 12 



166 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

the sum of mental presentations, or that which 
the ego sets over against itself in consciousness as 
its object. Secondarily, the non-ego comes to mean 
whatever is excluded from the conscious self. Each 
person sets all his objects, whether persons or things, 
over against himself, and they constitute the non-ego 
for him. By overlooking this ambiguity, some spec- 
ulators have proved a rich variety of truths. Ideal- 
ism has been confounded by pointing out that 
consciousness demands an object as well as a subject, 
and thus the reality of matter has been solidly estab- 
lished. Consciousness demands a non-ego, and is not 
matter preeminently a non-ego ! 

The further claim that the conception of self can 
arise only as the conception of a not-self accompanies 
it is but a repetition of the preceding objection con- 
cerning the ego and non-ego. Consciousness does 
involve the coexistence of these conceptions as the 
form under which consciousness arises, but not as 
things ontologically diverse. The distinction of sub- 
ject and object, on which consciousness depends, is 
only a mental function, and not an ontological distinc- 
tion. The possibility of personality or self-conscious- 
ness in no way depends on the existence of a 
substantial not-self, but only on the ability of the 
subject to grasp its states, thoughts, etc., as its own. 
It is, indeed, true that our consciousness begins, and 
that it is conditioned by the activity of something not 
ourselves ; but it does not lie in the notion of con- 
sciousness that it must begin, or that it must be 
aroused from without. An eternal, unbegun self is as 
possible as an eternal, unbegun notrself. Eternal 
consciousness is no more difficult than eternal uncon- 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 167 

sciousness ; and withal, if unconsciousness had ever 
been absohite there is no way of reaching conscious- 
ness. In addition, all the skeptical difficulties which 
attend that view crowd upon us. Hence to the ques- 
tion. What is the object of the Infinite's conscious- 
ness ? the answer is, The Infinite himself, his thoughts, 
states, etc. To the question, When did this con- 
sciousness begin? the answer is. Never. To the 
question. On what does this consciousness depend? 
the answer is. On the Infinite's own power to 
know. 

On all these accounts we regard the objections to 
the personality of the world-ground as resting on a 
very superficial psychology. So far as they are not 
verbal, they arise from taking the limitations of 
human consciousness as essential to consciousness in 
general. In fact we must reverse the common specu- 
lative dogma on this point, and declare that proper 
personality is possible only to the Absolute. The 
very objections urged against the personality of the 
Absolute show the incompleteness of human personal- 
ity. Thus it is said, truly enough, that we are condi- 
tioned by something not ourselves. The outer world 
is an important factor in om- mental life. It controls 
us far more than we do it. But this is a limitation 
of our personality rather than its source. Our person- 
ahty would be heightened rather than diminished, if we 
were self-determinant in this respect. Again, in our 
inner life we find similar limitations. We cannot 
always control our ideas. They often seem to be 
occurrences in us rather than our own doing. The 
past vanishes beyond recall ; and often in the present 
we are more passive than active. But these, also, are 



168 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

limitations of our personality. We should be much 
more truly persons if we were absolutely determinant 
of all our states. But we have seen that all finite 
things have the ground of their existence, not in 
themselves, but in the Infinite, and that they owe 
their peculiar nature to their mutual relations and to 
the plan of the whole. Hence, in the finite conscious- 
ness, there will always be a foreign element, an 
external compulsion, a passivity as well as activity, a 
dependence on something not ourselves, and a corre- 
sponding subjection. Hence in us personality will 
always be incomplete. The absolute knowledge and 
self-possession which are necessary to perfect personal- 
ity can be found only in the absolute and infinite 
being upon whom all things depend. In his pure 
self-determination and perfect self-possession only do 
we find the conditions of complete personality ; and 
of this our finite personality can never be more than 
the feeblest and faintest image. 

In addition to these psychological misunderstandings, 
a logical aberration is also latent in the attempts to 
trace the personal to the impersonal. The law of the 
sufficient reason, when uncritically handled, is al- 
ways tempting us to explain the explanation, thus 
committing us to the infinite regress. Under this 
illusion we try to get behind intelligence, or to 
exhibit it as something welling up from impersonal 
depths beneath it. This is fictitious. When we 
have reached intelligence the regress must end. 
Further inquiry must concern the purpose of intelli- 
gence. When we look for something beneath intelli- 
gence, we merely leave the supreme and self-sufficient 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 169 

category of personality for the lower mechanical cate- 
gories, which are possible only in and through intel- 
ligence. The law of the sufficient reason is a most 
excellent principle ; but of itself it does not tell us 
what can be a sufficient reason. Reflection shows 
that only living intelligence can be a sufficient reason ; 
and logic forbids us to ask a sufficient reason for a 
sufficient reason. Intelligence, as we have said, ex- 
-plains other things as its own work, and accepts 
itself 

Furthermore, metaphysics shows the contradiction 
inherent in the notion of impersonal existence. Con- 
scious thought is seen to be the supreme condition of 
all existence. The reconciliation of change and iden- 
tity, without which both thought and being perish, is 
found only in conscious thought The rescue of reality 
from fatal dispersion through the infinite divisibility 
of space and time is possible only through conscious 
thought. On the impersonal plane all the categories 
either vanish or deny themselves. The universe of 
experience has no meaning or possibility apart from 
conscious intelligence as its abiding source or seat. 
Thus once more we are compelled to reverse the spec- 
ulative dogma that personality is second and not first, 
and say that living, personal intelligence is the only 
possible first. 

All this we may hold with firm conviction. At 
the same time we must recognize that a true feeling 
underlies many of these objections, and guard our- 
selves against a superficial anthropomorphism in our 
theistic doctrine. First of all we must beware of 
hasty and over-confident interpretations of the design 
in things. Epistemology compels us to affirm final- 



170 THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 

ity as the essential form of cosmic causality, but this 
does not imply that we can always trace this finality. 
On the contrary^ experience shows that we are largely 
unable to trace the purpose in cosmic arrangements 
and events. In such cases we must content ourselves 
with finding the laws of coexistence and sequence, and 
must wait for further insight. Again, in a complex 
system the essential purpose can be known only from 
a knowledge of the whole ; and in that case it is easy 
to mistake partial purposes for finalities, or to make 
some relative convenience of our own a standard of 
judgment. It is well known that not a little of the 
prejudice against final causes is due to the absurdities 
into which men have fallen in their interpretation. 
We are in this matter where the intelligent Christian 
is with reference to the behef in a divine guidance 
of our lives. It is something believed in, but also 
something which can be only very imperfectly traced. 
In both cases, also, too exact and extended specification 
is likely to lead to intellectual scandal. 

Further, we must bear in mind the distinction 
made in the last chapter between the purpose of 
things and the way in which they come about as 
events in space and time. Failure to regard this dis- 
tinction is the great source of the aversion of science 
to teleology. Thus two distinct inquiries, both neces- 
sary for our complete mental satisfaction, are confused, 
and needless hostility results. 

And finally we must beware of easy anthropo- 
morphism in our thought of the infinite mind. Of 
course we can think at all only as we assimilate that 
mind to our own ; but a little reflection warns us 
against transferring our finite peculiarities and limita- 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS PERSONAL 171 

tions without careful inspection. A thought life so 
different from ours eludes any but the vaguest appre- 
hension on our part. Its unchanging fullness yet 
without monotony, the structure of the absolute rea- 
son also which determines the eternal contents of the 
divine thought, the timeless and absolute self-posses- 
sion — how mysterious all this is, how impenetrable 
to our profoundest reflection. We can see that these 
affirmations must be made, but we also see that in a 
sense they must always lie beyond us. Here we reach 
a point where the speculation of philosophy must give 
place to the worship and adoration of religion. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE WORLD- 
GROUND 

Our speculative conception of the world-ground 
begins to approximate to the religious conception 
of God. A great variety of influences, instinctive, 
speculative, and ethical, have led the human mind to 
build up the conception of a personal and intelligent 
God ; and this view, when criticised, not only proves 
able to maintain itself, but also appears as a demand 
and implication of reason itself. The race, however, 
has not contented itself with this bare affirmation, 
but, by an intellectual labor extending over centuries, 
has sought to determine more closely the content of 
its theistic thought. These determinations fall into 
two classes, metaphysical and ethical. The former 
aim to tell what God is by virtue of his position as 
first cause, and the second relate to his character. 
Or the former refer to the divine nature, the latter to 
the divine will. Beyond this distinction, the various 
classifications of the divine attributes in which dog- 
matic theology abounds have no significance for either 
speculative or religious thought. We pass now to 
consider the leading metaphysical attributes as belong- 
ing to the world-ground. The result will be to show 
a still closer approximation of religious and specula- 

172 



UNITY 173 

tive thought. We begin also to use the terms, God 
and world-ground, as interchangeable. 

Unity 

The unity of the world-ground is the first of these 
metaphysical attributes ; and the necessity of its 
affirmation is found in a study of interaction But 
necessary as it is, its meaning is not always clearly 
grasped. We need, then, to inquire of metaphysics 
what is meant by the unity of being in general. 

In affirming unity of a thing the primal aim is to 
deny composition and divisibility. A compound is 
not a thing but an aggregate. The reality is the 
component factors. The thought of a compound is 
impossible without the assumption of units ; and if 
these are compounds, we must assume other units ; and 
so on until we come to ultimate and uncompounded ^' 
units. These are the true realities. Hence, the 
divisible is never a proper thing, but a sum or a 
crowd. When, then, we say that a thing is a unit, 
we mean first of all that it is not compounded, and 
does not admit of division. Hence the doctrine of 
the unity of the world-ground is first of all a denial 
of composition and divisibility. There can be neither 
unity nor plurality in any scheme that admits of 
infinite divisibility ; for instance, in any scheme that 
affirms the substantial reality of space and time. 

Unity has sometimes been taken to mean simpli- 
city, or the opposite of complexity and variety. 
Herbart especially has identified them, and has de- 
clared that unity of the subject is incompatible with 
plurality of attributes. The same view has often 



174 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

appeared in treating of the divine unity. This has 
been conceived as pure simplicity; and thus the 
divine being has been reduced to a rigid and lifeless 
stare. This view brings thought to a standstill ; for 
the one, conceived as pure simplicity, leads to nothing 
and explains nothing. It contains no ground of 
differentiation and progress. So, then, there is a 
very general agreement that the unity of the world- 
ground must contain some provision for manifoldness 
and complexity. 

The history of thought shows a curious uncertainty 
at this point. On the one hand, there has been a 
universal demand for unity with a very general failure 
to reach it. And on the other hand, if the unity has 
been reached, there has been quite as general an 
inability to make any use of it. This is a necessary 
result of thinking only under mechanical conditions. 
In such thinking, when we begin with a plurality, we 
never escape it, for mechanical necessity cannot 
differentiate itself. If we trace the plurality to some 
one being, we are forced to carry the plurality im- 
plicitly into the unity, as there is no way of mechani- 
cally deducing plurality from unity. But in that case, 
though we confidently talk about unity, we are quite 
unable to tell in what the unity of such a being con- 
sists. If, on the other hand, we assume the unity, 
we are unable to take one step toward plurality. 
The all-embracing unity refuses to differentiate or to 
move at all. 

This puzzle can be solved only by leaving the 
mechanical realm for that of free intellect. The 
free and conscious self is the only real unity of which 
we have any knowledge, and reflection shows that it 



mnxY . 175 

is the only thing which can be a true unity. All 
other unities are formal, and have only a mental 
existence. Space and time contain no unity ; and 
spatial and temporal existence disappears in infinite 
divisibility. But free intelligence by its originating 
activity can posit plurality distinct from its own 
unity, and by its self-consciousness can maintain 
its unity and identity over against the changing 
plurality. Here the one is manifold without being 
many. Here unity gives birth to plurality without 
destroying itself. Here the identical changes and 
yet abides. But this perennial wonder is possible 
only on the plane of free and self-conscious intelli- 
gence. For mechanical thinking the problem admits 
only of verbal solutions. 

We see, then, that while it is easy to talk of unity, 
it is by no means so easy to reach it. Abstract reflec- 
tion reveals the difl&culty of the notion ; only personal 
experience of living intelligence presents any real 
unity and solves the problem. 

So much for the metaphysics of unity. Probably, 
however, the thought most generally connected with 
the divine unity is not so much that God is one 
as that God is only. Hence the doctrine has been 
always monotheism, and not henotheism. The his- 
toric influences which have led to this monotheistic 
faith are manifold ; and its speculative necessity is 
stringent. The thought of many gods, each of which 
should live in a world by himself, or rather, in a uni- 
verse of his own, is a pure fancy due to the abstract- 
ing and hypos tasizing tendency of the mind. If 
they should meet and interact in a common universe, 
they would necessarily become finite and conditioned 



176 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

beings in mutual interaction, and hence not independ- 
ent and self -existent. The discussion of the unity 
of the world-ground has shown that all things which 
are bound up in a scheme of interaction must have 
their existence in some one being on which they 
depend. This being founds the system, and all that 
is in the system flows from it. But we are able to 
form general notions, and then to conceive an indefinite 
number of members of the class. We do the same 
with the universe and the fundamental being. We 
form the notions, and then fancy that there may be 
other universes and other fundamental realities. But 
plainly such fancies are mental fictions. The actual 
universe, whereby we mean the total system of the 
finite, must be referred to the one world-ground. 
The imaginary systems need nothing for their expla- 
nation beyond the somewhat unclear mind that forms ' 
them and mistakes them for realities. If one should 
ask how we know that there may not be something 
entirely independent of our system and totally un- 
related to it, the answer would be that our business 
is with the actual universe, and does not include the 
disproof of chimeras. This only may be allowed. 
If by universe we mean the system of sense-perceptions 
in an idealistic sense, the one world-ground may 
maintain a series of such systems. In this sense a 
number of universes would be possible, but the unity 
and singleness of the fundamental reahty would still 
be necessary. 

This fact has often been disregarded in speculation. 
Not a few have been pleased to regard space, time, 
and God as mutually independent existences, or 
rather to make space and time into preexistent ne- 



UNCHANGEABILITY 177 

cessities to which God himself must submit. How 
these independent and unrelated existences could be 
brought into mutual relations is a problem left un- 
solved. Such notions spring from a very superficial 
metaphysics. 

The unity of the world-ground means, then, not 
only that it is uncompounded, indivisible, and with- 
out distinction of parts, but also that there is but one 
such fundamental existence. 

Unchangeability 

A second attribute is that of unchangeability. 
This attribute has often been verbally interpreted 
with the result of reducing existence to a fixed rigid- 
ity from which all life and movement are excluded. 
The Eleatics made being one and changeless, and 
were then utterly unable to account for the world of 
plurality and change. A similar mistake often appears 
in speculative theology. It has sometimes so empha- 
sized the unchangeability as to lose the living personal 
God altogether. 

This misconception has its main root in the sense 
metaphysics of spontaneous thought. This assumes 
that substance in general is changeless, and that 
change falls among the activities and properties. But 
a little reflection shows that an absolutely rigid sub- 
stance cannot explain the changing activities of the 
thing. For every change in the activity or the mani- 
festation, we must afiirm a corresponding change in 
the thing itself. Changes among things must depend 
upon changes in things. What is true of all agents 
is true of God or the world-ground. God, as a rigid 



178 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

sameness of existence, would contain no explanation 
of the advancing cosmic movement, and would admit 
of no change in action and knowledge. In truth, as 
metaphysics shows, the changelessness of a being con- 
sists not in such an ontological rigidity of fixed mo- 
notony of being, but rather in the constancy and 
continuity of the law which rules its several states 
and changes. The unchangeability of God means 
only the constancy and continuity of the divine nature 
which exists through all the divine acts as their law 
and source. Metaphysics further shows that if we 
insist upon having some abiding and identical prin- 
ciple superior to change and constant in change, it 
can be found only in personality. And here it does 
not consist in any rigid core of being, but rather in 
the extraordinary power of self-consciousness, whereby 
the being distinguishes itself from its states, and con- 
stitutes itself identical and abiding. Where this is 
lacking, there may be a continuity of process, but 
nothing more. The unchangeability is purely formal, 
as when a given note is constantly produced ; and 
this formal imchangeabiHty is possible only through 
the unchanging self. 

In the solution of this problem also we are thrown 
back again on experience. Thought must reach the 
changeless or perish. But on the impersonal plane 
and under the law of the sufficient reason, thought 
can never reach the changeless, but abides in the 
eternal flow and infinite regress. This law compels 
us to find the consequent in the antecedent. If 
change here, then change there. If plurality here, 
then plurality there. The problem can never be 
solved on the mechanical plane, but only on the 



OMNIPRESENCE 179 

plane of free personality and in terms of living 
experience. The changelessness we need is not the 
rigidity of a logical category but the self-identity 
and self -equality of intelligence. Both change and 
changelessness in the concrete have to be interpreted 
with reference to self -consciousness. Abstract defini- 
tions and temporal coordinates only distort the prob- 
lem or make it fictitious. 

So much for the metaphysics of unchangeability. 
But in truth many things are gathered up in this 
attribute. Eeligious thought, as distinct from theo- 
logical thought, has generally meant something dis- 
tinct from the metaphysical formula. One aim has 
been to affirm the independence and eternity of God 
in opposition to the dependence and brevity of man. 
Again, the predicate has often been made to mean 
the ethical constancy of the divine activity, and to 
exclude all arbitrariness and caprice from the divine 
purposes. In this last sense the attribute passes from 
the metaphysical into the ethical realm, and eludes 
any metaphysical deduction or justification. 

Omnipresence 

A third attribute is that of omnipresence. This 
concerns God's relation to space. By crude thought 
this is often understood as implying extension of the 
subject. Space is supposed to exist as infinite room, 
which is then filled out with a boundless bulk ; 
and this is omnipresence. This view is speculatively 
untenable, and is incompatible with the unity of the 
world-ground. Nothing that exists extended in space 
can be a unit ; for in every such being it will always 



180 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

be possible to distinguish different parts which are 
either actually separate, or are held apart and together 
only by the forces in them. In the latter case the 
body disappears into an aggregate of different forces, 
and in both cases its unity disappears. No more can 
such a thing be omnipresent in space. It can only 
be present in space part for part, or volume for 
volume, and hence there is no proper omnipresence. 
Omnipresence is real only as the entire being is 
present at any and every point ; as the entire mind 
is present in each and all its thoughts. ' 

Speculatively, then, the doctrine of omnipresence 
must take another form, and one mainly negative. 
We are able to act directly upon only a few things. 
These are said to be present to us. In other cases 
we can act only through media. These are said to 
be absent. If the interaction were equally direct and 
immediate in all cases, there would be no ground for 
the distinction of present and absent. Thus space 
appears to us as a limitation, although space is really 
but the form imder which our dynamic limitations 
appear. Omnipresence means a denial of these limi- 
tations. Immediate action means presence i imme- 
diate action which extends to all things means 
omnipresence. God, or the world-ground, therefore, 
as immanent in all things, is omnipresent. If, then, 
he wills to act upon anything, he has not to cross any 
distance, long or short, to reach it, and he is not 
compelled to use media; but his activity is rather 
immediately and completely present. Conversely, if 
the finite wishes to act upon God, say by prayer, 
neither the prayer nor the person need go wandering 
about to reach and find God ; for we live and have 



ETERNITY 181 

our being in him ; and he is an ever-present power 
in us. Only in this sense, which denies that space is 
a limitation or barrier for God, is the doctrine of 
omnipresence tenable. This view is made all the 
more necessary from the claim of metaphysics that 
space is no ontological reality, and has only a mental 
existence. 

In estimating this result we must notice that our 
spatial judgments are double. Some refer to the 
pure space intuition, as in geometry, and others refer 
to our own organic relations and limitations. The 
former may be viewed as universal, and they imply 
no extension of the subject. The thought of space 
is not spatial in the sense of being extended, any 
more than the thought of the square has four corners 
to it. The other class of spatial judgments is purely 
relative to us, and might have no significance for 
changed organic and dynamic conditions. When we 
speak of " annihilating space " we are dealing with 
relations of this class. Space in this sense would not 
exist for a being on whom all things immediately 
depend. 

Eternity 

The attribute of eternity concerns God's relations 
to time. It has a variety of meanings. The first 
and lowest is that of unbegun and endless duration of 
existence. If time be an ontological fact, the world- 
ground must be eternal in this sense, for void time 
could never have produced anything. There is, too, 
a certain aesthetic value in the thought of endless 
duration which is not unworthy of the Infinite. But 

THEISM 13 



182 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

in general, religious thinkers have been unwilling to 
identify the divine eternity with endless duration, 
but have rather sought to place it in opposition to all 
time, as denoting an existence above and beyond all 
temporal limits and conditions. This is an attempt 
to conceive the divine relation to time like the divine 
relation to space, as a superior and transcendental one. 

The common thought of the matter is that time 
exists as a boundless form, which God fills out with 
his duration, just as in the common thought he fills 
out space with his extension ; but this is metaphysi- 
cally as untenable in one case as in the other. Meta- 
physics shows that time itself is no independent 
reality which conditions change or in which change 
occurs. Such a view would violate the necessary 
unity of the world-ground and make all existence 
whatever impossible. Still this claim alone does not 
decide that the world-ground is superior to time ; for 
while time disappears as existence it may still remain 
as law, so that the temporal form is a necessity even 
of the basal reality. 

The shortest way out is to call the world-ground 
the unconditioned, and then to deduce from this 
attribute its superiority to all conditions, temporal or 
otherwise. But this notion of the unconditioned is 
a somewhat vague one, and cannot be used without 
scrutiny. Thought can positively affirm an uncondi- 
tioned being only in the sense of a being which does 
not depend on other beings ; but such a being might 
still have profound internal limitations. The world- 
ground is, indeed, unconditioned by anything beyond 
itself ; but it must be conditioned by its own nature 
in any case, and the question arises whether this con- 



ETERNITY 183 

ditioning involves temporal sequence in the infinite 
life itself. 

To maintain the affirmative here would involve us 
in the gravest speculative difficulties. We should 
have to hold that the world-ground is subject to a 
law of development and comes only gradually to 
itself, or rather that there is some constitutional 
necessity in the world-ground which forbids it always 
to be in full possession of itseK. In fact we should 
have to limit to the extent of this necessity that free 
and self-centered cause which reason demands as the 
only adequate world-ground. Moreover, epistemology 
shows that there is a certain timeless element in all 
consciousness. To admit real succession into con- 
sciousness would make thought impossible. The 
knowledge of the changing must be changeless, and 
the knowledge of time must be timeless. Further- 
more, metaphysics shows that the temporal relation 
is essentially a relation in and to self-consciousness. It 
is not an unvarying and absolute quality of events, but 
is relative to the range of consciousness itself. Time 
cannot be measiu-ed by or referred to any extra-men- 
tal fact whatever, but must be dealt with purely as a 
relation in consciousness. We do not have experience 
in time as something independent of mind, but expe- 
rience has the temporal form ; and this is largely an 
expression of our finitude and limitation. Indeed, the 
temporal judgment is so largely relative to our present 
conditions that we can easily conceive it indefinitely 
modified by changing them. Thus if the periodicities 
of day and night, summer and winter, rest and labor, 
youth and age were removed, not much would be left 
of our temporal measures and judgments. 



184 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

Bearing these facts in mind, we may view the rela- 
tion of the world-ground to time as follows : First, 
there are certain features in our relation to time 
which cannot be affirmed of the world-ground. Thus 
we are subject to slow development ; we come gradu- 
ally to self-possession ; we grow old and pass away. 
This we express by saying that we are subject to 
temporal limits and conditions. In none of these 
respects can the unconditioned world-ground be sub- 
ject to time, but must rather be non-temporal. A 
being which is in full possession of itself, so that it 
does not come to itself successively, but forever is 
what it wills to be, is not in time so far as itself is 
concerned. Such a being would have a changeless 
knowledge and a changeless life. It would be with- 
out memory and expectation, yet in the absolute 
enjoyment of itself. For such a being the present 
alone would exist ; its now would be eternal, and its 
name, I Am. For us the unconditioned world-ground, 
or God, is such a being ; and he is not to be viewed 
as conditioned by time with regard to his own self- 
consciousness and self-possession. But only in the 
self-centered and self-equivalent personality can we 
transcend the conditions and the sphere of time. 
God in himself, then, is not only the eternal or ever- 
enduring ; he is also the non-temporal, or that which 
transcends temporal limits and conditions. 

This is easily admitted for God as the absolute 
person, but a difficulty arises when we consider him 
as the founder and conductor of the world-process. 
This fact seems to bring God into a new relation to 
time. This process is a developing, changing one, 
and hence is essentially temporal. Hence the divine 



ETERNITY 185 

activity therein is also essentially temporal. The 
divine knowledge of the system in its possibilities may 
be non-temporal, but the divine agency in and knowl- 
edge of the actual system must be temporal, because 
the system is temporal. There is succession in the 
process and there must be succession in the realizing 
will. A changeless knowledge of an ideal is possible ; 
but a changeless knowledge of a changing thing looks 
like a contradiction. Unchangeability and non-tem- 
porality, then, would seem to apply to God only in 
his relation to himself. They apply to his knowledge 
only as related to himself or to the possible or to his 
purposes. 

This seems perfectly clear at first sight, but grows 
cloudy on reflection. If the world-process is to be in 
time in any sense it must be in time for some one. 
Its temporality has no meaning in itself or for itself, 
being essentially only a relation in consciousness. 
Epistemology refuses to allow us to subordinate con- 
sciousness to change or to carry any ontological 
change into consciousness. Consciousness itself is the 
fixed background on which change is projected and 
without which it is nothing. When from supposed 
real changes we reason backward by the law of the 
sufficient reason, thought perishes at once, either in 
the Heraclitic flux or in the infinite regress. To 
escape this result all change must be referred to the 
changeless, that is, to the non-temporal ; and all 
temporal measures and relations must be found, not in 
thought itself, but in the order of objects which 
thought constitutes. Of course, this is impossible on 
the impersonal plane. The problem of change and 
changelessness, of time and non-temporality, which is 



186 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

one of thought's deepest problems, finds its solution 
only on the basis of free intelligence and theistic 
idealism. Abstract thought with its abstract cate- 
gories can do nothing; we must fall back on tran- 
scendental empiricism, and interpret our terms by the 
living experience of intelligence. The self -identity or 
self-equality of intelligence is the only real changeless- 
ness of which we have experience ; and it is the only 
one which meets this case. All else is abstract fiction. 
The net result is this : We borrow from meta- 
physics the conviction that in any case time is no 
form of existence but only of experience ; and that 
it is essentially a relation in self-consciousness which 
varies with our finite conditions. There is a large 
element of relativity in our temporal judgments which 
may not be transferred to God, being valid only 
for ourselves. Further, the temporal relation must 
always be sought among the works of intelligence, 
and never within intelligence itself. Hence the abso- 
lute intelligence and will must lie beyond all tem- 
poral limits and conditions as their source, but never 
included in them. ^ 

Omniscience 

In interpreting omniscience, etymologizing has too 
often taken the place of philosophizing, and specula- 
tors have sought to determine the content of the idea 
by analyzing the word. But this process is delusive. 
No idea can be understood by studying the composi- 
tion of the word, but only by reflecting upon the way 
in which the idea is reached. In the largest sense of 
the word omniscience means a knowledge of all things 



OMNISCIENCE 187 

and of all events, past, present, and future, necessary 
and free alike. But we cannot affirm that this is 
possible on the sole strength of etymology. We must 
rather inquire whether this stretching of omniscience 
is not as untenable as the similar stretching of omnip- 
otence, when it is made to affirm the possibility of 
the contradictory. All allow that the contradictory 
is impossible ; and hence we are not at liberty to in- 
clude contradiction in our conception of the divine 
attributes. As omnipotence must be limited to the 
doable, so omniscience must be limited to the know- 
able. If, then, there be anything essentially unknow- 
able, it must lie beyond even omniscience. 

In advance of reflection it is a possible supposition 
that intelligence plays only a coordinate, if not second- 
ary, part in the world-ground. Our own knowledge 
reaches only a small part of what takes place within 
us, and the rest is shrouded in mystery. It is con- 
ceivable that, in like manner, there should be in the 
world-ground a double reahn, one part of which is 
hidden from the scrutiny and control of intelligence. 

This view results partly from an anthropomorphic 
transference of our limitations to the absolute being 
and partly from picture thinking. It is the double- 
faced somewhat over again. It is so destitute of pos- 
itive grounds as to be quite gratuitous. If extended 
to cosmic action it would deprive us of the control 
of free intellect, which we have found necessary for 
understanding the cosmic order. Moreover, reflection 
shows that this view would end in an impossible dual- 
ism. Absolute personality must be absolute self- 
knowledge and self-control. This only will meet the 
ideal of reason in the case, and in the lack of positive 



188 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

objection reason will always aflSrm it. The sole per- 
missible inquiry is how far the notion of omniscience 
is self -consistent. 

A preliminary scruple exists concerning the divine 
knowledge of those forms of finite experience which 
cannot be ascribed to the Infinite. The totality of 
physical experiences seems to belong only to the 
finite ; how, then, can the Infinite comprehend them? 
The work of our understanding in these cases con- 
sists entirely in classifying and naming ; the thing 
itself is realized only in immediate experience. To 
press this difiiculty would make an impassable gulf 
between the finite and the Infinite ; and to solve it is 
beyond us, except in a formal way. If we are not 
willing to ascribe these experiences, as of physical 
pains, to God, and are also unwilling to deny him 
knowledge of the same, we must allow that there are 
modes of the divine knowing which we cannot com- 
prehend. The contents of a sense that we do not 
possess are utterly unknowable to us, and yet by 
hypothesis the Infinite comprehends the finite experi- 
ence without participation therein. The mystery in- 
volved in this assumption has led to many surmises 
in both theology and philosophy. A crude pantheism 
has thought to solve the problem by declaring that 
our experience is really God's ; but this only con- 
founds all distinctions. The psychology and episte- 
mology of the Infinite have their obscurities. 

But for popular thought the chief difficulty in 
omniscience concerns the foreknowledge of free 
choices. The past and present may be conceived 
to lie open to omniscience. The possible also may be 
fully known. The free creature can do nothing 



OMNISCIENCE 189 

that was not foreseen as possible. Here, then, is a 
realm forever free from all enlargement and surprise. 
Here the parting of the ways begins. A free act by 
its nature is a new beginning, and hence is not repre- 
sented before its occurrence by anything that must 
lead to it. Hence a free act, until performed, is only 
a possibility, and not a fact. But knowledge must 
grasp the fact as it is, and hence, it is held, the act 
can be foreknown only as possible, and never as 
actual. Being only a possibility antecedently to its 
occurrence, it must be known as such. On the other 
side it is held that, though only a possibility in itself, 
it may yet be known as one which will surely be 
realized. The knowledge in this case does not com- 
pel the fact, but foresees it, and leaves the fact as free 
as if unforeseen. • , 

Upon the possibility of such foreknowledge opinions 
still difer. Some have asserted foreknowledge and 
denied freedom; others have asserted freedom and 
denied foreknowledge ; and still others have affirmed 
both. Both of the former classes agree in viewing 
freedom and foreknowledge as incompatible, and 
differ only as to which member of the antithesis they 
reject. ^ 

The difficulty in the last view is this : By definition 
a free act is an absolute beginning, and as such is 
not represented by anything before its occurrence. 
We trace it to a specific volition, and beyond that 
it has neither existence nor representation. But 
knowledge of a future event always supposes present 
grounds of knowing ; and in the case of a free act 
there are no such grounds. Hence a foreknowledge 
of a free act is a knowledge without assignable grounds 



190 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

of knowing. On the assumption of a real time it is 
hard to find a way out of this difficulty. Indeed, 
there would be no way out unless we assume that 
God has modes of knowing which are inscrutable to us. 
A foreknowledge of freedom cannot be proved to be 
a contradiction ; and on the other hand it cannot be 
construed in its possibility. 

All this on the supposition of a single, all-condi- 
tioning time. On our own view of the ideality and 
relativity of time the problem vanishes in its tradi- 
tional form, and nothing remains but the general 
mystery which shrouds for us the epistemology of the 
Infinite and the existence of the finite. 

Omnipotence 

This predicate implies what we have before assumed 
from metaphysics, that the world-ground is not a 
substance, but an agent ; not a stuff, but a cause ; 
and the general aim has been to affirm the absolute- 
ness or imconditionedness of the world-ground. 

Two tendencies appear in the common view of the 
matter. One is to view God as able to do the doable 
but as limited by some necessities, probably self- 
existent and eternal, which cannot be transcended. 
This view has not satisfied either religious feeling or 
speculative thought, as involving an untenable sub- 
ordination of God. The result has been to suggest 
the opposite view, according to which God is lifted 
above all limits and is able to do all things, the 
impossible as well as the possible. But if the former 
view seemed tame, the latter seems to be utter non- 
sense and the death of reason itself. 



OMNIPOTENCE 191 

Probably no one who believes in God at all would 
find any difficulty with his omnipotence in contingent 
matters. Accordingly, those who have affirmed limi- 
tation of power have commonly done so on the basis 
of some necessity of reason or eternal truth. These, 
it is assumed, can never be violated by any power 
whatever, and these impose Hmitations on all power, 
human or divine. The question of divine limitation, 
then, really concerns God's relation to these neces- 
sities of reason, or eternal truths. Is he conditioned 
by them or superior to them? We shall need to 
move warily and with great circumspection to escape 
falling a prey to the abstractions that swarm in this 
region. 

In speaking of the unity of the world-ground we 
pointed out that it is incompatible with any plurality 
of fundamental being. Hence it follows that truth 
and necessity themselves must in some way be founded 
in the world-ground. If we should assume a realm 
of truth to exist apart from being, it could have no 
effect in being unless we should further assume an 
interaction between it and being. But this would 
make truth a thing, and would compel the assumption 
of another being deeper than both truth and reality to 
mediate their interaction. At this point we fall an 
easy prey to our own abstractions. A law of nature 
is never the antecedent, but the consequence of 
reality. The real is first and only, and being what it 
is, its laws result as a consequence, or, rather, are but 
expressions of what the things are. Yet so easily do 
we mistake abstractions for things that, after we have 
gathered the laws from the things, we at once proceed 
to regard the things as the subjects, if not the prod- 



192 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

ucts, of the laws they found. Then we speak of the 
reign of law ; and thus by a double abstraction law is 
made to appear as a real sovereign apart from and 
above things, and as the expression of some fathom- 
less necessity. Of course, when reality appears it has 
nothing to do but to fall into the forms which the 
sovereign laws prescribe. Thus the cause is made 
subject to its own effects, and reality is explained as 
the result of its own consequences. The inverted 
nature of the thought is manifest. Natural laws are 
the consequences of reality, and never its grounds or 
anything apart from it. 

The same is true for truth. Rational truth, as dis- 
tinct from truth of contingent fact, is never anything 
more than an expression of the necessary relations of 
ideas, or of the way in which reason universally pro- 
ceeds. As such, it is nothing apart from the mind or 
antecedent to it, but is simply an expression of the 
mental nature. But we overlook this and abstract a 
set of principles which we call eternal truths, and 
erect into a series of fathomless necessities to which 
being can do nothing but submit. The fictitious 
nature of this procedure is apparent. There is no 
realm of truth apart from the world-ground ; and we 
must look in this being for the foundation of truth 
itself, and of all those principles whereby the distinc- 
tions of true and false, consistent and contradictory, 
possible and impossible, themselves exist. In a sys- 
tem in which these distinctions are already founded, 
they would be valid for all new events, not, however, 
as abstract necessities, but as actual laws of a real 
system. 

It is partly oversight of this distinction which leads 



OMNIPOTENCE 193 

US to think that these principles precede reality. They 
do, indeed, precede specific events and condition them, 
and hence we fancy that they precede reality in gen- 
eral. A further fancy completes the illusion. When 
one speaks of truth as valid even in the void, he fails 
to see that his conception of the void is only a con- 
ception, and that he himself is present with all his 
ideas and laws of thought. And when along with 
his conception of the void he has other conceptions, 
and finds that the customary relations between them 
continue to exist, he fancies that he has truly con- 
ceived the void and has found that the laws of 
thought would be valid if all reality should vanish. 
But the illusion is patent. The whole art of finding 
what would be true in the void consists in asking 
what is now true for the thinking mind. The true 
void would be the undistinguishable nothing ; and 
the ideal distinctions of truth and error would have 
no meaning, to say nothing of application. Hence 
we conclude that truth is not independent of the 
world-ground, but is in some way founded therein 
and dependent thereon. The notion of an independ- 
ent realm of self-sufficient, all-conditioning truth may 
be set aside with all conviction. 

This dependence may be conceived in two ways. 
Truth may be viewed as founded in the nature of the 
world-ground, or as a creature of volition. The 
latter view has often appeared in theology, but is 
inconsistent with itself. The statement that God is 
arbitrary with regard to truth, that he can make or 
unmake it, assumes that truth exists and has a mean- 
ing apart from the divine volition. For why should 
the product of the creative act be called truth rather 



194 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

than error, unless it agree with certain fixed stand- 
ards of truth with which error disagrees ? Hence all 
such statements as that God can make the true false, 
or the possible impossible, imply that the standard of 
both exists independently of volition; and God is 
merely allowed to transfer objects back and forth 
across limits which are fixed in themselves. 

The inconsistency of the negative form of statement 
is equally manifest. In order that truth shall be 
unmade or broken, it must first exist as truth. If 
any proposition that is to be broken were not in 
itself true, there would be no truth to break. A 
proposition that is false cannot be made false, for it 
is false already. Hence, to make truth the creature 
of volition either denies truth altogether, or else it 
breaks down through its own self-contradiction. But 
the aim of those who have held this view has never 
been to deny truth, but rather to exalt the absolute 
and unconditioned independence of God. The spec- 
ulators who have argued in this way have commonly 
meant well, but have had no clear insight into the 
nature of the problem. 

So, then, we object to the statement either that 
God makes truth or that he recognizes it as something 
independent of himself. He is rather its source and 
foundation ; and it, in turn, is the fixed mode of his 
procedure. We may view rational principles as con- 
sequences or expressions of the divine nature, or as 
fundamental laws of the divine activity. Both 
phrases have the same meaning. 

Many have objected to ascribing a nature of any 
kind to God as the source of the divine manifesta- 
tion. They have found in such a notion a limitation, 



OMNIPOTENCE 195 

and have held that God, as absolute, must give him- 
self his own nature. There must be nothing consti- 
tutional with God, but all that he is must be a product 
of his absolute will. In himself God has been styled 
"the abyss," "the silence," "the super-essential," and 
many other verbal vacuities. This is due partly to 
a misunderstanding of the term nature, and partly 
to an overstrained conception of absoluteness. We 
notice first the misunderstanding. 

We finite beings are subject to development, and 
view our nature as the mysterious source of the 
movement. Again, we inherit much, and we often 
sum up our inherited peculiarities as our nature. This 
nature, too, frequently appears as a limitation from 
which we would gladly escape. Thus a split arises 
in the soul. The free spirit has to struggle against a 
power which seems to be not of itself — an old man 
of the sea, or a body of death. In this sense a nature 
cannot be ascribed to an absolute being. Such a 
nature is essentially a limitation, and can belong only 
to the conditioned and finite. 

But a nature in the sense of a fixed law of activity 
or mode of manifestation involves no such limitation. 
This is best seen in a concrete case. Thinking, we 
say, is governed by the laws of thought. But these 
laws are not anything either out of the mind or in 
the mind. We feel them neither as an external yoke 
nor as an internal limitation. The reason is that 
they are essentially only modes of thought activity, 
and are reached as formal laws by abstraction from 
the process of thinking. The basal fact is a thought 
activity, and reflexion shows that this has certain 
forms. These are next erected into laws and im- 



196 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

posed on the mind ; and then the fancy arises that 
they are limitations and hindrances to knowledge. 
In fact, however, they do not rule intellect, but 
only express what intellect is. Nor is the mind 
ever so conscious of itself as self-guiding and self- 
controlled as when conducting a clear process of 
thought. It would be a strange proposition to free 
the mind and enlarge knowledge by annulling the 
laws of thought. 

This brings us to the overstraining mentioned. To 
deny a nature to God in the sense just described would 
be to cancel his existence altogether. For whatever is 
must be something, must be an agent, and must have a 
definite law of action. Without this the thought van- 
ishes, and only a mental vacuum remains. This may 
indeed be filled up with words, but it acquires no sub- 
stance thereby. To regard this definite law as a lim- 
itation is to make being itself a limitation. In that 
case we find true absoluteness only in pure indefinite- 
ness and emptiness, and then there is no way back to 
definite existence again. Once in such a void, thought 
would remain there. This overstraining of absolute- 
ness defeats itself. It cancels the absolute as a 
reality, and leads to the attempt to construct both 
the universe and the living God out of nothing. But 
when we say that the nature of a thing is a law, we 
must not think of the law as a thing in the thing, or 
even as ruling the thing. The thing itseK is all ; and 
the law is only an expression of what the thing is, or 
of the way in which it proceeds. 

Here, as elsewhere, we must avoid abstractions and 
must fall back on experience for the concrete mean- 
ing of our terms. If we consult the dictionary only, 



OMNIPOTENCE 197 

we may easily persuade ourselves that fixity and 
freedom are incompatible ; but if we consult experi- 
ence, we shall find that we cannot dispense with either. 
To give freedom any significance it must be based on 
uniformity or fixity ; and to give this fixity any value 
it must be allied with freedom. Pure necessity 
cancels reason. Pure arbitrariness cancels reason. 
It is only in the union of fixity and freedom that the 
rational life is possible ; or rather it is only as the 
rational life has these opposite aspects that it exists. 
They are not preexistent factors out of which the 
rational life is made ; they are only antithetical 
aspects of the rational life ; and this is the essential 
and only reality in the case. 

Has, then, the divine will nothing to do with the 
divine existence ? Does God find himself given to 
himself as an object, or is he, rather, his own cause ? 
The answer must be both yes and no. The question 
really assumes that God as knowing and willing is 
subsequent to himself as existing. Of course there is 
no temporal sequence, but only a logical one. God 
does not exist and then act, but exists only in and 
through his act. And this act, though not arbitrary, 
is also not necessary ; or though necessary, it is also 
free. What this apparent contradiction means is this : 
Freedom and necessity are contradictory only as 
formal ideas, and are not mutually exclusive as 
determinations of being. Indeed, both ideas are 
at bottom abstractions from opposite sides of per- 
sonal existence. We find an element of uniformity 
and fixity in our life, and this gives us the only posi- 
tive idea of necessity that we possess. We find 
also a certain element of self-determination, and this 

THEISM — 14 



198 METAPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES 

is our idea of freedom. Reality, then, shows these 
formally opposite ideas united in actual existence, 
and reflection shows that both are necessary to rational 
existence. 

We have an illustration both of the meaning and 
of the possibihty of this union in our own life. The 
laws of thought are inviolable in the nature of reason. 
Volition can do nothing with them in the wa}^ of 
overthrow. And yet, though absolute and secure 
from all reversal, they do not of themselves secure 
obedience. The human soul does not become a 
rational soul by virtue of the law of reason alone; 
there is needed, in addition, an act of corresponding 
self-determination by the free spirit. Hence, while 
there is a necessity in the soul, it becomes controlling 
only through freedom ; and we may say that every 
one must constitute himself a rational soul. How 
this can be is inconstruable, but none the less is it 
a fact. We come to our full existence only through 
our own act. What is true for ourselves in a limited 
degree, we may regard as absolutely true for God. 
At every point the absolute will must be present to 
give validity and reality to the otherwise powerless 
necessities of the divine being. In this sense we 
may say, with Spinoza, that God is the cause of him- 
self. He incessantly constitutes himseK the rational 
and absolute spirit. God is absolute will or absolute 
agent, forever determining himself according to ra- 
tional and eternal principles. 



CHAPTER V 

GOD AND THE WORLD 

Thus far we have considered mainly the attributes 
of God in himself ; we have now to consider his cos- 
mi cal relations. Of course it is not our aim to tell 
how God produces the world, or how the world 
depends on him, but only to find what general thought 
we must form of their mutual relations. By the 
world, here, we mean all finite existence. Two gen- 
eral classes of views exist : theistic and pantheistic. 
Pantheism makes the world either a part of God or a 
necessary consequence of the divine nature. Theism 
holds that the world is a free act and creation by 
God. We consider pantheism first. 

Pantheism 

The view that the world is a part of God is the 
common factor in all theories of emanation, ancient 
and modern. As the waves are a part of the ocean, 
or, better still, as each finite space or time is a part 
of the one infinite space or time, so each finite thing 
is a part or phase of the one infinite existence. In 
each of these views God is regarded as world-substance 
rather than first cause ; and this substance is con- 
ceived as a kind of plastic stuff or raw material 
which, like clay, can be variously fashioned, and 

199 



200 GOD AND THE WORLD 

which is at least partly exhausted in its products. 
Sometimes the view is less coarse, and God is con- 
ceived as the background of the world, something as 
space is the infinite background and possibility of the 
figures in it. Sometimes God is said to produce or 
emit the world from himself, or by a process of self- 
diremption to pass from his own unity into the plu- 
rality of cosmic existence. The finite, on the other 
hand, is a part, or mode, or emanation of the infinite, 
and shares in the infinite substance. Whether the 
world is eternal is not decided. Some will have it to 
be an eternal part and factor of God, while others 
think of it as made out of God. 

All views of this class are products of the imagina- 
tion, and result from the attempt to picture that 
which is essentially unpicturable. When we try to 
conceive the origin of the world, we are tempted to 
form the fancy of some back-lying plastic substance 
of which the world is made, and then the imagination 
is satisfied. Either we refer the world to some pre- 
existent stuff, or we regard it as preexisting itself in 
some potential form. Then its production becomes 
either the working over of a given stuff or a letting 
loose of potentialities. Our own relation to the cosmic 
reality confirms us in this tendency to solve the prob- 
lem by picturing rather than thinking. We are 
limited to the modification of given material ; and 
this anthropomorphic limitation easily passes with the 
uncritical for a necessary law. 

Views of this class are as obnoxious to reason as 
they are dear to the irrational fancy. Metaphysics 
shows that reafity is never a stuff, but an agent. 
Nor does an agent have any substance in itself 



PANTHEISM 201 

whereby it exists, but by virtue of its activity it is 
able to assert itself as a determining factor in exist- 
ence, and thus only does it acquire any claim to be 
considered real. To explain the universe we need not 
a substance, but an agent; not substantiality, but 
causality. The latter expresses all the meaning of 
the former, and is free from misleading sense-implica- 
tions. Metaphysics further shows that every agent 
is a unit, uncompoimded and indivisible. God, then, 
is not the infinite stuff or substance, but the infinite 
cause or agent, one and indivisible. From this point 
all the previous views of the relation of God to the 
world disappear of themselves. He has no parts and 
is not a sum. Hence the world is no part of God, 
nor an emanation from him, nor a sharer in the divine 
substance ; for all these views imply the divisibility 
of God and also his stuff-like nature. His necessary 
unity forbids all attempts to identify him with the 
world, either totally or partially. If the finite be 
anything real, or more than phenomenal, it must be 
viewed, not as produced from God, but as produced 
by God ; that is, as created. Only creation can rec- 
oncile the substantial reality of the finite with the 
unity of the infinite. For the finite, if real, is an 
agent, and as such it cannot be made out of any- 
thing, but is posited by the infinite. 

Similar objections lie against all views which speak 
of the world as a mode of God. This phrase, in its 
common use, is allied to the imagination, and is based 
on the notion of a passive and extended substance. The 
thought commonly joined with it is that each thing 
is a particular and separate part of the infinite, as 
each wave is not a phase of the entire sea, but only 



202 GOD AND THE WORLD 

of the part comprised in the wave itself. But meta- 
physics further shows that the unity of being is com- 
patible with plurality of attributes only as each is an 
attribute of the whole thing. Any conception of 
diverse states which are states of only a part of the 
thing would destroy its unity. The entire being 
must be present in each state ; and this cannot be so 
long as the notion of quantity is applied to the prob- 
lem. The only way in which a being can be con- 
ceived as entire in every mode, is by dropping all 
quantitative and spatial conceptions and viewing the 
being as an agent, and the modes as forms of its 
activity. If, then, finite things are modes of the in- 
finite, this can only mean that they are acts of the 
infinite, or modes of agency. 

Another conception of this relation has been ven- 
tured, based on the relation of the universal to the 
particulars subsumed under it, and more especially on 
the relation of the universal reason to the individual 
mind. As reason is the same in all, and as no one 
can claim a monopoly of it, but only a participation 
in it, we may say that the universal reason is the 
reality, and that the finite mind exists only in and 
through it as one of its phases or manifestations. 
^ But this is only an echo of the scholastic realism. 
Class terms denote no possible existence, and have 
reality only in the specific existences from which they 
are abstracted. 

This relation of the world to God cannot be pic- 
tured ; it must be thought. The quantitative and 
spatial conceptions with which the imagination deals 
are ruled out, both by the unity of the basal reality 
and by the ideality of spatial relations. We cannot 



PANTHEISM 203 

trace the world into God ; we must be content with 
tracing it to him. The existence of the world in God 
means simply its continuous dependence on him. 
To find the world in God in any discriminable onto- 
logical form, such as Schelling's " dark nature-ground/' 
would cancel his necessary unity. The experienced 
relation of active intelligence to its products is the only 
solution of this problem. As we have before said, 
the attempt to trace the works of intelligence into 
intelligence in any substantial sense is to make ship- 
wreck of reason. We refer them to intelligence as 
their cause. The possibility of such causation we 
experience. Beyond this, thought cannot go. 

Two conceptions of the finite are logically possible. 
First, we may regard it as only a mode of the divine 
activity and without any proper thinghood. Secondly, 
we may view it as a proper thing, not only as an act 
of God, but as a substantial product. The former 
conception is illustrated by the relation of thoughts 
to the mind. These are not modes of mind, but 
mental acts. They are not made out of anything, 
but the thinking mind gives them existence. At the 
same time, they are not things in the mind, but exist 
only in and through the act which creates them. 

The decision between these views can be reached 
only as we find, in the finite, things which can know 
themselves as things. At first sight, indeed, things 
and substances appear to be given in immediate per- 
ception ; but epistemology shows that the objects of 
perception are primarily never more than our own 
conceptions and representations which have been 
objectified under the forms of space and time, sub- 
stance and attribute, cause and effect, etc. They 



204. GOD AND THE WORLD 

represent only the way in which the mind reacts 
against a series of incitements from without. Meta- 
physics further shows that the independent fact is 
totally unlike the appearance ; and when these con- 
siderations are followed out, we reach the insight that 
true substantial existence, in distinction from phe- 
nomenal existence, can be predicated only of persons. 
Only selfhood serves to mark off the finite from the 
infinite, and only the finite spirit attains to substan- 
tial otherness to the infinite. The impersonal finite 
has only such otherness as a thought or act has to its 
subject. 

This is the view of the physical system to which 
speculative thought is fast coming. Thought begins, 
indeed, with the conviction that all things are sub- 
stantially there ; but the more we study them, the 
more they vanish into law and process without any 
proper thinghood beyond continuity, uniformity, and 
universality. Nor does it avail anything against the 
conclusion to say that the world-ground may posit 
impersonal agents as well as personal ones ; for the 
notion of the impersonal finite vanishes upon analy- 
sis into phenomenality. Identity, unity, causality, 
substantiality are possible only under the personal 
form. On all these accounts the impersonal can only 
be viewed as dependent phenomenon, or process of an 
energy not its own. 

This view does not commend itself to spontaneous 
thought, and is questioned by many in the name of 
common sense. The objections commonly rest upon 
misapprehension. Our sense-experience puts us in 
connection with a system of things. Concerning this 
system, we may ask whether it depends on us, as the 



PANTHEISM 205 

illusions of the madman depend on his distempered 
mind, or whether it is independent of us and our per- 
ception. The common conception of idealism is that 
it affirms the former view. This is one of the 
chronic misconceptions for which, when once estab- 
lished, there seems to be no exorcism. No rational 
idealist, however, has ever held such a view. He 
believes, as much as any one, that the system of 
experience is no product of our own, and that it 
exists for all. He only raises the question what this 
system may be in its essential nature. The realist 
proposes the conception of a brute existence as ex- 
pressing its ultimate nature ; but the idealist has no 
difficulty in showing that such a conception is only 
the realist's theory, and not a fact of immediate 
experience, and that this theory, moreover, is quite 
unable to do the work assigned it. And the realist 
himself is compelled to relax his theory when he 
comes to consider the relation of God and the world. 
Of course the imagination has no difficulty in con- 
struing this relation as a spatial one — as one of 
mutual inclusion and exclusion — but not much 
reflection is needed to show the impossibility of such 
a view or the contradictions involved in it. The 
most striking advantages of the realistic view for the 
imagination become its chief embarrassments for 
reflective thought. In fact, that view is the unsus- 
pected source of most of the metaphysical difficulties 
under which theology labors. The real space with 
its real matter and force forever tends to make the 
mechanical and materialistic conception law-giving 
for all existence, and thus to make any other concep- 
tion impossible. Realism may not be atheism, but it 



206 GOD AND THE WORLD 

is certainly one great source of atheism. Its things 
and forces are continually threatening to set up for 
themselves, and in unclear minds of irreligious turn 
they often do it. ^ 

In any case the world of finite spirits must be 
viewed as created. It is not made out of preexistent 
stuff but caused to be. Creation means to posit some- 
thing in existence which, apart from the creative 
act, would not be. Concerning it two consistent 
questions may be asked : Who is the agent ? How 
is it possible ? To the first question the answer is, 
God. To the second there is no rational answer in 
the sense of a rationale of the process. 

Besides these consistent questions, various incon- 
sistent ones are asked, as, for instance : What is the 
world made " out of " ? The common answer is, out 
of nothing. Both question and answer are worthy 
of each other. Both are haunted by the notion of 
a preexistent stuff, and, to complete the absurdity, 
the answer suggests nothing as that stuff; as if by 
some process God fashioned the nothing into some- 
thing. The old saw, from nothing nothing comes, is also 
played off against creation, but without effect. The 
truth therein is merely that nothing can ever pro- 
duce, or be formed into anything. But theism does 
not teach that nothing produces something, but rather 
that God, the all-powerful, has caused the world to 
exist. No more does theism hold that God took a 
mass of nothing and made something out of it, but 
rather that he caused a new existence to begin, and 
that, too, in such a way that he was no less after 
creation than before. God neither made the world 



PANTHEISM 207 

from nothing as a raw material, nor from himself. 
Both notions are absurd, but he caused that to be 
which apart from his activity had no existence. 
Recalling the ideality of time, we may say that 
creation means simply the dependence of things on 
the divine activity for such existence as they have, 
and their exclusion from any quantitative sharing 
in the divine substance. Of course such a relation 
is mysterious ; but the alternative view is a con- 
tradiction of thought itself. Creation is the only 
conception which reconciles the unity of God with 
the existence of the finite. Perhaps, too, we need 
not be especially troubled at the mystery, as mystery 
is omnipresent; and besides, creation is not our 
affair. 

Some speculators have sought relief from the 
mystery of creation in the claim that the world was 
not made from nothing, but from the potentialities 
of the divine nature. The only intelligible meaning 
of this view is that the world existed as a conception 
in the divine thought before it became real. This 
conceptual existence constituted its potentiality, but 
this in no way shows how that which existed as 
conception was posited in reality. For the rest, the 
claim in question is only a form of words of learned 
sound but without meaning. 

The world, then, depends on God, but not as a 
mode or part of the divine substance. Such concep- 
tions are excluded by the divine unity and by the 
identification of substantiality with causality. The 
pantheism, then, that would make the world a part 
of God, or would construe the relation under the 
category of quantity, or of whole and part, is untenable. 



208 GOD AND THE WORLD 

We now consider the pantheism that views the 
world as a necessary consequence of the divine nature. 
This view also admits of a double interpretation 
according to om- thought of being in general. We 
may regard the world as a logical implication of the 
divine nature or as a dynamic resultant. In one view 
God is the all-conditioning premise and the world is 
the implied conclusion. Here the relation is logical 
and static, and the view might be called static pan- 
theism. Or God might be viewed as the all-condi- 
tioning causality necessarily manifesting itself in the 
world of things. Here the relation is dynamic, and 
the view might be called dynamic pantheism. In 
this view the infinite is forever energizing according 
to certain laws, and producing thereby a great variety 
of products. But these laws are throughout expres- 
sions of its nature and admit of no change. The 
world-order is the divine nature, and, conversely, the 
divine nature is the world-order. Hence pantheists 
of this order have always been the stoutest opponents 
of miracles, for miracles imply a will apart from and 
above nature. If the world-order were really the 
divine nature, then, of course, God could not depart 
from that order without denying himself. This con- 
viction is further strengthened by the natural tendency 
of the untaught mind to mistake the uniformities 
of experience for necessities of being ; and thus the 
world-order is finally established as necessarily invari- 
able, the mind not recognizing its own shadow. This 
is the view which underlies all schemes of philosophic 
evolution, and a large part of current scientific specu- 
lation, or rather speculation on the supposed basis of 
scientific facts and principles. While static pantheism 



PANTHEISM 209 

says, In the beginning was the eternal substance or 
the eternal reason coexisting changelessly with all its 
implications ; dynamic pantheism says, In the begin- 
ning was force, necessary and persistent, and by its 
inherent necessity forever generating law and system. 
When this view is combined with the impersonality 
and unconsciousness of the world-ground, it becomes 
identical with vulgar atheism. The world-ground is 
simply the unitary principle and basal reality of the 
cosmos, and is exhausted in its cosmic manifestation. 
There is immanence without transcendence ; and God 
and the world are but opposite aspects of the same 
thing. The world considered in its ground is God ; 
and God considered in his manifested nature is the 
world. 

Static pantheism is an untenable abstraction which, 
if allowed, would bring the universe to a standstill 
and load thought with illusion. It would give us 
a rigid and resting being from which all time and 
change would be excluded, and which could in no 
way be connected with our changing experience. If 
we should call that experience delusion, the delusion 
itself would be as unaccountable as the fact. On this 
rock Eleatic philosophy was wrecked, and here, too, 
Spinoza's system went to pieces. And this must be 
the case with any view which makes the relation of 
God to the world one of logical implication. For 
logic knows no time, and the conclusion must coexist 
with the premises. If then the world as existing were 
a logical implication of the divine being, it and all its 
factors would be eternal. There would be no room 
for change, but aU things would rigidly coexist. In 



210 GOD AND THE WORLD 

this view, also, finite minds with all their contents 
would be necessary and eternal ; and as error and 
evil are a manifest part of those contents, it follows 
that they likewise are necessary and eternal. Hence 
we should have to assume a factor of unreason and 
evil in God himself ; and by this time the collapse of 
thought would be complete. 

The truth, then, in pantheism, if there be any, lies 
in dynamic pantheism. But this view is also unten- 
able for the following reasons : — 

1. It is unclear. The dynamic implication which 
is other than logical is quite unintelligible except as 
free volitional activity. Again, the view provides 
only for the world-order and does not recognize its 
details. But the world-order, as a system of general 
laws, accounts for no specific fact whatever. We 
must refer, then, not only the world-order to the 
divine nature, but also the cosmic details. And 
since these are incessantly shifting, the divine nature, 
which is their ground, must also be shifting, and 
hence a temporal thing. Thereby the infinite is 
degraded to a temporal existence and its absoluteness 
disappears ; for only the self-determining can be 
absolute. 

The very general oversight of this difficulty is due 
to the fallacy of the universal. It has been thought 
that the system of the world as a whole might result 
from the divine nature without taking account of its 
details; but this is impossible when we think con- 
cretely. Then we are compelled to carry all com- 
plexity and multiplicity into their ground, which thus 
becomes complex and multiform itself. The same 
fallacy has concealed the degradation of the divine 



PANTHEISM 211 

which is involved in pantheism. Few would care to 
carry bodily into God the great mass of opaque, in- 
significant, sinister details which bulk so large in ex- 
perience ; but we easily hide them behind the thought 
of the world-order or system of law. This system 
in turn seems to be an adequate and worthy expres- 
sion of the divine nature ; and the unseemly and 
embarrassing features of concrete experience drop 
from our thought altogether. This illusion the critic 
must not fail to point out. 

2. Self-determination being denied, we must find 
some ground for the changing activity of the infinite ; 
and this must be found in some mechanism in the 
infinite whereby its states interact and determine the 
outcome. But of such metaphysical mechanism we 
can form no conception whatever; and the view, if 
carried out, would cancel the unity of the infinite 
altogether. We might continue to speak of unity, 
but we should be quite unable to find it, or to tell in 
what it consisted. We should remain in the midst 
of an interacting many with no possibility of reach- 
ing any basal one. As we have already pointed out, 
the free and conscious self is the only real unity of 
which we have any knowledge, and reflection shows 
that it is the only thing which can be a true unity. 
This type of pantheism would necessarily pass over 
into atheism. 

3. We have seen that the alleged necessity of 
natural laws and products is purely hypothetical. 
No reflection upon necessary truth shows the present 
order to be a necessary implication in any respect. 
Metaphysical necessity is a purely negative idea to 
which no positive conception or experience corre- 



212 GOD AND THE WORLD 

sponds ; and so far as rational necessity is concerned, 
the world and all its details are contingent. 

4. We have further seen that every system of 
necessity overturns reason itself. Freedom is a 
necessary implication of rationality. 

On all these grounds we hold that God is free in 
his relation to the world, and that the world, though 
conditioned by the divine nature, is no necessary 
product thereof, but rather rests upon the divine 
will. To carry the world into God is to carry time 
and evolution into God : and the notion of an evolv- 
ing, developing God does not commend itself to 
speculative thought. Again, to carry the actual 
world into God with all its antitheses of good and 
evil, and its boundless wastes of insignificance and 
imperfection, would be to degrade the theistic idea 
to about the level of the Platonic demiurge. Every- 
thing would be divine but God. 

And if one should ask. How much better off are we 
on the theistic view, seeing that these things must 
in some sense be referred to God ? the answer would 
be this. We are much better off in being able to 
maintain the divine absoluteness and perfection, 
which is impossible to pantheism. Moreover, the 
seeming evils and imperfections of the world being 
founded in purpose and freedom, and not in an in- 
tractable necessity, we are permitted to hope for 
their removal or transformation in the completion of 
the divine plan. This would not be possible in a 
system where all things happen by an opaque neces- 
sity, and where nothing is the outcome of proper 
prevision and purpose. 

If, then, we ask how the world comes to be, we 



PANTHEISM 213 

have to refer the conception of the world to the 
divine thought ; and any inquiry into the origin and 
possibility of this conception is futile. Such inquiry 
applies the principle of the sufficient reason to thought 
itself rather than to its products, and always begins 
and ends in confusion. If we next ask how this con- 
ception came to be realized, we refer it not to any 
necessity of the divine nature, but to the free will of 
the Creator. If we further ask why this conception 
was realized, we may assume some worthy purpose, 
some supreme good to be reached thereby. If, finally, 
we ask how this supreme good implies the actual 
world for its realization, we must be content to wait 
for an answer. 

In concluding that God is free in his relation to the 
world, we abandon all hope of a speculative deduction 
of creation. Such hope has often been entertained, 
and numberless attempts have been made to realize it. 
Inasmuch as we conclude from the world to God, it is 
said, we must be able to conclude from God to the 
world. Sometimes the matter has been made very 
easy by defining creation as essential to the divine 
nature; and then the conclusion has been drawn that 
God without the world would be a contradiction. In 
addition to being failures, these attempts spring from 
a speculative lust for understanding and construing, 
which fails to grasp the conditions of understanding. 
In this respect they are on a par with the infantile 
wisdom which asks, Who made God ? We must refer 
the concrete system to intelligence as its source, but 
we can never deduce it from intelligence as a neces- 
sary implication. 

This conclusion applies to the entire system of the 

THEISM — 15 



214 GOD AND THE WORLD 

finite, whether physical or spiritual. It affirms the 
freedom and absoluteness of God in creation, but it is 
quite compatible with the complete dependence, and 
even phenomenality of the creature. In that case, 
however, creation produces no real otherness to God, 
and vanishes into a species of ambiguous meditation 
on the Creator's part. With this result we are all at 
sea again. The finite becomes an unaccountable illu- 
sion, which defies all understanding. We must, then, 
make an efert to secure some substantiality for the 
finite spirit. Having shown that God is free in his 
relation to the world, we must next show that the 
finite spirit has some reality over against God. 

The great difficulty here lies in the necessary de- 
pendence of the finite. In studying interaction, we 
have seen that all finite things are comprehended in 
an order of dependence, and it is very easy to use 
this fact for dissolving away our personality and 
responsibility unless we look well to our goings. A 
passage is borrowed from the author's " Metaphysics," 
in elucidation of the point : — 

"A more subtle source of error concerning this 
matter lies in the necessary dependence of the finite. 
The finite is dependent on the infinite, and is also a 
member of a system to which it is continually subject. 
The result is that the finite spirit has only a limited and 
relative existence at best. As compared with the in- 
finite, it has only a partial and incomplete existence. 
In the fullest sense of the word, only the infinite 
exists; all else is relatively phenomenal and non- 
existent. 

^^By thinking along this line in an abstract way it 
is easy to come to this conclusion \ and every reader 



PANTHEISM 215 

acquainted with the history of speculation will recall 
how often men have stumbled into pantheism at this 
point. Nor is it easy to escape this conclusion so 
long as we dwell on the abstract categories of finite 
and infinite, dependent and independent, phenomenal 
and real, existence and nonexistence. The truth is 
we have no insight into these categories that will 
enable us to decide what is concretely possible in this 
case. We have to fall back on experience, and in- 
terpret the categories by experience, instead of de- 
termining experience by the categories. Any other 
method is illusory and the prolific source of illusions. 
" Adopting this method, we discover that, while we 
cannot tell how the finite can be, it nevertheless is. 
The finite may not exist in the full sense of the 
infinite, but for all that, in a small way, it is able 
to act and is acted upon. In the sense of seK- 
sufiiciency there is but one substance, as Spinoza 
said ; but it does not follow that all other things are 
only powerless shadows, for there are a great many 
substances that can act and be acted upon. It 
matters little what we call these, provided we bear 
this fact in mind. They are not substances, if sub- 
stance means self-sufficiency. They are substances, 
if substance means the subject of action and passion. 
If, then, we bear our meaning carefully in mind, we 
may say that only the infinite exists or truly is, that 
the finite has only partial, relative, incomplete, non- 
existent existence ; and there would be a sort of truth 
in the saying. But these utterances are so easily mis- 
understood that they should be reserved for esoteric 
use, and frugality is to be recommended even there. 
In these operations we must proceed antiseptically, 



216 GOD AND THE WORLD 

and sterilize our verbal instruments by careful defini- 
tion before we begin. 

" Now when we consider life at all reflectively, we 
come upon two facts. First, we have thoughts and 
feelings and volitions ; and these are our own. We 
also have a measure of self-control or the power of 
self -direction. Here, then, in experience we find a 
certain selfhood and a relative independence. This 
fact constitutes us real persons, or rather it is the 
meaning of our personality. The second fact is that 
we cannot regard this life as self-sufficient and inde- 
pendent. How the life is possible we do not know ; 
we only know that it is. How the two facts are put 
together is altogether beyond us. We only know 
that we cannot interpret life without admitting both, 
and that to deny either lands us in contradiction and 
nonsense. It is no doubt fine, and in some sense it 
is correct, to say that God is in all things ; but when 
it comes to saying that God is all things and that all 
forms of thought and feeling and conduct are his, 
then reason simply commits suicide. God thinks and 
feels in what we call our thinking and feeling ; and 
hence he blunders in our blundering and is stupid in 
our stupidity. He contradicts himself also with the 
utmost freedom ; for a deal of his thinking does not 
hang together from one person to another, or from one 
day to another in the same person. Error, folly, and 
sin are all made divine ; and reason and conscience 
as. having authority vanish. The only thing that 
is not divine in this scheme is God ; and he vanishes 
into a congeries of contradictions and basenesses. 

"For note the purely logical difficulties in the 
notion, not to press the problem of evil and error 



PANTHEISM 217 

just referred to. Suppose the difficulty overcome 
which is involved in the inalienability of personal 
experience, so that our thoughts and life might be 
ascribed to God as consciously his. What is God's 
relation as thinking our thoughts to God as thinking 
the absolute thought ? Does he become limited, con- 
fused, and blind in finite experience, and does he at 
the same time have absolute insight in his infinite 
life ? Does he lose himself in the finite so as not to 
know what and who he is ; or does he perhaps exhaust 
himself in the finite, so that the finite is all there 
is ? But if all the while he has perfect knowledge 
of himself as one and infinite, how does this illusion 
of the finite arise at all in that perfect unity and 
perfect light ? There is no answer to these questions, 
so long as the infinite is supposed to play both sides 
of the game. We have a series of unaccountable 
illusions and an infinite playing hide-and-seek with 
itself in a most grotesque metaphysical fuddlement. 
The notion of creation may be difficult, but it saves 
us from such dreary stufiP as this. How the infinite 
can posit the finite, and thus make the possibility of 
a moral order, is certainly beyond us ; but the alter- 
native is a lapse into hopeless irrationality. We can 
make nothing of either God or the world on such a 
pantheistic basis. Accordingly, we find writers who 
incline to this way of thinking in uncertain vacilla- 
tion between some " Eternal Consciousness " and our 
human consciousness and without any definite and 
consistent thought concerning their mutual relation, 
but only vague and showy phrases." ^ 

We conclude, then, that pantheism in whatever 

1 " Metaphysics " (revised edition), p. 100 ff. 



218 GOD AND THE WORLD 

form is untenable. Both its doctrine of God and its 
doctrine of man are equally obnoxious to criticism. 
It is equally fatal to reason to subject God to necessity, 
and to reduce man to a phantom of the infinite. 
Indeed this doctrine is less a matter of thought than 
of vague feeling. In a time of mechanical deism 
and religious anthropomorphism, pantheism naturally 
arises as a reaction. In a time of overdone mecha- 
nism and materialism it is welcomed as a relief. In 
a time when the Living God has retreated into a 
distant past and disappeared below the horizon, 
pantheism seems an advance. But this is a mistake. 
What is really needed is, not a God who blocks exist- 
ence by absorbing all things into himself, but the 
living and immanent God in whom we live and move 
and have our being, and whose tender mercies are 
over all his works ; a God also in whom revelation 
and mystery mingle, who comes near enough for love, 
and rises high enough for awe and voiceless adora- 
tion. It is only a mind subject to verbal illusions 
that can find any help or inspiration in pantheism 
proper. India and the Indian pantheon reveal the 
essential meaning of pantheism. 

We pass now to the theistic conception of the rela- 
tion of God to the world. 

In this view the world depends on the divine will. 
In estimating this result, care must be taken not to 
apply to the divine willing the limitations of the 
human. As in human consciousness there are many 
features that are not essential to consciousness, and 
that arise from our limitations, so in human willing 
there are many features that are not essential to 



THEISM 219 

willing, and that result from our finiteness. Since 
we get our objects of volition gradually and by experi- 
ence, we tend to think of will as a momentary activity 
which comes into our life now and then, but which, for 
the most part, is quiescent. In this way we come to 
think of an act of will as having nothing to do with the 
maintenance of a fixed state, but only as producing a 
change ; or if it should look to the preservation of a 
given state, it would only be as that state might be 
threatened by something external. And so, finally, it 
comes to pass that we think of willing as something 
necessarily temporal or beginning. When, then, we 
speak of the world as depending on the divine will, the 
imagination finds it difficult to grasp this thought with- 
out assuming an empty time before its origination. 

But these features of human willing are not to be 
transferred to God without inspection. To begin 
with, willing does not necessarily imply beginning. 
In studying the divine omnipotence we saw that 
God's will in reference to himself must be eternal; 
that is, it is as unbegun as God, being but that free 
self-determination whereby God is God. It is only in 
relation to the world that God's will can be temporal ; 
and here, too, there is an essential difference. We 
come only gradually to a knowledge of owe aims; 
but this cannot be affirmed of God. We have seen 
that in his absolute self-knowledge and self-possession 
God has neither past nor future. Hence the ideals of 
the divine will are also eternal in the divine thought. 
The will to create, however, is differently regarded. 
Some view it as an eternal predicate of God, and 
others view it as a temporal predicate. 

Still another distinction betw^een our will and the 



220 GOD AND THE WORLD 

creative will must be noticed. With us to will is not 
necessarily to fulfill ; and thus we come to think that 
in addition to the will there must also be a special 
activity of realization. Some have carried this con- 
ception over to God, and have affirmed the will to 
create to be eternal, while the execution is temporal. 
But this view confounds intention with will, and for 
the rest is false. This feature of our willing is due 
altogether to our finiteness. Our willing, in fact, 
extends only to our mental states, and is not absolute 
even there. For the production of effects in the. outer 
world we depend on something not ourselves ; and as 
this is not always subservient to us, we come to dis- 
tinguish between volition and realization. Again, we 
find that we cannot always control our thoughts, 
because they are partly due to external causes ; and 
in the struggle which thus arises we find additional 
ground for distinguishing the will and the realization. 
Finally, our control of the body is attended by many 
feelings of strain and effort, and these we carry into 
the idea of will itself, where it by no means belongs. 
These feelings are effects of muscular tension resulting 
from our will, but they are no part of the will itself. 
None of these elements can be transferred to God. 
He is unconditioned by anything beyond himself. 
He is absolutely self-determining, and with him wil- 
ling must be identical with realization. 

On the realistic doctrine of time two views are 
held of the will to create, some making it an eternal 
and others only a temporal predicate of God. We 
devote a word to these before passing to the idealistic 
conception. 



ETERNAL CREATION 221 

Of the two views the one which makes creation 
only a temporal predicate is the more easily realized 
by the imagination. By its affirmation of an empty 
time before the creative act, that act is made to 
appear more like an act than an eternal doing would 
be, and at the same time the view marks off 
creation as an act of will more clearly from the 
opposite doctrine, which makes creation a necessary 
consequence of the divine nature. This, however, is 
only an aid to the imagination. If the Creator be free, 
he is eternally free. He did not first exist and then 
become free, but his freedom is coexistent with him- 
self ; and hence his free doing may coexist with him- 
self. There is nothing in the notion of eternal crea- 
tion which is incompatible with divine freedom or 
with the absolute dependence of the world on the 
divine will. The notion of a temporal creation has 
the disadvantage also of raising certain troublesome 
questions, such as. What was God doing in the 
eternity before creation ? or. Why did creation take 
place when it did, and not at some other time ? We 
cannot fill up this time with a divine self-evolution, 
as if God were gradually coming to himself and get- 
ing ready to create, for this would cancel his abso- 
luteness and reduce him to a temporal being. Some 
of the more naive speculators have thought to fill 
up the time before creation by a series of previous 
creations — a suggestion which shows more appreci- 
ation of the difficulty of the problem than of the 
required solution. It seems, then, that no reason for 
delay can be found in God, and certainly none can 
be found in time itself, since one moment of absolute 
time is like any other ; and hence, finally, it seems 



222 GOD AND THE WORLD 

that a temporal creation must be an act of pure 
arbitrariness. On all these accounts many theolo- 
gians have declared for an eternal creation, and have 
further declared creation to mean not temporal origi- 
nation, but simply and only the dependence of the 
world on God. 

On the other hand, the claim is made that eternal 
creation is a contradiction. On the supposition of a 
real time this cannot be maintained. The claim is 
that the world must have had a beginning in time, 
while the arguments employed prove with equal 
cogency that time itself must have had a beginning. 
This is the case even with Kant, whose famous anti- 
nomy is no more efficient against the eternity of the 
world than it is against the eternity of time. But no 
one who admits an infinite past time can find any 
good reason for denying that something may always 
have been happening in it. Every believer in neces- 
sity must hold that something has always been going 
on ; and every theist must allow that something may 
always have been going on. There is no a priori 
reason in theism for denying that the cosmic process 
may be coeternal with God. 

The difficulties commonly urged depend on the 
contradiction said to inhere in the notion of an 
infinite elapsed time. But this arises from overlook- 
ing the sense in which past time is said to be infinite. 
This infinity means simply that past time cannot be 
exhausted by any finite regress. Past time is infi- 
nite just as space in any direction is infinite. In the 
former case no regress will find a beginning, just as 
in the latter case no progress will find an end. If, 
now, time were anything capable of real objective 



ETERNAL CREATION 223 

existence, its past infinity, in the sense described, 
would offer no difficulty to thought ; indeed, it would 
rather seem to be a necessary affirmation. Such 
difficulty as might arise would be due to confounding 
thought and imagination. The imagination cannot 
represent either space or time as unlimited, but 
thought cannot conceive either as limited. But 
with infinite time and the eternal God as data, there 
seems to be no reason for denying the possibility of a 
cosmic process extending throughout the infinite 
time. 

Some further objections are offered, based on the 
nature of number. Number is necessarily finite, and 
hence anything to which number applies must be 
finite also. But number applies to time as its meas- 
ure, and hence time must be finite, and hence must 
have a beginning. Such argument, however, puzzles 
rather than con^dnces. To begin with, the necessary 
finiteness of number means only that any number 
whatever admits of increase. But it is entirely com- 
patible with this finitude that the number should not 
admit of exhaustion in any finite time. If we sup- 
pose time to be real and infinite, then in the past 
time a definite number of units have passed away; 
but that number does not admit of expression in finite 
terms. It is constantly growing, to be sure, because 
time is constantly passing. In no other sense need it 
be finite. If it be said that the very nature of a 
series demands a beginning, as there can be no second 
without a first, we need to consider whether such 
application of number to the boundless continuum of 
time is not as relative to ourselves as its similar appli- 
cation to space. For our apprehension we have to 



224 GOD AND THE WORLD 

set up axes of reference in both cases; but we are not 
able to say that the fact itself depends upon those 
devices by which we conceive it. The celestial hori- 
zon and equator do not make the motions and posi- 
tions which they enable us to grasp and measure. 
The argument from number proves the finitude of 
space quite as cogently as that of time. For at any 
point whatever the adjacent mile in any direction is 
the last mile, the nth. mile, therefore, of the distance 
extending indefinitely in that direction. And as there 
can be no second without a first, it follows that dis- 
tance itself begins and that extension is finite in all 
directions — which is more than a believer in infinite 
space cares to have proved. 

But if we allow that time is infinite, and claim 
only that the cosmic process in time must be finite, 
we fall into a curious antinomy. On the one hand, 
it seems clear that the Eternal God may always have 
been doing something ; but on the other hand, owing 
to the potency of number, God must wait for the 
past eternity to elapse before he can do anything. 
This certainly is a very bizarre result ; and it cannot 
be escaped by any reflections on the necessary fini- 
tude of a series, or the impossibility of making an 
infinite by the summation of finites. 

The real solution of this puzzle lies in the ideality 
of time. The denial of any ontological time compels 
us to limit temporal relations to the cosmic move- 
ment, without extending them to the Creator. In 
his absolute, self-related existence, God is timeless. 
Hence he did not create at a certain point of absolute 
time, but he created, and thus gave both the world 
and time their existence. If, then, we view the 



THE WORLD AND TIME 225 

world as begun, it is strictly absurd to ask when or 
at what moment of the eternal flow of time did God 
create. There is no such flow ; and hence creation 
did not take place at any moment. In the begin- 
ning God created, for creation was the beginning 
even of time itself. We need not concern ourselves, 
then, with what God was doing in the long eternity 
before creation; for there was no such eternity. 
There was simply the self-existent, self-possessing, 
timeless God, whose name is I Am, and whose being 
is without temporal ebb and flow. Temporal terms 
have meaning only within the cosmic process itself, 
and are altogether empty when applied to the abso- 
lute God. Our thought leads not to an absolute 
existence temporally before the world, but rather to 
an absolute existence independent of the world. The 
priority is logical, not temporal. 

And within the cosmic process itself temporal 
relations are but the form under which we represent 
the unpicturable dynamic relations among the things 
and phases of that process. Here we must recall 
what was said of the relativity of the temporal 
judgment. It is no absolute property of the cosmic 
movement so that it can be defined bv itself without 
reference to self-consciousness. The present, which 
is the origin of all temporal judgments, is purely a 
relation in self -consciousness ; and its extent depends 
on the range of our powers. Hence we cannot be too 
careful in extending our time measures and estimates 
to God. 

The phenomenality of space and time does indeed 
vacate many of these questions about the relation of 
the world to space and time, but it may be urged 



226 GOD AND THE WORLD 

that after all it leaves the question as to the infini- 
tude of the world in space and time unanswered. 
For the world appears under the spatial and temporal 
form, and thus the question as to its extent is still in 
order. This is indeed the case, but the problem is 
greatly modified. With an ontological space and 
time, the mind is equally puzzled whether it regards 
them as finite or infinite. But this puzzle disappears 
from the idealistic view. On this theory the only 
infinitude is the fact that the laws of spatial and 
temporal synthesis admit of no exhaustion. They 
are, then, potentially infinite, like the numerical 
series. The infinitude of the latter makes us no 
trouble, and that of the former is equally harmless. 
When it comes to applying these laws to experience, 
we are in the same case with regard to all three 
infinitudes. We have no a priori ground for afiirming 
a concrete infinitude of space or time or number; 
and we have no ground in experience for affirming 
a completed or final finitude. On this point experi- 
ence is the only source of knowledge. The mind, 
then, has not to maintain both sides of a contradic- 
tion, but is unable to reach a positive decision either 
way. And the need of reaching such decision 
vanishes when time and space are seen to be only 
phenomenal. Their assumed ontological character 
is the source of our antinomies and logical woes. In 
this matter, with Kant, we replace the '' either, or " of 
dogmatic realism, by the " neither, nor " of criticism. 

The world was produced by the divine will, but 
this does not determine its present relation to that 
will. Concerning this there are two extreme views 



DEISM 227 

and an indefinite number of intermediate ones. One 
extreme, deism, regards the world as needing only 
to be created, being able to exist thereafter entirely 
on its own account. The other extreme finds so 
little substantiality in the world as to regard its 
continued existence as a perpetual creation. Between 
these extremes lie the views which, against deism, 
maintain an activity of conservation distinct from 
that of creation, and which, on the other hand, refuse 
to identify creation and conservation. All of these 
views commonly assume the reality of time as a 
something during, or through, which things exist. 

The deistic view sets up nature as existing at pres- 
ent in its own right, while God appears as an absentee 
and without administrative occupation so far as nature 
is concerned. He created the world, and thereafter it 
got on by itself. He is needed, then, only as first 
cause or prime mover, and has no further function. 

The impossibility of this conception has already 
appeared. In treating of interaction we saw that all 
interaction of the many is really an immanent action 
in the One. In the physical system no finite thing 
or phenomenon has any metaphysical or other rights 
of its own, whereby it becomes an obstacle or barrier 
in any sense to God. Both laws and things exist or 
change solely because of the demands of the divine 
plan. If this calls for fixedness, they are fixed ; if it 
calls for change, they change. They have in them- 
selves no groimd of existence so as to be a limit for 
God ; because they are nothing but the divine purpose 
flowing forth into realization. If natural agents en- 
dure, it is not because of an inherent right to existence, 
but because the creative will constantly upholds them. 



228 GOD AND THE WORLD 

If in the cosmic movement the same forces constantly 
appear working according to the same laws, this is 
not because of some eternal persistence of force and 
law, but because it lies in the divine plan to work in 
fixed forms and methods for the production of effects. 
In a word, the continuity of natural processes upon 
which physical science is based may be admitted as a 
fact ; not, however, as a fact which accounts for itself 
or which rests upon some metaphysical necessity, but 
rather as a fact which depends at every moment upon 
the divine will, and which only expresses the consist- 
ency of the divine methods. As against deism, then, 
we hold that the world is no self -centered reality, inde- 
pendent of God, but is simply the form in which the 
divine purpose realizes itself. It has no laws of its 
own which oppose a bar to the divine purpose, but 
all its laws and ongoings are only the expression of 
that purpose. In our dealing with nature we have 
to accommodate ourselves to its laws, but with God 
the purpose is original, the laws are its consequence. 
Hence the system of law is itself absolutely sensitive 
to the divine purpose, so that what that purpose 
demands finds immediate expression and reahzation, 
not in spite of the system, but in and through the 
system. 

The view that identifies conservation with per- 
petual creation has no difficulty when apphed to the 
physical system. Here form and law are the only 
fixed elements we can find ; and metaphysics makes 
it doubtful whether there can be others. In that case 
the physical order becomes simply a process which 
exists only in its perpetual ongoing. It has the iden- 
tity of a musical note, and, like such a note, it exists 



CONTINUAL CREATION 229 

only on condition of being incessantly and continu- 
ously reproduced. But we cannot apply this view to 
the world of spirits without losing ourselves in utterly 
unmanageable difficulties, at least on the realistic 
theory of time. The identity of the phenomenal pro- 
cess exists only for the beholder ; and to reduce the 
finite spirit to such process would cancel its selfhood 
altogether and make thought impossible. 

We seem, then, shut up to distinguish creation from 
preservation ; and the nature of this distinction eludes 
all apprehension. We affirm something whose nature 
and method are utterly opaque to our thought. The 
only relief, such as it is, lies in falling back on the 
ideality of time. We replace the notions of creation 
and conservation by the notion of dependence on the 
divine will. The mystery of this fact we have seen 
in treating of pantheism, and we have also seen that 
thought cannot move without affirming at once the 
dependence and the relative independence of the 
finite spirit. On the possibility of such a relation 
thought cannot pronounce ; it can only wait for ex- 
perience to reveal the fact. The puzzle about the 
identity of the dependent has the same solution. The 
identical spirit has not to maintain its identity across 
different times, but only to identify itself in experi- 
ence. This self-identification is the real and only 
meaning of concrete identity ; and it is to be judged 
or measured by nothing else. Experience is the only 
test of meaning and possibility in this matter. The 
abstract categories of time, continuity, and identity 
do not go before and make experience possible ; but 
experience is the basal fact from which these cate- 
gories get all their meaning and by which they are 

THEISM — 16 



230 GOD AND THE WORLD 

to be tested. Apart from this experience they are 
self -canceling abstractions. 

If the physical system only were concerned, nothing 
more need be added about the relation of the world 
to God. He is its creator and conserver, and we 
should add nothing in calling him, its ruler or gov- 
ernor. Even realism regards the world of things as 
receiving its law from God, and as unable in any way 
to depart from it. Such things need no government ; 
or, rather, government has no meaning when applied 
to them. We can speak of government only where 
there are beings which by a certain independence 
threaten to withdraw themselves from the general 
plan which the ruler aims to realize. We find the 
proper subjects of a divine government only in finite 
spirits ; as only these have that relative independence 
over against God which the idea of government 
demands. 

The notion of a divine government, then, implies 
free spirits as its subjects. But freedom in itself is a 
means only and not an end. Apart from some good 
which can be realized only by freedom, a free world 
is no better than a necessary one. Hence the notion 
of a world-government acquires rational meaning only 
as some supreme good exists which is to be the out- 
come of creation, and which, therefore, gives the law 
for all personal activity. A world-government im- 
plies a world-goal which, in turn, implies a world- 
law. A cosmic movement without direction and aim 
could not be the outcome of a self-respecting intelli- 
gence. 

What, then, is that great end which all free beings 



WORLD-GOAL 231 

should serve ? Nature shows us numberless particu- 
lar ends, but none of these have supreme worth, and 
most of them have no assignable worth. So far as 
observation goes, the ends realized in nature are gen- 
erally so insignificant that they seem to add nothing 
to the perfection of the world, and in many cases 
they even appear as blemishes. Observation dis- 
covers no supreme end. The cosmos as a whole does 
not seem to set very definitely in any direction, and 
presents a drifting movement rather than a fixed 
course. Nor can we find the aim of the cosmic 
movement in any development of the world-ground, 
as that would reduce it to a temporal existence. 
But if we insist on having a world-goal, we can find 
a sufiicient one only in the moral realm. A commu- 
nity of moral persons, obeying moral law and enjoy- 
ing moral blessedness, is the only end that could 
excuse creation or make it worth while. Hence the 
notion of a moral government leads at once to the 
ethical realm, and implies notions foreign to meta- 
physics. If one has not these notions there can be 
no question of such a government, and theistic phi- 
losophy closes with considering the causal relation of 
God to the world. 

The conception of creation as a free act and not 
as a necessary evolution of the divine nature, for- 
bids all attempts to identify the world with God, 
or to establish any equational relation between them. 
The relation of a mind to its thoughts, or of an 
agent to his deeds can be understood only in expe- 
rience; it can never be expressed in quantitative 
and equational terms. But apart from this chronic 
illusion, speculative thought has been prolific of 



232 GOD AND THE WORLD 

attempts to understand the manner and motive of 
creation. A superficial type of speculation has sought 
to explain the manner by a great variety of cosmogo- 
nies, some of which are still in fashion. None of 
these have either religious or speculative significance. 
They relate only to the transforming and combining 
of given material, and say nothing concernmg its 
origination. For understanding the origin of the 
creative act, we have only the analogy of our own 
experience, according to which we first form concep- 
tions and then realize them. Hence the divine 
understanding has been distinguished from the divine 
will, and a kind of division of labor has been made 
between them. The understanding furnishes the con- 
ception of all possibilities, and from these the divine 
wisdom chooses the best for realization by the divine 
will. Many scruples have been raised concerning 
this distinction, on the ground that in God knowing 
and willing must be identical; but this identity is 
secured only by defining each term so as to include 
the other. In both cases, however, we have to leave 
out those features of our knowing and willing which 
arise from our limitations. In general the identifica- 
of knowing and willing in God confounds synchro- 
nism with identity. In knowing that looks towards 
doing there is no assignable reason why the doing 
should be postponed, and thus we are led to view 
them as contemporaneous. But knowing and will- 
ing as mental functions remain as distinct as ever. 
Besides, God's knowledge extends to the evil as well 
as the good ; does he therefore will the evil ? 

Concerning the motive of creation, pure speculation 
can say nothing positive. It can only point out that 



MAN AND NATURE 233 

if the divine absoluteness is to be maintained, this 
motive must not lie in any lack or imperfection of 
the Creator. For positive suggestion we must have 
recourse to our moral and religious nature; and this 
refuses to be satisfied with any lower motive than 
ethical love. This fact, together with the positive 
teachings of Christianity, has led to many attempts 
to deduce the system as an outcome of love; but the 
success has been very slight. We are so little able to 
tell a priori what that love implies that we cannot 
even adjust a large part of actual experience to the 
conception of any kind of love, ethical or otherwise. 
It only remains that we believe in love as the source 
of creation and the essence of the divine nature, with- 
out being in any way able to fix its implications. 

If only a world of things were concerned, as we 
have said, nothing more need be added concerning 
God's relation to it. Such a world would never go 
astray, as it would be incapable of any action or reac- 
tion on its own account. But the reference to a 
divine government of the world, with its implication 
of free subjects, raises some further questions. For 
the complete clearing up of our thought, we must 
consider the relation of these free subjects to the 
system of which they form a part. Or, since men 
are the only subjects of this kind of whom we have 
experience, we must study the relation of man to the 
system. 

Of course in the deepest sense man belongs to the 
system. He is not to be understood apart from the 
system, nor is the system to be understood apart from 
him. God's fundamental plan must include all things, 
coexistent and sequent alike, in one inter-related order, 



234 GOD AND THE WORLD 

and cannot be viewed as a congeries of things thrown 
together without essential connection, or added on to 
some crude beginning as a series of afterthoughts. 
The popular view on this general subject is an incon- 
sistent compound of instinct and superficial reflection, 
but a study of it will help us to a better one. 

Spontaneous thought distinguishes man from na- 
ture, but for obvious reasons nature is conceived as 
physical nature, and this bulks so large as to threaten 
to absorb all existence. Of the existence of this 
nature and of its material and dynamic character 
there is no doubt whatever. With this unquestioned 
datum, as soon as reflection begins, the query arises 
where nature ends. Then it is discovered that man 
himself in his physical being certainly belongs to 
nature, and the surmise is soon reached that nature 
is all-explaining and all-embracing. This surmise is 
strengthened by extending the term nature to include 
the whole system of law, while the physical sense of 
the term is unwittingly retained, and soon it passes 
for established that nature is all. Further, the tem- 
poral order is supposed to be ontological, and the 
early phases of cosmic manifestation are assumed to 
be the true realities by which all later phases are 
produced, and in comparison with which the later 
phases are unsubstantial and transitory. Life and 
mind, as late products, were evolved from lower reali- 
ties more substantial than they. In this way mechan- 
ism, determinism, materialism, and atheism are bom 
or extend their claims. 

This illusion springs up naturally on the plane of 
sense metaphysics. There is no suspicion of the phe- 
nomenality of all impersonal existence ; and the mate- 



MAN AND NATURE 235 

rial and mechanical scheme emerges as a matter of 
com:se. There is likewise no suspicion of the impossi- 
bility of mechanically evolving anything which is not 
implicit in the antecedents; and thus it seems easy 
to get life and mind from the essentially lifeless and 
non-intelligent. There is equally no suspicion of the 
fact that an evolving thing can never be defined or 
expressed by that which it momentarily is, but only 
by all that which it is to become ; and hence the true 
realities are supposed to be the first and lowest, and 
all else is their passing product. But a profounder 
metaphysics dispels the illusion. This self-running 
nature is an idol of the sense den. The only defini- 
tion of physical nature that criticism can allow is 
the sum-total of spatial phenomena and their laws. 
This nature is throughout effect, and contains no 
causality and no necessity in it. The causality pro- 
duces the phenomena, but lies beyond them. And 
the only definition of nature in general, or of nature 
in its most extended sense, is the sum-total and sys- 
tem of all phenomena that are subject to law. And 
even this definition is largely relative to ourselves. 
For the existence of laws, except as formal and subjec- 
tive, may be questioned. There is not first a system 
of general laws into which effects are afterward in- 
terjected, but there is the actual system of reality, 
upheld and maintained by the immanent God. For 
our thought this system admits of being analyzed 
into universal laws on the one hand and particular 
effects on the other ; but in fact this is only a logical 
separation. The effects are no more consequences of 
the law^s than the laws are consequences of the effects. 
The analyses and devices of discursive thought do not 



236 GOD AND THE AVORLD 

give us reality in its actual existence, but only a for- 
mal equivalent for purposes of our calculation. But 
from our human standpoint it is necessary to distin- 
guish the general order of law from the concrete 
facts. 

And here we must once more remind ourselves that 
in concrete matters experience has absolute right of 
way. Nature, science, categories, dogmatic intu- 
itions, and all the rest of the family of abstractions 
must submit to this test. The aim of thought is to 
interpret experience, and all schemes which conflict 
with experience are to be peremptorily set aside. Now 
the only nature which will meet this demand is one 
which fulfills two requirements. First, it must be a 
system of discernible order which can be depended on. 
Secondly, it must admit of some modification from 
human volition. Without the first feature we should 
have chaos rather than a world ; and our intelligence 
could never begin. Without the second feature the 
natural order would be closed against us ; and so far 
as action goes we should not be in the world at all. 
This is the nature found in experience, and the only 
nature found in experience. That other ^' Nature," 
whose final cause and highest law are to keep ^ M Y^ 
a constant quantity, is a fiction born of a romantic 
devotion to abstractions, aided and abetted by an 
exhaustive ignorance of the elementary principles 
and results of philosophical criticism. That is the 
"Nature" which forbids us to think that thought 
and purpose and will have anything to do even with 
the direction of our own bodies, lest continuity or 
something else supremely important be interfered 
with. All superstitions tend to wreck intelligence. 



MAN AND NATURE 237 

Combining all these results we reach this conclusion. 
There is no self-running system of physical nature, 
but there is an order of phenomenal law which is 
independent of us. Moreover, there is an order of 
concomitant variation between that order and our- 
selves, so that each has significance for the other. 
We are able to act so as to produce changes and even 
permanent modifications in that order. It is perpetu- 
ally taking on new forms which are not results of 
the antecedent states of the physical system, but 
which have their source in human volition. A great 
many features of the physical world are not to be 
traced to the star dust, but to human will which has 
impressed itself upon its environment. Enormous 
changes in the flora and fauna of the earth, and even 
in climate and rainfall are to be thus traced, while 
natural forces are at work in human service in a 
most exemplary manner. This will, however, breaks 
no natural laws, but realizes itself through the laws. 
As soon as the volitional impulse is given, the effect 
enters into the great web of law and is carried out 
by the same. We can choose to will or not to will, 
but we cannot choose the effects of our willing. 
They depend on the power not ourselves which 
founds and maintains the natural order. The same 
relation exists in the case of those laws that enter 
into our own constitution. Here also we find laws 
that we do not make and cannot abrogate. Here 
also our success depends on obedience ; and here also 
we can will the deed, but we cannot will away its 
consequences. Thus to a considerable extent we 
make ourselves; and to some extent we make our 
world. 



238 GOD AND THE WORLD 

Thus the world becomes flexible, at once the abode 
of law and the servant of intelligence. It has the 
order which both reason and practical life demand, 
and also the pliability which is equally necessary, if 
we are to live in the world at all. The continuity of 
this world does not consist in a rigid changelessness 
of existence ; for as phenomenal it has no continuity 
in itself whatever. Its continuity consists in the 
subordination of all phenomena to the same laws. 
Phenomena come and go ; but all phenomena, new 
and old alike, are comprehended in the same scheme 
of law and relation. This fact constitutes the unity, 
uniformity, and continuity of the system. From the 
phenomenal standpoint, natm^e has, and can have, no 
other imiformity and continuity. And this continuity 
in no way conflicts with the complete pliability of 
the system to free intelligence, which may be found 
in it, or be in interaction with it. The laws of the 
system are no independent necessities by which 
the action of God is bound; they are rather the 
rules according to which he proceeds. Neither are 
they anything that opposes a rigid bar to finite free- 
dom ; they are rather the conditions of any effective 
use of freedom. Nature itself is only a general term 
for the established order of procedure; and a natural 
event is one in which familiar processes can be 
traced, or which can be connected with other events 
according to general rules. But all events root in the 
divine activity, and are alike supernatural as to their 
causation. 

This result suggests a means of conceiving the 
method of the divine government. It is manifest 
that our mental and moral sanity demands an order 



GOD IN THE WORLD 239 

of law on which we can depend. On no other con- 
dition could reason or conscience be secure. But this 
order is not the rigid, self-executing thing which the 
deists supposed it to be. We must indeed work out 
our own salvation, but it is God who worketh in us 
nevertheless. We replace the absentee God of deism 
by the immanent God of enlightened theism. If, 
then, things go on in the familiar routine, it is simply 
because, in the divine plan, that routine is the best 
thing. Nothing is done because law demands it, but 
because the divine purpose demands it; and the 
divine will is as present and as active in the most 
familiar thing as it would be in any miracle. But 
this is entirely compatible with the maintenance of 
phenomenal law. For as human volition is contin- 
uously playing through natural law, and realizing its 
purposes thereby, so we may well believe that what 
is possible with man may be possible with God. God, 
then, may be present in human history, guiding the 
world, raising up leaders, giving direction to public 
thought, purifying the receptive and willing heart, 
answering prayer according to his wisdom, and 
scourging public and private wickedness ; yet with- 
out in any way breaking through the fixed phenom- 
enal order. It is in this way that we may conceive 
how the divine government may coexist with fixed 
laws. God's immanence in the law renders unnec- 
essary any interference from a realm beyond the law. 
Here some deistically-minded reader may demur 
that this result is valid only for a superficial view of 
the subject. Our lack of knowledge, he may say, 
permits us to surmise a purpose ; but if we knew all, 
we should see that all events follow rigorously from 



240 GOD AND THE WORLD 

their antecedents, and that therefore everything is nat- 
ural, and no purpose or government is needed in the 
case. 

This is another echo from a sense metaphysics 
which criticism has set aside. Without doubt, if we 
knew all the antecedents of an event, even of a mir- 
acle, we should find it explained; but this tells us 
little unless we are also told what the "all" is that 
we need to know. There is here a tacit assumption 
that if we knew all the finite antecedents in space 
and time, we should need no other explanation, and 
along with this is the further assumption that these 
antecedents were not determined to the effect by any 
purpose whatever. But in fact, as metaphysics shows, 
we cannot trace, either phenomenally or metaphysi- 
cally, the antecedent into the consequent. We see an 
order of succession, but the inner connection eludes us. 
Nature is never so completely expressed in the spatial 
fact, that by simple deduction from that fact we could 
logically deduce all future phases. Such a deduction 
would break down over the simplest qualitative 
change, if it were quantitatively possible. In every 
system the dynamism is invisible; and the dynamic 
changes are perpetually producing departures from 
any purely kinematic deduction. Unless we unite the 
laws of the hidden dynamism with the kinematic 
deduction, the latter will show constant breaks of 
continuity. No system, then, can view nature as 
fully expressed in the visible spatial fact, but all alike 
must assume a world of invisible power. But meta- 
physics further shows that this world of power is 
volitional and intelligent, so that the whole finite 
system must at last be referred to the supreme will 



THEISM AND SCIENCE 241 

and purpose for all of its factors and changes. That 
purpose and that will are the "all" which we should 
need to know for the real and final understanding of 
anything. Without doubt, if we knew this "all " we 
should find all things explained. For no intelligent 
theist can suppose that even miracles are wrought at 
random, or that any effect is produced without refer- 
ence to the final cause of the whole. 

And if it be further objected that then science has 
no sure foundation, the answer must be that science 
can have no surer foundation than the divine will 
and purpose. Except as it begs the question, neces- 
sity is no foundation whatever ; for a necessity incom- 
patible with change would block the universe ; and 
change once admitted into necessity, no one can tell 
how far it may go, or what becomes of the necessity 
itself. On the impersonal plane, under the law of 
the sufficient reason, a necessity of change means a 
changing necessity ; and that means a multitude of 
necessities, which in turn leads to the endless disper- 
sion of thought, so that no unitary and abiding prin- 
ciple whatever can be found. Everything, necessity 
and all, is drawn into the universal flow. 

But on the theistic basis science remains possible 
as a sane inquiry into the orders of being and hap- 
pening revealed in experience, and as such it may 
have great practical value. This is the teleological 
conception of science, which more and more appears 
as the result of critical reflection. Science itself is 
not there for its own sake, but for the sake of what 
it can help us to. Of course on this view we must 
beware of making these discovered uniformities into 
fathomless necessities, or of giving them infinite 



242 GOD AND THE WORLD 

validity in space and time. They are practical prin- 
ciples, not speculative ; and, like all such principles, 
they must be confined in our affirmation to a " reason- 
able degree of extension to adjacent cases." Moreover, 
this science always remains on the surface and does 
not go beyond phenomena. The question of causality 
and inner connection belongs to philosophy. Such 
practical science is possible and valuable. But when 
it becomes " Science " and begins to talk of the 
infinities and the eternities and the " iron chain of 
necessity," it is no longer science but dogmatic 
metaphysics which understands neither itself nor its 
problems. 

Due reflection on these points will go far to remove 
that artificial hostility between science and religion 
which has been such an infestation of popular 
thought. It will also do much to remove that false 
antithesis of the natural and supernatural which is 
an axiom with popular thought, both religious and 
irreligious. The false natural of mechanical thought 
will vanish, and along with it will go the equally 
false supernatural which finds God only in signs and 
wonders. Both alike root in a mechanical and on to- 
logical conception of nature and the fallacy of the 
universal. Because of the former, nature is perpetu- 
ally setting up as a rival of God, and each extension 
of the realm of law is an encroachment upon the 
realm of God. Because of the latter, God, if allowed 
at all, is supposed to have made only a system of 
things in general, and to be concerned only with the 
maintenance of general laws. Details and particulars 
are supposed to result from the laws in some unspeci- 
fied way, yet so as not to have been in the divine 



THEISM AND SCIENCE 243 

thought and purpose. Then follow difficulties about 
special providences, answers to prayer, etc. 

All of this is an illusion resulting from the fallacy 
of the universal. There is no system of things in 
general, or of unrelated general laws. There is only 
the actual system of reality ; and the divine thought 
and activity which produce this actual system must 
be as manifold and special as the facts themselves. 
The simplicity of the class term does not remove the 
complexity and plurality of the individuals comprised 
under it; and for each of these special facts, there 
must be correspondingly special thoughts and acts. 
We may not be able to discern the purpose in details, 
and may reduce them to some familiar rule of experi- 
ence without further speculation ; but if there be pur- 
pose in anything, there is purpose in everything. We 
must not allow the fallacy of the universal with its 
verbal simplifications to hide the fact. At the same 
time we must be on our guard against dogmatic and 
confident interpretations of the purpose in events. 
We maintain the fact of a purpose in all things, but 
reserve the right to criticise any specific interpreta- 
tion. For the full expression of our thought in this 
matter we have to maintain a supernatural natural ; 
that is, a natural which roots in a divine causality 
beyond it ; and also a natural supernatural, that is, a 
divine causality which proceeds by orderly methods. 
In such a view, events are supernatural in their caus- 
ality and natural in the order of their happening ; 
and a so-called special providence would be simply an 
event in which the divine purpose and causality, 
which are in all things, could be more clearly traced 
than in familiar matters. 



244 GOD AND THE WORLD 

When, then, some ecclesiastical champion of the 
traditional type gets excited over what he calls " bald 
naturalism " and stigmatizes it as " an abyss of 
Satan," he should consider whether there is not a 
" bald supernaturalism " which is equally obnoxious 
to criticism. And when his fit companion piece, the 
noisy unbeliever by profession, announces a purely 
naturalistic interpretation of all religious phenomena, 
he should be required to show that there is any such 
nature as he assumes. This inquiry, if followed up, 
could hardly fail to prove illuminating to both of 
these Boanergistic champions. Without doubt there 
has been a deal of naturalism which was " bald " and 
even worse. Such is the naturalism which assumes 
that there is a blind mechanical system called Nature, 
which does a great variety of unintended things on 
its own account, so that they represent no divine 
thought or purpose, but are merely by-products of 
the mechanism. But when this fiction is eliminated, 
and the divine causality is discerned in all things, 
the natural becomes simply the familiar and orderly 
expression of a purposive causality beyond it. This 
insight enables us to dispense with both sorts of 
" baldness," that of the natural and that of the super- 
natural, and leaves us free to trace the order of ex- 
perience, so far as we may, in all events ; and that 
without any fear of seeing them set up for themselves 
in mechanical self-sufficiency. 

In leaving this subject of the relation of God to 
the world, a word must be devoted to a traditional 
verbalism. Is God, it may be asked, immanent or 
transcendent ? and we may even be instructed that 
thought can never transcend the universe. We 



IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE 245 

might reply by asking for a definition of the terms. 
It would be absurd to take them spatially, as if im- 
manent meant inside and transcendent outside — a 
fancy, however, which seems to underlie not a few 
utterances on this subject. The One cannot be con- 
ceived as the sum of the many, nor as the stuff out 
of which the many are made, neither does it depend 
on the many ; but, conversely, the many depend on 
it. In this sense the One is transcendent. Again, 
the many are not spatially outside of the One, nor a 
pendulous appendage of the One ; but the One is the 
ever-present power in and through which the many 
exist. In this sense the One is immanent. In any 
other sense the terms are words without any meaning. 
The alleged impossibility of transcending the uni- 
verse is another form of the same verbalism. In the 
sense defined we must transcend it ; in any other 
sense there is no need of transcending it. In modern 
thought substantiality has been replaced or defined 
by causality. A world-substance, as distinguished 
from a world-cause, is a product of the imagination 
and vanishes before criticism. For the explanation 
of the system we need a cause which shall not be 
this, that, or the other thing, but an omnipresent 
agent by which all things exist. This agent may be 
called anything, first cause, absolute, infinite, world- 
ground, or even universe, if only we keep the mean- 
ing in mind; and the meaning is that power not 
ourselves, nor any other finite thing, by which all 
things exist. If we choose we may unite this agent 
and all its cosmic products into the one thought of 
the universe ; and we may then loudly proclaim the 
impossibility of transcending the universe ; but this 

THEISM — 17 



246 GOD AND THE WORLD 

procedure will hardly tend to clearness, as the term 
universe is generally restricted to mean the system 
of finite things and manifestations. Still, if any one 
finds pleasure in teaching that thought is limited to 
the universe, when the universe is taken as the total- 
ity of being, it would be hard-hearted, indeed, to 
deny him this satisfaction. 

As commonly used, the conceptions of immanence 
and transcendence are products of picture thinking. 
There is a desire to bring God into intimate relations 
to the world, and immanence is the word which 
meets the demand. But this is so carelessly used as 
to look toward a pantheistic dissolution of all things 
in an indistinguishable haze. Or there is a desire 
to escape this result and vindicate some existence for 
the finite ; and then transcendence is the word. But 
this is apt to be interpreted as a spatial separation, 
and the result is to exclude God from the world alto- 
gether after getting it started. We escape this re- 
sult only by noting the true meaning of our terms 
and by carefully excluding all spatial and quantita- 
tive interpretation. We also need to bear in mind 
that this metaphysical immanence has no moral sig- 
nificance. It is simply the dependence of all finite 
things on God, and involves no spiritual likeness or 
nearness. We may all live and move and have our 
being in God, without any spiritual sympathy. It is 
no uncommon thing to find persons, whose heads 
have been a little heated by the new wine of specu- 
lation, using this metaphysical immanence as imply- 
ing moral and spiritual character. But within this 
universal dependence of all things on God lie all the 
distinctions of finite things and all the various grades 



IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE 247 

and antitheses of character. Moral sympathy and 
fellowship are quite another matter, and cannot be 
reached by speculation. 

There is another back-lying thought which may 
be hinted at by this antithesis of immanence and 
transcendence, although it is not expressed by it. 
This concerns the question whether God is dependent 
on the world for self-possession, and whether he be 
fully expressed and exhausted in the world, or 
whether, apart from the real world, there are infin- 
ite possibilities in the divine nature. The first part 
of the question must be answered in the negative. 
God's absoluteness excludes any thought of depend- 
ence on the world or of any implication with the 
world in a pantheistic sense. The rest of the ques- 
tion is of uncertain meaning. If the " real world " 
means the momentarily existing system, that world 
does not exist at all. If it means all that has been, 
is, and will be, reason can give no answer ; and prac- 
tical life needs none. The question becomes an aca- 
demic and barren abstraction. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

The attributes thus far considered are purely meta- 
physical and concern only the understanding. They 
are such properties as the speculative intellect must 
affirm in dealing with the problem of the universe and 
its ground. If we should stop here, however, we should 
not attain to any properly religious conception, but 
only to the last term of metaphysical speculation. A 
good example of this is furnished by Aristotle, with 
whom the idea of God has a purely metaphysical 
function and significance. God appears as prime 
mover, as self -moved, as the primal reason, etc., but 
not as the object of love and trust and worship. 

But the human mind in general, not content 
with a metaphysical conception of God, has rather 
demanded a religious one. And the latter concep- 
tion has always been first and not second. The 
metaphysical thought instead of being the foun- 
dation upon which the religious thought was built, 
has rather been reached by later analysis as an im- 
plication of the religious conception. The race has 
been universally religious, but only moderately meta- 
physical. 

We must note, then, as a matter of logic and as a 
fact of history, that we have not yet reached the God 
of religion. As a matter of logic, plainly not ; for 

248 



THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 249 

these metaphysical attributes of the world-ground 
are ethically barren. They furnish the possibility of 
an ethical nature, but they do not imply it as a ne- 
cessity. As a fact of history, also, systems have 
existed and still exist, that maintain a supreme 
reason and will in the world-ground but deny 
its moral quality. Sometimes moral indifference is 
affirmed, as with the gods of Epicurus ; and some- 
times morality is viewed as a purely human product, 
a somewhat adventitious episode of biological evolu- 
tion. In that case, of course, morality has no sig- 
nificance for God, and is not to be extended beyond 
human relations. It is a psychological incident 
rather than a cosmic law. This view is not unknown 
in philosophy, ancient and modern, and finds an echo 
in not a little literature. These facts admonish us 
that much remains to be done before we can affirm 
the world-ground to be truly ethical. 

From the religious standpoint, then, in distinction 
from the metaphysical, the important attributes con- 
cern the divine character, or ethical nature. We 
have now to consider the ground of their affirma- 
tion. 

If we accept the mental ideal of a perfect being as 
the ground of the universe, the question is settled at 
once. Moral qualities are the highest. The true 
the beautiful and the good, love goodness and right- 
eousness — these are the only things that have abso- 
lute sacredness and unconditional worth. The thought 
of a perfect being in which these qualities should be 
lacking, or present in only an imperfect degree, would 
be an intellectual, sesthetic, and moral absurdity of 
the first magnitude. But this demand for faith in 



250 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

the ideal when thus baldly made is apt to stagger us, 
and we prefer to reach the result in somewhat ob- 
scure manner. When we are told that the problem 
of knowledge demands the assumption of a universe 
transparent to our reason, so that what the laws of 
our thought demand the universe cannot fail to ful- 
fill, we are staggered and have many doubts and 
scruples. So large an assimiption is not to be made 
without due wariness and circumspection. But we 
make the assumption piecemeal without a single 
critical qualm. In the actual study of nature, in 
dealing with specific problems, we assume the prin- 
ciple in question as a matter of course. It is only 
when stated in its abstract universality that it appalls 
us. It is so with the larger ideal of the perfect 
being. We assume it implicitly and upon occasion, 
but we do not like to have it brought out in sharp 
abstract statement. Here, then, is a psychological 
limitation of the average mind which must be re- 
garded. We shall find it interesting, however, to 
note the way in which the ideal determines our rea- 
soning. 

There is no way of speculative deduction ; for the 
metaphysical attributes of the world-ground, as we 
have said, are ethically barren. We must, then, 
either have immediate faith in our ideal of the per- 
fect being or else appeal to experience to prove that 
the world-ground proceeds according to ethical prin- 
ciples. Our actual procedure is a mixture of both. 

The empirical argument for the moral character of 
the world-ground is. derived from our moral nature, the 
structiu-e of society, and the course of history. The 
two first are held to point to a moral author, and the 



THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT 251 

last reveals a power not ourselves, making for right- 
eousness, and hence moral. 

Our moral nature may be considered in two ways, 
first, as an effect to be explained, and secondly, in its 
immediate implications. The first problem, then, is 
to account for the existence of our moral nature. 

The readiest solution is that this moral nature has 
a moral author. He that formed the eye, shall not 
he see ? He that giveth man knowledge, shall not 
he know? So also, He that implanted in man an 
unalterable reverence for righteousness, shall not he 
himself be righteous ? 

This inference is so spontaneous and immediate 
that it is seldom questioned where the moral interest 
is strong and thought is clear. For of course there 
can be no question about the knowledge of moral dis- 
tinctions by the Creator. Such a doubt would imply 
that some knowledge is impossible or non-existent to 
the source of all knowledge. The question, then, can 
only concern God's recognition of these distinctions 
in his action. And here, if we allow the real 
validity of moral distinctions and the supreme value 
of the moral will, we cannot deny the moral will to 
God, without making him inferior to man in the 
highest things. Such a view would be so complete 
an inversion of our rational ideals, that it would tend 
strongly toward atheism. 

A great deal of ingenuity has been expended in 
tr3mig to evade the conclusion from the moral effect 
to a moral cause. Much of this has been irrelevant, 
and all of it has been unsuccessful. As there is no 
known way of deducing intelligence from non-intelli- 
gence, so there is no known way of deducing the 



252 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

moral from the non-moral ; except of course, by the 
easy, but unsatisfactory, way of begging the question. 
The irrelevance mentioned consists in the fact that 
a large part of this discussion has concerned itself 
with the inquiry how we come to recognize moral 
distinctions. This belongs to the debate between the 
empirical and the intuitional school of morals, and 
does not necessarily touch the deeper question as to 
the reality of moral distinctions. The confusion is 
increased by the further fact that our concrete codes 
are functions of experience as well as of moral insight, 
and this easily leads to the claim that experience is 
their only source. But to become relevant to the 
subject in hand, the claim must be made that moral 
ideas are purely matters of opinion and prejudice, so 
that, in fact, there is neither right nor wrong, and 
that one thing is as good and praiseworthy as another. 
Of course in that case we should hardly expect God 
to concern himself about human conventions and 
prejudices. Even this view has been theoretically 
affirmed, but it could never be practically maintained, 
because of the sharp contradiction of life and con- 
science. The theorist himself could never maintain 
it outside of the closet. As soon as he came into 
contact with others, he found himself compelled to 
affirm the difference between right and wrong, at 
least in others' treatment of himself. Thus the 
notion was seen to be a purely academic abstraction 
that would not be tolerated in practice. Hence 
spontaneous thought has generally regarded the moral 
nature in man as pointing to a moral character in 
God as its only sufficient ground. Speculation, too, 
knows of no better account to give. 



THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT 253 

The moral nature, we said, may also be considered 
in its immediate implications. The claim has been 
made by a great many that conscience itself immedi- 
ately testifies to a moral person over against us to 
whom it responds and to whom we are responsible. 
This claim can hardly be maintained in its literal 
form. In cases of high religious development and 
sensibility the feeling of obligation may take on this 
personal form. Right is the will of God ; sin is sin 
against God. This view is both strongly asserted 
and warmly disputed ; and, as is usual in such cases, 
there seems to be some truth on both sides. That 
conscience carries with it a direct assertion of God, 
the judge and the avenger, can hardly be pretended 
by any student of psychology ; but that the assertion 
of a supreme judge and avenger has its chief roots in 
the moral nature cannot well be denied. The sacred- 
ness of right, the sin of oppression and injustice, the 
intolerable nature of a universe in which justice is 
not regarded, and guilt and innocence come to a com- 
mon end — these considerations have led the race 
to posit a supreme justice and righteousness in the 
heavens. To this all literature bears witness ; and 
practically these reflections are potent arguments. 
But in logic they are not arguments at all. To 
one who assumes nothing concerning the universe, one 
thing is no more surprising than another, and one 
thing is as allowable as another. If we do not assume 
that the universe is bound to be moral, we cannot be 
surprised at finding it non-moral. If we do not as- 
sume that our interests ought to be considered by the 
world-ground, we ought not to be astonished at find- 
ing them disregarded. The truth is that in argu- 



254 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

ments of this sort we have an underlying assumption 
of a perfect being, and of the supremacy of human 
and moral interests ; and this gives the conclusion all 
its force. Suppose justice is not regarded, what does 
that prove, unless we have assumed that justice must 
be regarded ? Suppose the universe should turn out 
to be an ugly and shabby thing without moral or 
aesthetic value ; who knows that it is bound to be the 
seat and manifestation of the true, the beautiful, and 
the good ? The true force of such considerations is 
not logical ; they serve rather and only to reveal to 
us the distressing and intolerable negations involved 
in certain views. Their rejection is not a logical 
inference, but an immediate refusal of the soul to 
abdicate its own nature and surrender to pessimism 
and despair. Hence whatever enriches the inner life 
strengthens the appropriate faith. A poem like " In 
Memoriam," a growing affection, a strong sense of 
justice, may do more for faith than acres of logic. 
But this insight into the true nature of the argument 
need not prevent us from yielding to it ; for we have 
abundantly seen that it is the real basis of our whole 
mental life. 

The second form of empirical argument is drawn 
from the structure of life and society and the course 
of history. These, it is said, reveal moral ideas and a 
moral aim. Life itself is so constructed as to furnish 
a constant stimulus in moral directions. Both nature 
and experience inculcate with the utmost strenuous- 
ness the virtues of industry, prudence, foresight, self- 
control, honesty, truth, and helpfulness. In spite of 
the revised version, the way of the transgressor con- 



THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT 255 

tinues hard. The tendency of virtue is to life, while 
the final wages of sin must be death. Of two com- 
munities, equal in other respects, there can be no 
question that the virtuous one will tend to survive 
and the vicious one will tend toward destruction. 
When all allowance has been made for failing cases, 
the nature of things is still manifestly on the side of 
righteousness. This is so much the case that one 
school of morahsts has claimed that the virtues are 
simply the great utilities. The possibility of such a 
claim shows the ethical framework of life. And it is 
true that the virtues are great utilities ; ethical dis- 
pute could arise only over the claim that utilities are 
necessarily virtues ; and even then the debate would 
turn on the meaning of utility. If we define utility 
so as to include the satisfaction of the moral nature, 
there is no longer any ground of dispute. 

Society, again, in its organized form is a moral 
institution with moral ends. However selfish indi- 
viduals may be, they cannot live together without a 
social order that rests on moral ideas. And when 
these ideas are lacking, and injustice, oppression, and 
iniquity are enacted by law, social earthquakes and 
volcanoes begin to rock society to its foundations. 
The elements melt with fervent heat, and the heavens 
pass away with a great noise. Neither man nor so- 
ciety can escape the need of righteousness, truthful- 
ness, honesty, purity, etc. No cunning, no power, can 
forever avail against the truth. No strength can long 
support a lie. The wicked may have great power and 
spread himself like a green bay tree, but he passes 
away. The righteous are held in everlasting remem- 
brance, but the name of the wicked rots. When 



256 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

wickedness is committed on a large scale by nations 
the result is even more marked. No lesson is more 
clearly taught by history than that righteousness ex- 
alteth a nation while sin is a reproach to any people. 
Nations rich in arts and sciences have perished, or 
been fearfully punished, because of evil-doing. Op- 
pression, injustice, sensuality, have dragged nation 
after nation down into the dust, and compelled them 
to drink the cup of a bitter and terrible retribution. 
The one truth, it is said, which can be verified con- 
cerning the world-ground is that it makes for right- 
eousness. Out of the clash of selfish interests a 
moral system emerges. Altruism is rooted deep in 
life itself, and glorifies even the animal impulses. 
Animalism and selfishness are made to contribute 
to moral progress, and thus, across the confusion 
of human development, we discern more and more 
clearly a moral factor immanent in the process. 

These empirical arguments, however, while they 
may serve to illustrate and confirm our faith, are 
plainly not its source. They all rest upon picked 
facts, and ignore some of the most prominent aspects 
of experience. This explains why it is that mere 
arguers come to such different conclusions in this 
matter. According to some the earth is full of the 
goodness of the Lord, while others see only rapine 
and venom and failure and death. 

This picking and choosing appears especially in the 
historical argument. Here a scanty stream of prog- 
ress is discovered ; and the swamps and marshes of hu- 
manity through which it finds its doubtful way are 
overlooked. The area of progress is limited, while the 
great mass of humanity seems to have no significance 



THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT 257 

for history or development, and to have no principle of 
movement above simple animal want. Here is no his- 
tory, no progress, no ideas, only physical cravings and 
brute instincts. But we get on with the utmost cheer- 
fulness by letting the "race" and "man" progress, and 
by ignoring individuals and men. Clearly, we need 
something beside these facts as the source of our 
faith. As in the world we find marks of wisdom but 
not of perfect wisdom ; so in the world we find marks 
of goodness but not of perfect goodness. In both 
cases we pass from the limited wisdom and goodness 
which we find to the perfect wisdom and goodness in 
which we believe, only by force of our faith in the 
perfect and complete ideal. Then, having thus 
gained the conceptions, we come back to the world of 
experience again for their illustration. And the facts 
which from a logical standpoint make a poor show 
as proof are very effective as illustration; and this 
passes for proof. It does indeed produce conviction ; 
but the true nature of the argument should not be 
overlooked. If any one had an interest in maintain- 
ing the opposite hypothesis of unwisdom and evil 
in the world-ground, much might be said for it. 
The great mass of apparent insignificance and all 
the facts of evil with which life is crowded would 
lend themselves only too readily to illustrate such a 
view. Of course a purely objective procedure would 
demand that we take all the facts into account and 
strike the average. Such a study of the facts would 
leave us in great uncertainty. Over against the good 
in nature we should put the evil; and this would 
hinder the affirmation of goodness. But over against 
the evil we should put the good ; and this would not 



^58 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

allow us to affirm a fundamental malignity. Over 
against the wisdom in nature we should put the mean- 
ingless aspects of existence, the cosmic labor which 
seems to end in nothing ; and these would leave us in 
doubt whether we were not contemplating the work of 
some blind demiurge rather than of supreme wisdom. 
But over against these facts we should put the ever- 
growing rational wonder of the universe; and this 
would drive us into doubt again. The outcome would 
probably be the affirmation of a being either morally 
indifferent, or morally imperfect, or morally good, 
but limited by some insuperable necessity which for- 
bids anything better than our rather shabby universe. 

But the mind is not satisfied to take this road. It 
will not allow its ideals to collapse without some 
effort to save them. It prefers rather to maintain its 
faith in the ideal, and to set aside the conflicting facts 
as something not yet understood, but which to perfect 
insight would fall into harmony. This assumption is 
made both in the cognitive and the moral realm ; and, 
so far as logic goes, it is as well founded in one realm 
as in the other. In both cases our procedure is not 
due to any logical compulsion ; it is rather an act of 
instinctive self-defense on the part of the mind, where- 
by it seeks to save its life from destruction. This 
implicit teleology of life leads with equal necessity to 
the affirmation of a Supreme Reason and a Supreme 
Righteousness. 

This abstract discussion shows that we are in the 
same position respecting moral ideas in the world as 
respecting rational ideas. In both cases the ideas in 
their absolute form transcend experience and rest 
upon the energy of life itself. In both cases, also, in 



LOGIC AND LIFE 259 

the application of these ideas to experience we are 
mihtant rather than triumphant. We find illustra- 
tions of our faith, but no proper demonstration. In 
the physical realm disorder and unintelligibility dis- 
pute the reign of law and intelligence. In the moral 
realm, also, we find clouds and darkness as well as 
the throne of justice and judgment. But in both 
realms the conviction of the universality of the intel- 
lectual and the moral order grows with the deepening 
life of the race. Of course we cannot force oiu* faith 
upon an unwilling disputant, but we may be fully 
persuaded in our own minds. For the rest, life and 
the survival of the fittest must decide. 

Here we come again upon the fact dwelt upon in 
the Introduction, that the deepest things are not 
reached by formal syllogizing but by the experience 
of life itself. There is a vast deal of informal and 
instinctive inference upon which life necessarily pro- 
ceeds, but which can never be formally stated without 
seeming to weaken it. If one were called upon to 
formally justify his confidence in another, he would 
not succeed. The formal statements would seem cold 
and equivocal alongside of the confidence of friend- 
ship. And in all reasoning upon reality the same 
thing is true. There is an element of immediacy 
back of all inferential conviction which logic only 
very imperfectly reproduces. We may need the logi- 
cal form for its expression and impartation, but it is 
not reached in this way. It is intuition or instinct 
rather than ratiocination, a formulation of life rather 
than an inference of logic. 

And this is preeminently the case in dealing with 
the highest and deepest things. Here the whole man 



260 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

enters into the argument, and not simply the under- 
standing as an isolated faculty. The understanding 
is only an instrument for manipulating the data fur- 
nished by experience; and when the experience is 
limited or lacking, there is nothing to interpret and 
really no problem. No logical subtlety would enable a 
man to judge in the court of aesthetics, who was lack- 
ing in the aesthetic sense. Such an one would likely 
decide that there is no proof that the Hottentot Venus 
is any less fair than the Venus of Milo ; and he might 
even boast of the acumen and impartiality of his deci- 
sion. In like manner no one with meager moral in- 
terests can judge of the theistic argument from man's 
moral nature. To such an one it must seem weak or 
worthless, however it may appeal to others. 

Furthermore, this argument can never be rightly 
estimated in passive contemplation, but only in moral 
action. It is a curious fact that truths which bear 
on practice soon grow vague and uncertain when 
abstracted from practice. Thus the uniformity of 
nature as an abstract proposition admits of much 
academic doubt ; but in practice it rules us in spite 
of ourselves. Our deepest affections also may be 
quiescent, and even seem non-existent, in passive 
moments ; but the need of action reveals them, and 
reveals them in their otherwise unsuspected might. 
In the same way the force of the ethical demand for 
an ethical Creator can never be felt from mere reflec- 
tion upon psychological abstractions, but only from 
living participation in the moral effort and struggle 
of humanity. Thus and thus only do its meaning 
and profundity dawn upon us. To the one who meas- 
ures things by bulk, the starry heavens may be the 



LOGIC AND LIFE 261 

greatest of all things, and the only thing needing ex- 
planation. To the morally minded, the moral realm 
is more wonderful still. To him the historical drama 
of humanity will have far greater significance than all 
the revelations of astronomy. But unless moral prin- 
ciples live in the speculator's will, they will have little 
significance for his contemplation. 

Finally, in all arguments which root in life itself 
the matter is commonly so complex as to elude 
definite and adequate statement. There is an un- 
formulated activity of the mind in such cases which 
is the real gist of the reasoning, and which gives the 
formulas their meaning. This meaning, again, is not 
to be gathered from the dictionary, but from a study 
of the whole life of custom, rite, history, and litera- 
ture. If we would know what men really think on 
these points, we must not sit down to syllogize, but 
must go out into the open field of the world and 
study the entire movement and manifestation of 
humanity. Then we discern humanity's deathless 
faith in the divine righteousness so long as it remains 
theistic at all. Experience is held to testify not only 
to a cosmic reason but also to a cosmic righteousness. 

But it is plain that an argument of this sort can 
never be adequately tested by syllogistic rules. The 
underlying fact is a vital process, rather than a log- 
ical one. The alleged arguments so poorly set forth 
the living movement of conviction, that often they 
seem to be little more than pretexts, or excuses, for a 
foregone conclusion. At bottom we have competing 
tendencies in life, or conflicting theories of life ; and 
the living man has to judge between them. And 
how he judges will depend quite as much upon what 

THEISM — 18 



262 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

he is, as upon his facihty in the foiu* syllogistic fig- 
ures. What syllogistic procedure would harmonize 
Isaiah with a prophet of modern pessimism ? The will 
and the man himself enter too deeply into the faith 
or unfaith to be entirely amenable to logic. 

But if we allow that the belief in the divine goodness 
is not gained from an inductive contemplation of ex- 
perience alone, we are still not out of the woods. For 
while experience might not be the source of the idea, 
it might well serve as its refutation. The a priori idea 
when compared with the facts of experience might 
be found in such discord with them that it must be 
given up. And the claim is made that such is the 
case. 

This question is greatly complicated by the prob- 
lem of the individual. In a general way a case can 
be inductively made out for a moral factor in the 
world-order. We can point out, as already suggested, 
the altruistic factor in life, the moral nature in man, 
the way in which even the selfishness and wickedness 
of men are made to contribute to moral development 
and progress, the valuable moral auxiharies in our 
sub-moral life, and the many and memorable retribu- 
tions which have come to wrong-doing. And while 
we consider these generalities the case seems clear. 
But this is not enough in itself. The individual 
does not exist in a general way, but has his own 
concrete life and burdens. A righteousness and good- 
ness which are discernible only for society as a whole, 
or in the course of generations, may leave the lot of 
the iudividual as dark and puzzling as ever. A gen- 
eral optimism in such a case would be simply a claim 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 263 

that things look well at a distance, while the fact 
would be ignored that things look wretched enough 
on closer inspection. It may be something to believe 
that righteousness in general is visible in dealing with 
men in general, but after all, the lot of the individual, 
and the concrete details of existence may be such as 
to throw us back into doubt again. This brings us to 
the question of optimism and pessimism, which is an 
essential factor in this problem of the divine goodness 
and righteousness. A righteousness which is not a 
fundamental goodness is a barren and worthless thing. 
After our previous discussion, it is clear that we 
have no hope of a decisive demonstration in this 
matter. But some exposition of the problem is 
needed, as both parties have done not a little fight- 
ing in the dark. The only permissible question is 
not whether experience proves the goodness and 
righteousness of God, but whether it is compatible 
with faith therein. The optimist claims that we 
may hold fast our faith in the face of all the facts ; 
and the pessimist claims that our optimistic faith 
must surely perish when confronted with the dark 
realities of life and nature. 

Optimism and Pessimism 

There are two t3^es of both optimism and pes- 
simism. One is based on the facts of experience, 
and the other is inferred from our general world- 
view. The former might be called inductive or 
experiential, the latter inferential optimism and 
pessimism. The debate commonly begins with the 
former and ends with the latter. The theist seeks 
to show that life is good, but when pressed with the 



264 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

dark and sinister aspects of existence is apt to fall 
back on faith in God and the future. Thus his 
optimism becomes inferential and long range. The 
pessimist, on the other hand, finds life a not unmixed 
evil ; in spite of himself cheerfulness will come creep- 
ing in ; and then he falls back on his general theory of 
things to show that life can have no permanent value. 
Thus his pessimism also becomes inferential and long 
range. For the sake of clearness we must keep the 
inductive and the inferential standpoints distinct. 
We might remain optimists because of our theistic 
hope, or become pessimists from atheistic despair. 
But we must begin with experience. 

This discussion has commonly been vitiated by an 
abstract and academic treatment. The notions of per- 
fect power and perfect goodness have been abstractly 
shuffled, and the traditional antinomy between the 
divine power and the divine benevolence has been 
developed. We cannot maintain, it is said, that God 
is both almighty and perfectly good. Whichever attri- 
bute we choose, we must abandon the other. 

This is a contention which is perfectly clear only 
so long as we keep it abstract. As soon as we apply 
it to the actual world, either it becomes doubtful, or 
it is seen to be so vague as to say practically nothing. 
As an abstract thesis, however, the optimist has 
generally admitted it, and then has sought to rescue 
the divine goodness by saying that God could not 
help the evil that is in the world. This has been 
the current theodicy since the time of Leibnitz. A 
government by general laws necessarily implies indi- 
vidual hardship ; yet the system is not only good on 
the whole, it is also the best possible. The eternal 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 265 

truths of reason and the invincible might of logical 
sequence forbid the system being other than it is. 
Of course particular features by themselves might be 
improved; but nothing exists by itself or for itself 
alone. Everything is bound up in infinite relations 
and implications ; and when these are considered, it 
appears that nothing could be changed except for 
the worse. 

If this could be proved, it would help matters, at 
least so far as the divine responsibility is concerned. 
If the non-existence of evil involved a contradiction 
of some eternal and necessary truth, we should have 
to put up with it. Unfortunately this claim is clearly 
applicable only to the problem of moral evil, con- 
sidered as an imphed possibility of a free system. 
But that the non-existence of pain in its present 
degree, or even its utter absence, involves a con- 
tradiction or runs counter to some eternal truth is 
a proposition which is sadly in need of proof. So 
far as rational necessity, the only necessity of which 
we know anything, goes, the whole order of the 
world, for good or evil, is purely contingent. What- 
ever good purposes toothache and neuralgia and 
pestilence and fang and venom and parasites may 
serve, there is no proof that any eternal truth is to 
blame for their presence, or would be damaged by 
their absence. These facts have all the marks of 
contingency, not of necessity. 

The traditional optimist has made himself further 
confusion by his notion of the best possible system. 
It is argued, abstractly of course, that if God did 
less than the best, his goodness would be imperfect, 
which is not to be thought of. Hence the system 



266 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

is the best possible. But this too is either a con- 
tradiction or a futile abstraction. Taken quantita- 
tively it is a contradiction, like the notion of a largest 
possible number. Of any finite system whatever the 
questions would be possible, why thus and not other- 
wise ? Why now and not then ? Why on this plane 
and not on some other ? Why so much and not more 
or less? If we take the notion qualitatively, we still 
cannot escape a quantitative reference ; otherwise we 
might hold that a universe with only a few beings 
in it would be as good as another abounding in life 
and happiness. 

Another unclearness in the notion of a best possible 
system lies in the fact that the goodness may be 
instrumental; in which case its goodness would lie 
in its fitness for its work. When an instrument 
corresponds to its end it is perfect. In this sense a 
very imperfect system, absolutely considered, may be 
perfectly adapted to the work assigned it. Even de- 
fects may be instrumental perfections ; as in the case 
of the eye, where the shortcomings of the normal eye 
as an optical instrument are positive advantages in 
it, considered as an eye. In like manner the order 
of things might be highly imperfect as an end in 
itself, and at the same time perfect as an instrument 
for the development of a race in character and intel- 
ligence. 

Thus we see that the phrase, best possible system, 
is essentially unclear, and in its obvious meaning is 
contradictory. The only question that can be raised 
to edification is whether the actual system be com- 
patible with creative goodness or not. 

The optimist has fallen a prey to abstractions in 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 267 

this discussion ; this is still more the case with the 
pessimist. In addition to the abstract and academic 
antinomy, which is such a favorite with debating 
youths, he treats the problem of evil itself in an 
abstract and hysterical fashion. In particular he 
tends to forget that pain in the abstract is nothing, 
and that it has existence only as felt by sensitive 
beings. He heaps up all the misery of all beings, 
past, present, and future, and forthwith makes a sum 
so great as to hide all well-being from his vision. 
Thus he resembles the man who, from long dwelling 
in the hospital, should heap up in one thought all the 
sickness of the world, and should become so impressed 
thereby as to conclude that health and soundness 
nowhere exist. The illusion is continued by attribut- 
ing to other men the distress the pessimist would 
feel in their position and condition. He asks him- 
self how he would feel in the poverty, ignorance, and 
squalor which he sees, and concludes that those thus 
living must be in utter misery. Thus he commits 
what might be called the fallacy of the closet philan- 
thropist. The persons thus pitied are commonly 
having, from their own standpoint, a pretty good 
time ; and the great trouble with them is rather a 
lack of wants than a lack of supply. The pessimistic 
illusion is completed by attributing this sum of pains 
to the abstraction, man ; and then all the conditions for 
profound rhetorical woe are fully met. But if we 
are to get on with this question we must dismiss this 
integral of abstract pains and this abstract man who 
suffers them, and ask for living men to come forward 
and testify. The abstract man cannot be miserable, 
but only concrete, conscious men. The declaration 



268 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

that the world is bad must mean, then, that its structure 
is such as necessarily to make life miserable and not 
worth living. Thus the question becomes simply 
one as to the worth of life. This question every one 
must decide for himself. The futility of argument is 
apparent. As well might one appeal to theory to 
know whether he enjoys his dinner. 

The optimist claims that the system is good, the 
pessimist that it is bad. But plainly no final judg- 
ment can be reached in this case unless we have a 
knowledge of the system as a whole, and especially 
a knowledge of its outcome. How far we are from 
this is plain upon inspection. Even in the case of 
the human world the lack of knowledge of the life 
after death leaves us without sufficient data for an 
assured judgment. On our Christian view it is plain 
that human history now lies mainly in the invisible 
world. The vast majority of the race are there. 
The inhabitants of the earth are but a handful to 
the myriads that have gone over to the majority. 
We barely begin and are gone; and a new genera- 
tion takes our place. Our earth is little more than 
a cold frame for starting the plants, which are soon 
transplanted to other soil and skies. Or it is a uni- 
versity which has only undergraduates, and of whose 
alumni nothing is known. Hence the rudimentary 
and crude character of all things human. Hence, 
also, it is very doubtful if any finished condition of 
things will ever be reached upon the earth; for the 
generations begin in most respects at the beginning, 
and cannot get far in the time allotted to them. 
But however this may be, it is plain that no judg- 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 269 

ment on the worth of human history is possible unless 
we know what is going on behind the veil, or what 
the alumni are doing. A careful logic, then, would 
dismiss the case on the ground of no jurisdiction. 
But as the litigants insist on being heard, we must 
follow the case a little further. 

The present type of thought in the speculative 
world is somewhat favorable to optimism, largely 
owing to a reaction of cheerfulness, rather than to 
any better argument. The current notions of devel- 
opment, progress, and improvement enable the opti- 
mist to claim that everything shows a tendency to 
the better. The universe is not yet complete, but 
only in its raw beginnings Meanwhile we see, if 
not a finished optimism, at least a decided meliorism, 
and meliorism is optimism. He calls, therefore, upon 
the pessimist to master the significance of the great 
law of evolution, and pending this mastery to hold 
his peace. The pessimist wants to know why things 
were not made perfect at once ; but the current type 
of thought declines the question as a survival of an ob- 
solete mode of thought. If evolution is the law of life, 
of course the present must seem imperfect relative to 
the future, and the past imperfect relative to the present. 

So long as this way of thinking is in fashion, the 
argument will be accepted, but it does not meet the 
question why this progress might not have been 
accomplished at less cost of toil and struggle and 
pain. In truth, it is only another way of saying that 
the system is to be judged only in its outcome, and 
the outcome is assumed to be good. The fancy that 
evolution in any way diminishes the Creator's respon- 
sibility for evil is really somewhat infantile. It rests 



270 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

on the assumption that there is some element of 
chance or self-determination in the system whereby 
it is able to make new departures on its own account. 
But in a mechanical system there is no such element, 
and the foimder is responsible for the outcome. 

Some very naive work has been done in evolution- 
ary theodicy. Some writers who would not hear of 
the world as the creation of a good God have found 
their difficulties disappearing before an evolution phi- 
losophy. Just why the world is less a crime when 
slowly produced than when created by fiat does not 
at once appear, provided in both cases that the future 
is spanned by a bow of promise. Two reasons seem 
to underlie the notion. One is the fancy just referred 
to, that the system itself is responsible, and that it is 
doing its best. The other is the psychological fact 
that the evils which we think spring from an imper- 
sonal order do not seem so exasperating as those 
which are due to purpose and are a personal inflic- 
tion. The former may be hard to bear; the latter 
rouse our wrath, or at least compel attention and 
reflection. Hence the curious fact that many who 
have been pessimists from a theistic standpoint have 
been helped to become optimists by evolution. But 
cheerfulness is so desirable that one is glad to have it 
reached even by irregular logic. 

It is also worth while to note how completely the 
discussion of the goodness of the world rests upon 
the assumed supremacy of human interests. What 
is meant by a good or a bad imiverse ? Implicitly our 
interests furnish the standard. That universe is good 
which conserves our interests, and that is bad which 
ignores them. But how do we know that the universe 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 271 

exists for us ? May it not well have inscrutable ends 
which it perfectly realizes, and may not our complaints 
be like those of a nest of ants who should first assume 
that the universe is meant to be an ant-hill, and 
should then condemn it for its unhappy adjustment 
to formic interests and necessities ? Pessimism is the 
most striking illustration possible of the fact that the 
mind is bound to measure the universe by itself. 

Abstract and a 'priori discussions of this subject are 
manifestly futile. Reflections on the best possible 
universe, the infinite gradations of being, the neces- 
sary subordination of all finite things in the scale of 
boundless existence are both theoretically and practi- 
cally barren. The question so far as we can deal with 
it is one of experience rather than of argument. It 
concerns the value of life and the impression which 
our hving in the world makes upon us, or rather the 
impression which the experience of the race has made 
upon it respecting the goodness of God and the value 
of life. This is a matter to be solved not by logic, nor 
even by verbal testimony, but by the observation of life 
as it reveals itself in its great historical manifestations, 
social, political, ethical, and religious. Testimony alone 
in such a matter is not to be trusted, because thought 
itself is often too vague or elusive to find exact 
utterance, and also and more especially because esti- 
mates of values are revealed in deed rather than word. 
Deeds reveal men's thoughts better than words. "Words, 
then, must be tested by comparison with the unsophis- 
ticated revelations of life in action and literature and 
institutions and religion and the whole sweep of human 
history. 

The only permissible question, we have said, is 



272 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

whether the facts of experience are compatible with 
faith in God's goodness and righteousness, and this 
question admits of no theoretical solution. We may 
regard both the optimism and the pessimism of the 
eighteenth century as antiquated. The problems they 
raised are insoluble in the form in which they raised 
them. We must confine ourselves to the humbler 
task of interpreting experience, if possible, in an opti- 
mistic sense, that is, in a sense which maintains the 
worth and desirability of life. Questions why every- 
thing is not different or why anything is as it is, we 
pass by, as is most meet, in reverent silence. It will 
suffice for our purpose if we can show a moral and 
beneficent framework in the system of experience. 
For the present we confine ourselves to the human 
world. 

From this standpoint something can be said in 
justification of our faith in the righteousness and 
goodness of God. We no longer seek to demonstrate 
but to illustrate. As theistic arguments in general 
are never the source of our theistic faith, but only 
reasons for a faith already possessed, so optimistic 
arguments are never the source of our optimistic 
faith, but only reasons for a faith already possessed. 
They serve mainly to remove difficulties in the way 
of instinctive conviction. It should further be re- 
membered that with the great body of theists our 
relation to God is a personal and rehgious one, and 
this fact profoundly modifies our mode of argument. 
In all personal relations, when we have general grounds 
of confidence, we trust where we do not understand, 
and wait for further knowledge. We judge men by 
their deeds, but we also judge deeds by their men. 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 273 

The act of personal trust on which society depends, 
while not independent of induction, can by no means 
be reached by a simple enumeration of particulars. 
There is something in it which is beyond inductive 
logic. This, which is a law in our relations with one 
another, applies equally in our relations to God. Our 
trust here is also not independent of induction, but it 
includes an element of personal confidence of which 
induction can give no account. Having, as we con- 
ceive, good grounds for confidence in the divine good- 
ness and righteousness, we trace them where we can, 
and trust God for the rest. The religious relation it- 
self imphes this trust, so that doubt or criticism seems 
irreverent. And when we consider the enormous 
complexity of the universe and also its illimitable 
extent, and remember our own brief life and scanty 
insight, there is almost an air of grotesqueness in the 
thought of our assuming to criticise the Creator at 
all; as if he should apologize to us for not having 
made the world more to our mind and liking, or more 
in accordance with good taste, and especially for not 
having explained himself more at length to his human 
critics. Plainly if we are to reach faith at all there 
must be some shorter and surer way than unaided 
induction by the individual. We have to deal with a 
great historical product of humanity, and not with an 
inference of syllogizing speculation. 

Having made all these provisos, we proceed to 
study experience. And it must be admitted that the 
world presents at first sight a grim and astounding 
spectacle. In advance of knowledge, our theistic 
premise of a God all-wise, almighty, and perfectly 
good would lead us to expect a world very different 



274 THE AVORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

from this. Passing over the strange features of the 
inorganic world, the apparent meaninglessness of so 
many of the lower orders of life, the fixed institutions 
of claws, fangs, and venom, and confining ourselves 
to the human world, we are filled with amazement 
and astonishment at what we find. Pain and death 
hold universal sway, and the cry of the mourner goes 
up unceasingly unto heaven. Besides these fixed 
factors of evil, famine and pestilence have always 
hung on the heels of the race for man's destruction ; 
while heredity and social solidarity have been in age- 
long league for his overthrow. In addition, human 
history presents a fearful spectacle on its own account 
— the many races, their ceaseless wars and aliena- 
tions, their mutual slaughter. How wave after wave 
of slaughter has rolled again and again over the 
earth. Confusion, blood, and the noise of conflict are 
ever about us as we trace the history of men. Note, 
too, the degradation of most races and the scanty 
attainments of the best. How men have wandered 
in error and darkness. How their minds have been 
blinded by ignorance and superstition. How they 
have been shut in by massive necessities which could 
not be escaped. In most cases there has been no 
history at all, but only an aimless and resultless 
drift. No ideas, no outlook, no progress, only animal 
wants and instincts, mostly unsatisfied — this sums 
up the history of the vast majority of human beings 
who have lived, or who live this day. Plainly, cos- 
mic ethics, if there be such a thing, differs sufficiently, 
both positively and negatively, from human ethics 
to give us pause in our speculation. Positively : for 
any human being who should imitate the cosmos in 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 275 

its inflictions would be killed on the spot. Negatively : 
for any human being who should imitate the cosmos 
in its apparent indifference to our pain and sorrow 
would be execrated as a monster. 

This is not an indictment, but a recital of admitted 
facts. Disagreement concerns only the interpreta- 
tion. In dealing with it we must form some con- 
ception of what the world is for in its relation to 
man. If the sole goods of life are pleasurable 
aifections of the passive sensibility, and if the aim is 
to produce them, then the world is a hopeless failure. 
But if the chief and lasting goods are those of the 
active nature, conscious self-development, growing 
self-possession, progress, conquest, the successful putting 
forth of energy and the resulting sense of larger life, the 
matter takes on a different look. Still more is this 
the case if the aim of the human world is a moral 
development for which men themselves are to be 
largely responsible, working out their own salvation. 
In such a view the goodness of the world would be 
instrumental and not a finished perfection in itself. 
It would consist in its furnishing the conditions of 
a true human development, and in the possibility of 
being made indefinitely better. 

Moreover, a good part of our horror at the facts 
recited rests upon an unpermissible anthropomorphism. 
The different relation of the Creator to his work from 
that which obtains among men must forbid any par- 
alleling of cosmic ethics with human ethics, except in 
their most general principles. The simple fact that 
death is the law of life, and that the power of life and 
death is not in our hands, widely differentiates them 
in the concrete. A Lisbon earthquake or a Galveston 



276 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

tidal wave, or a Mont Pelee eruption, over which, it 
is easy to wax hysterical, really has no more theoret- 
ical significance than the events of every day. The 
imagination is impressed and weak nerves are shaken 
by the former. This is the only difference. 

From this point of view the order of the world is 
not so utterly dark after all. The imperfection of the 
physical world in itself is its perfection, considered as 
an instrument for the upbuilding of men. A world 
that furnished no obstacle to man, but spontaneously 
supplied all his wants without forethought and effort 
on his part, would be both paralyzing and intolerable. 
It would make no demand upon the living energies 
of the will, and furnish no field for self-realization. 
The great ordinance of work is obnoxious only to 
our native indolence. As men are, it is the supreme 
condition of human development. The only demand 
we can rightly make is that the system shall re- 
spond to labor with adequate returns. The physi- 
cal world in the main is a good servant ; but if 
through sloth or ignorance we allow it to become our 
master, we rightly find the way of the transgressor 
hard. 

Everywhere man is made responsible for himself. 
Neither in physical nature nor in human nature are 
we presented with things ready-made. The potentiali- 
ties are there, but we must evoke them. Harvests are 
waiting to grow, but in default of our industry and 
prudence and forethought, weeds and thorns will 
usurp their place. We are under laws which lead the 
willing and obedient, but drag the unwilling and dis- 
obedient. There is no law of life which is in itself 
evil. Whether the laws shall bring bane or blessing 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 277 

depends on man himself. If he insists on lying down 
in indolence in the lap of nature, he is soon roughly 
shaken out ; but if he bestirs himself, he finds nature 
going his way. Even our general weakness and the 
limitations of our intellectual powers are wise provi- 
sions in a system where freedom is being disciplined 
into self-control. Conceive of a baby in character 
and intelligence, with the physical force of a man, 
or a body of savages possessing the physical energies 
of a civilized state. Even a few anarchists serve to 
reveal the danger of undisciplined power. 

The chief ills under which man suffers are the 
results of his own doing. Even our physical ills, the 
physicians say, are mostly the product of our artificial 
and improper modes of living. Few bodies are en- 
gines of torture until physiological law has been out- 
raged and violated either by the person himself or by 
his ancestors. The law of heredity, too, — that fruit- 
ful source of frightful ills, — is in its natural operation 
most beautiful and beneficent. With no law of the 
human order would we longer refuse to part if men 
were good and wise. Human sin it is which changes 
this law into a curse, and even as it is, the law works 
more good than harm. Otherwise society could never 
improve. And so with the law of social unity and 
solidarity. Universal community of interest is a di- 
vine ideal, and there could be no worthy moral world 
without it. Absolute self-dependence would make the 
love-life impossible, and reduce society to an atomistic 
egoism. But the mutual interdependence which soli- 
darity implies makes it possible that it should be the 
prolific mother of woes. In a world of folly and un- 
reason and selfishness, heredity and solidarity league 

THEISM 19 



278 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

together for human ruin ; but what would they be in 
a world of love and wisdom ? 

And other evils are often vindicated by their results. 
Man as he is can be made perfect only through struggle 
and suffering. Virtue acquires sturdiness only from 
resisted temptation, and power grows through obstacle 
and resistance. The higher manifestations of char- 
acter spring mainly from the soil of sorrow. If we 
should strike out from human history the heroic and 
saintly characters w^hich have been made perfect 
through suffering, all that is noble and reverend in it 
would depart. If we should strike from literature 
all to which sorrow and loss have given birth, its 
inspiration would perish forever. Even the presence 
of death has brought a solemn tenderness and dignity 
into human affection which otherwise had been im- 
possible. So long as man is as he is, none of the 
general conditions of existence could be changed 
without disaster. The dark things also have their 
uses in the moral order. Not even the brevity and 
uncertainty of life could be dispensed with without 
moral loss to the individual ; while for the community 
the brevity of individual life is one great condition 
of progress. It would be instructive for the cosmic 
critic to see how many general improvements in the 
order he could suggest that would not be disastrous 
to man's best development. It would then be seen 
that the order of things has more wisdom in it than 
at first glance appears. The order of the world is not 
ill-suited to its human inhabitants. 

How little the woes of life depend on the system, 
and how much upon human sin and folly, will appear 
if we reflect on the changes that would result if men 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 279 

at once began to love God and righteousness with all 
their hearts, and their neighbors as themselves. This 
one change would carry with it the immediate ame- 
lioration of all our woes, and the speedy removal of 
most of them. Wrong-doing with all its consequences 
would cease. All the social energies now expended in 
repressing wrong-doing would be free for the positive 
service of the community. All the wealth and effort 
now spent in ministering to the vices and follies of men 
would be free for helpful uses. With the vanish- 
ing of sin and folly, there would be an end of all the 
worst distresses of the soul. There would likewise be 
a vanishing of most diseases and an indefinite increase 
of productive efficiency. This, together with universal 
industry, would soon make the race rich enough to 
furnish the conditions of a himaan existence to all its 
members. Under these conditions knowledge would 
greatly flourish, and the treasures of knowledge would 
soon become a universal possession. Man's control 
over nature would be indefinitely extended ; and 
disease and pain would be correspondingly eliminated. 
Nature would be subordinated to human service ; and 
man, freed from breaking drudgery, would have time 
and leisure for development in the upper ranges of 
his nature. Art and the arts would flourish. The 
potentiahties of beauty with which the earth is filled 
would be summoned forth, and the earth would become 
a garden of the Lord. 

In the social realm the results would be still more 
blessed. With universal good-will there would be 
universal peace. If differences arose they could be 
easily adjusted by the Golden Rule. All envy, wrath, 
malice, evil speaking, and evil thinking would pass 



280 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

away. All vanity and contempt and superciliousness 
and assumption, prolific sources of sorrow, would also 
disappear. Inequalities of fortune or faculty would 
produce no heartburnings ; for the strong would delight 
to serve and bear the burdens of the weak. The ills 
that are inherent in our earthy lot would be lightened 
by sympathy, and, so far as possible, shared. Poverty, 
if it existed at all, would never be allowed to be 
crushing, as it would never be the outcome of vice 
and folly; and there would be no want unrelieved 
which human power could reach. And in the uni- 
versal atmosphere of sincerity and good will how 
would friendship flourish and all souls expand in 
joyous fellowship. 

All that stands in the way of this consummation 
is man himself. There is no inherent intractability 
in the nature of things which forbids it. The diffi- 
culty lies solely in human nature. 

Man being what he is, we can find good reasons 
for the general order of things in its relation to man. 
A moral beneficence and wisdom are apparent. Of 
course we can ask why man is as he is, why some 
other method was not adopted, but such questions we 
have long since learned to decline. All that we can 
hope for is to show moral and beneficent principles 
in the world as it actually is. 

This problem, we have said, can never be solved 
from the apriori standpoint, or by shuffling the abstract 
categories of infinite power and goodness. Except 
in a purely formal way, we cannot decide what is 
compatible with goodness, or even what goodness itself 
is. Only in life are life's values revealed ; and only 
in life can they be tested. In abstract contemplation 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 281 

we might well fancy that any risk or strain or trial 
would be incompatible with infinite benevolence, 
which might as well make us happy at once and 
without effort on our part. And this seems to be the 
notion which haunts the academic discussion of this 
topic ; as if the only good in life were passive pleasure, 
and the only evil passive pain. To all this life itself 
is the answer. The chief and lasting goods of life do 
not lie in the passive sensibility, but in activity and 
the development of the upper ranges of our nature. 
The mere presence of pain has seldom shaken the 
faith of any one except the sleek and well-fed specula- 
tor. The couch of suffering is more often the scene 
of loving trust than are the pillows of luxury and the 
chief seats at feasts. He that increaseth knowledge 
increaseth sorrow, but we would not forego the knowl- 
edge to escape the sorrow. Love, too, has its keen 
and insistent pains, but who would be loveless on that 
account ? Logic and a mechanical psychology can 
do nothing with facts like these ; only life can reveal 
them and remove their contradiction. For. man as 
moral and active, as we have said, the goodness of 
the world consists in the possibility of making it in- 
definitely better, and in its furnishing the conditions 
of a truly human development. Persons thus minded 
and devoted to the betterment of the world are gen- 
erally of optimistic temper ; while others who have 
lost their grip, whose energy is low, who are living 
in the passive rather than the active voice, whose 
ideals are sub-moral, and who wish to escape respon- 
sibility and live on others, tend to become pessimists. 
In short, theoretical optimism and pessimism are 
academic abstractions which admit of no edifying dis- 



282 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

cussion. Neither a finished optimism nor a final pes- 
simism is warranted by knowledge ; but experience 
shows the possibility of indefinite meliorism, and with 
this for the present we must be content. Practical 
optimism and pessimism belong to the will rather 
than to the understanding. The former means health, 
hope, energy ; and the latter means disease, despair, 
death. 

Thus the futility of theoretical discussion becomes 
still more apparent. The justification of the world 
must be found in experience rather than in specula- 
tion, in life rather than in the closet. If we find life, 
with its furnishings of hopes and aspirations, worth 
living, that must be the end of all discussion. If we 
find the things we most rejoice in and would least for- 
get are the struggles, the conquests, the sacrifices we 
have made, there is no need for their further justifi- 
cation. We should never have chosen them for our- 
selves ; but on no account would we forego the deeper 
and more abundant life which has been reached 
through them. This, however, is not a matter for 
argument, but for experience. No conclusion can be 
reached which can be forced upon unwilling minds, 
but each one for himself may see that life is good. 
And here the patient must minister to himself. These 
general considerations, while casting much light on 
the system as a whole, by no means explain all the 
vicissitudes of the individual lot, and the darker phases 
of, history. Here sight fails us, and we must fall back 
on faith and some sense that our lives are in the hands 
of him that made us, and that he can be trusted 
though we do not understand. 

This practical solution is all that is possible to us 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 288 

now. It may even be all that we could at present 
comprehend. The child at school and under family 
discipline has no experience of life's values which 
would enable him to understand the reason of the 
repressions and compulsions which shut him in on 
every side. Only mature life can make it plain to 
him. Meanwhile he must be dealt with in ways that 
often seem hard and unloving to him. We also may 
not have the mental and moral development that would 
enable us to understand the explanation if it were 
given. Indeed, considering our overestimate of the 
goods of sense and our immaturity and scanty insight 
in higher matters, this might well be the case. In 
the cognitive world many practical convictions are 
so important that they are not left to reasoning, but 
are fixed for us in the spontaneous working of our 
intelligence. In the moral world the same fact ap- 
pears. Apart from reasoning, life is optimistic in its 
structure and tendency. This especially appears in 
the ebbing of the pessimistic tide which is now so 
marked in the higher speculative circles. Cheerful- 
ness has returned; and professional pessimism is 
rapidly passing into the hands of rhetorical convul- 
sionists, who are no longer taken seriously, and who 
do not even take themselves seriously. 

God's great provision for maintaining that practi- 
cal optimism without which life could not go on, is 
found in the inextinguishable hopefulness of humanity. 
Anything can be borne, borne bravely, borne with a 
new increment of life, so long as hope remains. And 
life as a whole will always have an optimistic charac- 
ter, so long as the future is spanned by a bow of 
promise. This is practical optimism. But this also 



284 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

is not without its ebb and flow. Prophets and psalmists 
and many, many saints have known what it is to be 
assaulted by pessimistic misgivings concerning the 
moral goodness of God and the worth of life. The 
writer of the book of Job was no easy optimist, and 
the author of the Seventy-third Psalm was disturbed 
at the prosperity of the wicked. And what happened 
then happens still. Even practical optimism is still 
militant, and has its struggle for existence. But the 
faith that grows from more to more in the individual 
soul, and that strengthens itself from generation to 
generation in the community, is that we are in our 
Father's hands, and that, having brought us thus far 
on our God ward way, he may well be trusted to finish 
the work he has begun. As long as this faith remains, 
men will go on singing hymns, praying prayers, and 
chanting Te Deums in the face of the grim and dis- 
quieting aspects of experience ; but if this faith should 
ever permanently perish, there would be an end of all 
optimism beyond the sluggish content of thoughtless- 
ness. Earth can be endured and justified if it have 
relations to heaven. If there be a promised land, and 
if man live forever, then it is right that he should 
wander in the wilderness until he has fitted himself 
to enter the promised land. But considered as a final- 
ity the visible life cannot be justified. 

Thus we see that while optimism must begin in and 
with experience, it cannot complete itself without ris- 
ing to a general world-view, and thus becoming theo- 
retical and inferential. This aspect of the case will 
be discussed in the next chapter. This does not mean, 
however, that theory will ever prove the goodness of 
the world, but only that without certain general views 



OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 285 

of things our native optimism must fall into contra- 
diction with itself. 

So much for the human world. In the animal world 
the problem is simply one of pain. Here the pains of 
personality would seem to be entirely lacking. These 
spring from the power of looking before and after, from 
the backward look of memory and the forecasting of 
the future, from our affections and conscience and the 
implications of our moral nature. If these were away, 
our physical pains would be small, after deducting 
those which we bring on ourselves. Where these are 
away, as in the case of the lower animals, the prob- 
lem is not so dark as zoological anthropomorphism 
would have us believe. The extent and nature of 
animal pain are imknown. A multitude of facts 
indicate that even the more highly organized animals 
are far less sensitive to pain than men are, while of 
the sensibility of the simple organic forms we have 
no knowledge whatever. It is plain, then, that this 
problem is entirely beyond us. Inhuman treatment 
of the animals is unpermissible, for our own sake as 
well as theirs. We may not interfere with them be- 
yond the point where our safety and convenience 
require it. But no practical interest demands a theo- 
retical explanation of the forms and laws of animal 
life as a whole. In our utter ignorance of its inner 
significance, we should first lose ourselves in zoologi- 
cal anthropomorphism, and probably end by express- 
ing wonder at the bad taste revealed in many phases 
of the animal creation. 

The net result of human experience is faith in the 
moral goodness of God. The problem is not abstract 
and academic, but concrete and historical. This faith. 



286 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

with all that it implies, will remain until human na- 
ture changes, or experience enters into a contradictory 
phase. The facts, logically and abstractly considered, 
neither compel nor forbid this faith. They permit it, 
and to some extent illustrate it ; and the mind with 
that faith in the perfect which underlies all its opera- 
tions refuses to stop short of the highest. 

Speculative theology has produced elaborate schemes 
of the ethical attributes as well as of the metaphysical. 
Love, mercy, justice, righteousness, and holiness have 
been set up as separate attributes ; and a good deal of 
ingenuity has been shown in adjusting their relations. 
Into these questions we have no need to enter. The 
ethical nature of God is sufficiently determined for 
all religious, and, we may add, for all speculative 
purposes, as being holy love. These factors belong 
together. Love without holiness would be simply 
well-wishing without any ethical content; and holi- 
ness without love would be a lifeless negation. 

Love needs no definition ; but the notion of holi- 
ness is not so clear. Negatively, holiness implies the 
absence of all tendencies to evil and of all delight in 
evil. Positively, it involves the delight in and devo- 
tion to goodness. The knowledge of evil must exist 
in the divine thought, but perfect holiness implies that 
it finds no echo in the divine sensibility and no real- 
ization in the divine will. It further implies, posi- 
tively, that in God the ideal of moral perfection is 
realized; and this ideal involves love as one of its 
chief factors. 

In determining this ideal we can only fall back upon 
the immediate testimony of the moral nature. No 



ETHICS AND THE ABSOLUTE 287 

legislation can make anything an abiding part of this 
ideal unless it be commanded by conscience ; and 
nothing can be allowed to enter into it which is for- 
bidden by conscience. It is this voice of conscience 
which distinguishes the non-moral good and evil of 
simple sensibility from the moral good and evil of the 
ethical life. 

In maintaining the absoluteness of God as a moral 
being a curious difficulty arises from the nature of the 
moral life itself. This life implies community and \ 
has no meaning for the absolutely single and only. 
Love without an object is nothing. Justice has no 
meaning except between persons. Benevolence is 
impossible without plurality and community. Hence, 
if we conceive God as single and alone, we must say 
that, as such, he is only potentially a moral being. 
To pass from potential to actual moral existence the 
Infinite must have an object, and to pass to adequate 
moral existence the Infinite must have an adequate 
object. 

Several ways out of this difficulty offer themselves. 
First, we may affirm that the absolute and essential 
God is metaphysical only and not moral. His mo- 
rality is but an incident of his cosmic activity, and 
not something pertaining to his own essential exis- 
tence. God's metaphysical existence is absolute, but 
his moral life is relative to creation and has no mean- 
ing or possibility apart from it. 

The immediate implication of this view is another, 
as follows : God is not absolute and self-sufficient in 
his ethical life, but needs the presence of the finite 
in order to realize his own ethical potentialities and 
attain to a truly moral existence. But this view 



288 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

either makes God dependent on the world for his 
own complete self-realization, or it makes the cosmic 
activity the necessary means by which God comes 
into full self-possession. In either form the moral 
is made subordinate to the metaphysical, the proper 
absoluteness of God is denied, and a strong tendency 
to pantheism appears. When the view is made to 
affirm, as often happens, that God apart from the 
world is as impossible as the world apart from God, 
we have pronounced pantheism. 

The third view aims to escape these difficulties by 
providing for community of personal life in the divine 
unity itself. In this way the conditions of ethical 
life are found within the divine nature ; and the 
ethical absoluteness of God is assured. But how this 
community in unity is possible is one of the deepest 
mysteries of speculation. The only suggestion of solu- 
tion seems to lie in the notion of necessary creation. 
Such creation would be unbegun and endless, and 
would depend on the divine nature and not on the 
divine will. If now we suppose the divine nature to 
be such that the essential God must always and 
eternally produce other beings than himself, those 
other beings, though numerically distinct from him- 
self, would be essential implications of himself. There 
would be at once a numerical plurality and an organic 
unity. Hence pantheism, while viewing God and the 
world as numerically distinct, has always maintained 
that they are organically and essentially one. Such 
a conception can in no way be discredited by a verbal 
shuffling of formal ideas such as one and many, unity 
and plurality. Formally these ideas are opposed ; but 
reality has ways of uniting our formal oppositions in 



ETHICS AND THE ABSOLUTE 289 

indivisible syntheses which our formal thought can- 
not construe. 

But we have already seen that we cannot carry the 
actual world of finite things into God without specu- 
lative disaster and shipwreck. It only remains to 
abandon the notion of a necessary creation whereby 
God forever posits community for himself, or else to 
find its objects apart from the finite system as per- 
sons coeternal with God himself. If it be said that 
this is polytheism, the answer would be that poly- 
theism implies a plurality of mutually independent 
beings. If it be said that these dependent personal- 
ities are created, the answer would be that their ex- 
istence does not depend on the divine will, but on the 
divine nature. They therefore coexist with God; 
nor could God exist without them. If, then, in pan- 
theism we say that the world is God, what can we 
say of these but that they are God, at once numeri- 
cally distinct and organically one ? If creation seems 
to be an expression implying will, we may exchange 
it for the profoundly subtle terms of early theological 
speculation, and speak of an eternal generation and 
procession. These terms throw no light upon the 
matter, and only serve to mark off the eternal impli- 
cations of the divine nature from the free determina- 
tions of the divine will. 

We allow the last paragraph to stand as helping 
forward the thought, but it is plain that we have not 
yet reached its best expression. Both our conception 
of the absolute will and our rejection of ontological 
necessities forbid so sharp a separation of the divine 
will from the divine nature as our language has 
implied. The thought can be made consistent only 



290 THE WORLD-GROUND AS ETHICAL 

by distinguishing a double willing in God, that by 
which God is God, and that by which the system of 
the world exists. The former is the absolute will, 
conditioned by the divine nature and coeternal with 
God. It is logically necessary if God is to be God. 
At the close of Chapter IV we pointed out that the 
absolute will must ever be present to give validity 
and reality to the otherwise powerless necessities of 
the divine being, so that the divine existence as any- 
thing realized forever roots in the divine will. The 
will does not make or alter the logic of the divine 
nature, but it realizes it. If now that logic implies 
that God in order to be the ethically absolute God 
must have his adequate Other and Companion, then 
the will by which God is God implies the eternal 
generation of that Other. This will would be quite 
distinct from the will by which the world exists. 
The latter would be no necessity for God's self- 
realization. 

The consideration of the ethical absoluteness of 
God has led us into speculations which suggest the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and which may 
explain why so many thinkers have insisted on hold- 
ing that doctrine in spite of the formal opposition of 
the ideas of unity and trinity. But into this question 
we have no call to enter. In any case speculation 
can only call attention to difficulties and suggest pos- 
sibilities without being able to say anything positive. 



CHAPTER VII 

THEISM AND LIFE 

The considerations thus far dwelt upon are chiefly 
such as address themselves to man as a contemplative 
being. But man is not merely nor mainly contempla- 
tion ; he is also will and action. He must, then, have 
something to work for, aims to realize, and ideas by 
which to live. In real life the center of gravity of 
theistic faith lies in its relation to these aims and 
ideals. God is seen to be that without which our 
ideals collapse or are made unattainable, and the 
springs of action are broken. Hence the existence 
of God is affirmed not on speculative or theoretical 
grounds, but because of the needs of practical life. 
This has often been called the moral argument for 
the divine existence ; a better name would be the 
practical argument. 

That this argument has no demonstrative value is 
evident. It is essentially a conclusion from what we 
think ought to be to what is, or from our subjective 
interests to objective fact; and such a conclusion is 
forever invalid in logic. It becomes valid only on the 
assumption, expressed or implicit, that what our nature 
calls for, reality must, in one form or another, supply. 
Hence Kant, who was one of the leading expounders 
of this conception, expressly denied its speculative 
cogency. On the contrary, he claimed to have shown 

291 



292 THEISM AND LIFE 

that, by way of speculation, neither proof nor disproof 
is possible ; and in this balance of the speculative rea- 
son practical interests may be allowed to turn the 
scale. All that can be done, then, is to show that 
theism is a demand of our moral nature, a necessity 
of practical life. Whether to accept this subjective 
necessity as the warrant for the objective fact every 
one must decide for himself. That our entire mental 
life rests upon such an acceptance we have already 
abundantly seen. ^ 

The moral argument has often been mismanaged. 
Sometimes it is put forward as proof, and then it falls 
an easy prey to the hostile critic. For the argument 
is proof only in the sense of showing that our human 
interests can be conserved, and our highest life main- 
tained, only on a theistic basis. Such argument is 
practically important as showing the practical bear- 
ings of the question, but it is not proof. Again, the 
discussion has often taken on a hedonistic turn and 
run off into gross selfishness, by the side of which 
even atheism itself might seem morally superior. We 
need, then, to consider the relation of theism and 
atheism to the practical life. Of course the inquiry 
concerns solely the implications of the theories and 
not the characters of the theorists. Neither theists 
nor atheists, but theism and atheism, are the subjects 
of discussion. We begin with atheism. 

In the Introduction we pointed out that a large part 
of atheistic discussion has been devoted to picking 
flaws in theistic argument, rather than to showing any 
positive adequacy of atheism itself to solve the prob- 
lems of the world and life. In treating of epistemology 
we further pointed out that atheism has picked up its 



ATHEISM AND MORAL THEORY 293 

theory of knowledge ready-made on the plane of com- 
mon sense, with no suspicion of the complexity of the 
problem and especially without developing a doctrine 
of knowledge out of its own resources. The same 
naive procedure reappears here. Atheism has gener- 
ally borrowed from the common stock of moral and 
practical principles as a matter of course, and has given 
comparatively little attention to developing such prin- 
ciples for itself. But a theory must build on its own 
foundations. Atheism is quite successful in making 
grimaces at theism ; but it limps terribly in its own 
account of things. It talks fluently about science, but 
when it is compelled to frame a theory of knowledge, 
the result is not science, but hopeless ignorance. Simi- 
lar failiu?e meets it when it is required to formulate 
a theory of life and morals. Its strength lies in its 
criticism of faith rather than in any positive recom- 
mendation of its own unfaith. This we now show. 

A peremptory rejection of atheism as destructive of 
all moral theory might not be unwarranted, but it 
would fail to show the real points of difficulty. To 
do this we need to analyze the problem and consider 
it somewhat in detail. 

Any working system of ethics involves several dis- 
tinct factors — a set of formal moral judgments re- 
specting right and wrong, a set of aims or ideals to be 
reahzed, and a set of commands to be obeyed. In 
the first class we have only the moral form of con- 
duct ; in the second class we have the material con- 
tents of conduct ; and in the third class the contents of 
the two first are prescribed as duties. The perennial 
shortcoming of traditional ethics has been the failure 
to see the equal necessity of all of these factors. The 

THEISM — 20 



294 THEISM AND LIFE 

result has been many one-sided systems with resulting 
war and confusion. 

What, now, is the bearing of atheism upon these 
several factors — the system of judgments, the sys- 
tem of ideals, and the system of duties ? We con- 
sider the last first. 



Atheism and Duties 

In discussing this question we must consider the 
automatism involved in atheism. This imphcation, 
though not perhaps strictly necessary, can be escaped 
only by admissions fatal to all thinking, and hence 
atheism and automatism have generally been united. 
When we begin, then, to construct a system of duties, 
we are met at once by the question how an automaton 
can have duties. To this question there is no answer. 
The traditional evasion consists in saying that moral 
judgments, hke aesthetic judgments, are independent 
of the question of freedom. In determining what is 
beautiful or ugly we take no account of freedom or 
necessity, and the same is true in determining what 
is right or wrong. If ethics were only a set of moral 
judgments, this claim would not be without some 
foundation. But ethics is also a set of precepts to be 
obeyed, and obedience is reckoned as merit, and dis- 
obedience as demerit ; and for these notions the con- 
ception of freedom is absolutely necessary. 

The same evasion sometimes takes on another form, 
as follows : We judge persons for what they are, no 
matter how they became so. A thing which is ugly 
by necessity is still ugly, and a person who is wicked 
by necessity is still wicked. It is, then, a mistake to 



ATHEISM AND THE MORAL JUDGMENT 295 

claim that our judgment of persons is in any way 
conditioned by belief in their freedom. 

To this the answer is that our judgments of per- 
sons are from a double standpoint, that of perfection 
and that of ability. On the former depend judgments 
of imperfection, on the latter depend judgments of 
guilt or innocence, merit or demerit. But however 
imperfect one may be, he cannot be responsible for 
anything that transcends his ability. So, then, in 
any atheistic system the question must still remain, 
How can automata have duties ? 

This question is so important for the rationalizing 
of atheistic ethics, that it is much to be wished that 
the universal necessity, or some of its subordinate 
phases, might be brought to consider it. If this ques- 
tion were once answered, it would next be in order to 
inquire how an automaton could perform its duties if 
necessity set in another direction, or how it could help 
performing them if necessity set that way. Another 
interesting and important question would concern 
the ground of the moral difference between the sev- 
eral automata. These questions, however, are not 
likely to receive a speedy answer, owing, of course, to 
the intractability and illogicality of the cosmic neces- 
sity in general ; and we shall do better to go on to con- 
sider the bearing of atheism upon ethics as a system 
of moral judgments. 

Atheism and the Moral Judgment 

Our formal judgments of right and wrong have no 
direct dependence upon theistic faith. It is at this 
point that the moral argument has been most mis- 
managed. How can the obligation of justice, truth, 



296 THEISM AND LIFE 

benevolence, gratitude, be made to depend even on 
the existence of God ? And with what face can we 
pretend that atheism would make these virtues less 
binding than they are ? These are absolute moral 
intuitions. If no one regarded them, they would still 
be valid. Certainly, if they depend at all on theism, 
it must be indirectly. In this respect our moral 
judgments are like our judgments of true and false. 
The rejection of theism would not make the unjust 
just any more than it would make the false true. 

This seems conclusive. The sturdiest theist would 
hardly be willing to admit that he should feel free to 
violate all the obligations of truth and honor, if by 
some stress of logic he found himself unable longer to 
maintain his theistic faith. But while this seems an 
end of all discussion, finisher reflection shows that in 
the case of both rational and moral judgments our 
nature falls into discord with itself, or is unable to 
defend itself against skepticism, until our thought 
reaches the conception of God as supreme reason and 
holy will. Then reason and conscience, from being 
psychological facts in us, become universal cosmic 
laws, and their supremacy is assured. But so long 
as they are limited to human and terrestrial mani- 
festation they are perpetually open to the skeptical 
surmise that after all they may only be our way of 
thinking, and hence matters of opinion. That this 
conclusion has been persistently drawn from atheistic 
premises, and often by atheists themselves, is a matter 
of history. This is further strengthened by the fact 
that right and wrong, if distinct, can have no appli- 
cation to actual life because of the universal automa- 
tism. On this account theorists of this school have 



ATHEISM AND THE MORAL JUDGMENT 297 

generally tended to reduce the distinction to one of 
utility and inutility. This distinction plainly exists ; 
and by and by we remember that right and wrong 
are other names for the same thing. Forthwith we 
use them, and thus give variety to our terminology 
and save moral distinctions at the same time. 

It must, then, be a matter of sincere gratification 
to find atheists who are zealous for the absoluteness 
of moral obligation, but their name is not legion and 
their protestations show a good disposition rather than 
logical insight. They should consider the skepticism 
involved in any system of necessity, and remember 
that in such a scheme one view is as good as another, 
as long as it lasts, and that theism is a product of 
the same necessity that produces atheism. They 
should further consider the historical fact that atheis- 
tic premises have so often been offered in justification 
of ethical skepticism, and also the widespread tendency 
in pessimistic quarters to ethical agnosticism if not 
indifference. If logical reasoning be possible and 
obligatory, these facts should be studied, and some 
way of avoiding these results should be pointed out. 
Atheism must justify itself from its own premises 
and on its own principles, if it is to be a rational 
theory of life. Rebukes of selfishness sound humor- 
ous coming from a theory whose ethics is commonly 
based on selfishness. And denunciations of any belief 
or deed whatever seem strange when coming from a 
theory that views all belief and conduct as necessary. 
When we are told that all our beliefs are produced 
by the unknown cause, we cannot escape a feeling of 
confusion at hearing that theistic beliefs are false, 
although the unknown cause has produced them so 



298 THEISM AND LIFE 

freely. Atheism, then, is under special obligation, 
supposing logical reasoning possible, to set its own 
house in the true order of logic in this matter. 
Theism has its puzzles, no doubt ; but before abandon- 
ing it we must make sure that atheism is no worse. 
Unfortunately, as we have said, atheism has been 
so busy in berating theism that it has largely for- 
gotten this manifest duty of developing its own 
solution of the perennial problems of thought and 
Hfe. 

A consistent atheism, then, cannot defend itself 
against ethical skepticism any more than against spec- 
ulative skepticism in general. But there is no need 
to insist upon this point ; for if these formal princi- 
ples were set on high above all doubt, we should still 
not have all the conditions of a complete moral sys- 
tem. Such a system involves, not only these formal 
principles, but also a set of extra-ethical conceptions 
which condition their application. Of these the most 
important are our general world-view, our conception 
of life, its meaning and destiny, our conception of per- 
sonality also, and its essential sacredness. These ele- 
ments, however, express no immediate intuition of 
conscience, but are taken from our general theory of 
things. Yet any variation in these elements must 
lead to corresponding variations in practice, even while 
the formal principles remain the same. 

Illustrations abound. The law of benevolence may 
be absolute as a disposition, but its practical applica- 
tion is limited by a prudent self-regard on the one 
hand, and by our conception of the nature and signifi- 
cance of the object on the other. This appears in our 
treatment of the cattle. We owe them good will in 



ATHEISM AND THE MORAL JUDGMENT 299 

general ; but it is conditioned by our conception of the 
meaning and value of animal life. Hence we feel free 
to subordinate the animals to our own safety or health 
or convenience. Only a high conception of humanity 
gives sacredness to human rights and incites to stren- 
uous effort in its behalf. The golden rule, also, must 
be conditioned by some conception of the true order 
and dignity of life ; otherwise it might be perfectly 
obeyed in a world of sots and gluttons. With Plato's 
conception of the relation of the individual to society, 
Plato's doctrine of infanticide seems correct enough. 
With Aristotle's theory of man and his destiny, Aris- 
totle's theory of slavery is altogether defensible. From 
the standpoint of the ancient ethnic conceptions, the 
accompanying ethnic morality was entirely allowable. 
Apart from some conception of the sacredness of per- 
sonality, it is far from sure that the redemption of 
society could not be more readily reached by killing 
off the idle and mischievous classes than by philan- 
thropic effort for their improvement. And we often 
hear it shrewdly surmised that Christian philanthropy 
is all astray in its care for the weak, the diseased, and 
the helpless ; and that it would be not only cheaper, a 
consideration by no means to be despised, but in the 
end better and more humane, to let the survival of the 
fittest have its beneficent way. Indeed, the surmise 
sometimes passes into affirmation. Christianity has 
been denounced as more injurious than any crime in 
its practical sympathy for the weak and defective. Its 
" slave morality " is declared to be a gigantic conspir- 
acy on the part of the ignoble and feeble classes to 
save themselves from being eliminated from the social 
fabric. And from the standpoint of abstract moral 



300 THEISM AND LIFE 

principles, or abstract enthusiasm for humanity, it 
might be hard to show that the procedure suggested 
would not be justified in the case of both the criminal 
and the useless members of society. The objection 
does not lie in the abstract moral nature, but rather 
in the philosophy of man which we have learned from 
Christianity. And Christianity itself wrought its great 
moral revolution, not by introducing new moral prin- 
ciples, but by revealing new conceptions of God and 
man and their mutual relations. By making all men 
the children of a common Father, it did away with the 
earlier ethnic conceptions and the barbarous morality 
based upon them. By making every man the heir of 
eternal life, it gave to him a sacredness which he could 
never lose and which might never be ignored. By 
making the moral law the expression of a Holy Will, 
it brought that law out of its impersonal abstraction 
and assured its ultimate triumph. Moral principles 
may be what they were before, but moral practice is 
forever different. Even the earth itself has another 
look when it has a heaven above it. 

These illustrations show that the actual guidance 
of life involves, not only a knowledge of formal moral 
principles, but also a series of extra-moral conceptions 
which condition their application. They also show 
how impossible it is to construct a code of conduct 
which shall be independent of our general theory of 
things. We may be perfectly sure that any great 
modification of our conceptions concerning the mean- 
ing and outcome of human life would, sooner or later, 
reveal itself in corresponding changes in the ethical 
code. If we could really persuade ourselves that men 
are only functions of the viscera and will vanish with 



ATHEISM AND THE MORAL JUDGMENT 301 

the viscera, there would be a tendency to adjust 
ethics to the visceral standpoint. 

The actual working code, then, as a rational matter, 
depends not only on moral intuitions, but also on our 
general theory of things. Oversight of this fact has 
been the perennial weakness of the intuitional ethics. 
It has dreaded to take the aim and outcome of con- 
duct into account lest it fall into utilitarianism. As 
a result it has had to fall back upon purely formal 
principles which, while good and even necessary as far 
as they go, furnish no positive guidance for practical 
life. We are told to be virtuous, to be conscientious, 
to act from right motives, and to act so that the 
maxims of our conduct shall be fit to be universal 
law. But this only concerns the form of conduct and 
overlooks the fact that conduct must have aims beyond 
itself, and that these aims must be in harmony with 
the nature of things. Besides, it is narrow. The 
moral task of the individual by no means consists 
solely in being conscientious or even virtuous, but 
rather and chiefly in an objective realization of the 
good. Mere conscientiousness is the narrowest pos- 
sible conception of virtue, and the lowest possible aim. 
A worthy moral aim can be found only in the thought 
of a kingdom of righteousness and blessedness realized 
in a community of moral persons. But no one can 
work with this aim without implicitly assuming a 
higher power which is the guarantee of the possi- 
bility of its realization. Without assuming the per- 
manence and final triumph of the moral universe, the 
continued existence of the moral subject, and the 
possibility of continuous approximation to the moral 
ideal, there is no way of rationalizing any moral code 



302 THEISM AND LIFE 

which goes beyond mere conscientiousness and the 
dictates of visible prudence. For morality which 
transcends these humble limits we must have recoiu^se 
to religion. 

Atheism had insuperable difficulty in explaining 
how automata can have duties in any moral sense of 
the word. It has similar difficulty in developing and 
defending a satisfactory code out of its own principles. 
In a world produced and pervaded by Christian con- 
ceptions it may get on with borrowed capital ; but it 
is sorely cramped when confined to its own resources. 
A further difficulty emerges when treating of the 
moral ideal. For a working system of ethics must 
not only present rules for piecemeal and routine con- 
duct, but must also furnish some ideal for life as a 
whole which shall give unity and completeness to our 
moral system. This point we now consider. 

Atheism and the Moral Ideal 

What is the relation of atheism to the ideals of 
conduct, or what ideals can atheism consistently 
furnish ? 

This question is sufficiently answered by a moment's 
survey of life from the standpoint of atheistic theory. 
To begin with, we have a blind power, or set of 
powers, perpetually energizing without purpose or 
plan, without self-knowledge or objective knowledge, 
forever weaving and forever unweaving because of 
some inscrutable necessity. The outcome is, among 
innumerable other things, a serio-comic procession of 
" cunning casts in clay " in all forms from mollusk to 
man. No one of these forms means any more than 
any other, for nothing means anything in this theory. 



ATHEISM AND THE MORAL IDEAL 303 

A procession of wax figures would not be more truly 
automatic than these forms are in all respects. When 
we come to the human forms we find a curious set of 
illusions. Most of them necessarily believe in a God, 
whereas there is no God. Most of them necessarily 
believe that they are free, whereas they are not free. 
Most of them necessarily believe themselves responsi- 
ble, whereas no one and nothing is responsible. Most 
of them necessarily believe in a distinction between 
right and wrong, whereas there is no distinction. 
Most of them necessarily believe in duty, whereas 
automata cannot have duties, or cannot perform 
them, or cannot help performing them, according as 
necessity determines. All of them, without exception, 
necessarily assume the possibility of logical thought 
and reasoning, whereas this assumption is totally 
unfounded. Further, the members of this procession 
are perpetually falling out, and that is the end of 
them as individuals. For a time the melancholy 
order is kept up by the fundamental unconsciousness 
through the incessant reproduction of new forms; 
but there are signs that the process itself will yet 
come to an end, and leave no sign. Such is the 
history, meaning, and outcome of human life on 
atheistic theory. It seems needless to add anything 
about the moral ideals of atheism. If we speak of 
them at all, it is only by a fundamental inconsistency, 
which, however, is not to be reckoned to ourselves, 
but to the basal necessity, which is given to doing 
odd things. 

This leads to another matter which is implicit in 
what we have been saying. Ethics is not a matter 
of the closet only, but of life. It is of little impor- 



304 THEISM AND LIFE 

tance that fine theories be spun, unless they be put 
into practice. Ethics, then, must not only dream 
about ideals, but must furnish the inspiration and 
driving force which will lead to their realization. 
We consider atheism from this standpoint also. 

Atheism and Moral Inspiration 

In this matter of inspiration we touch the point of 
chief practical difficulty with all ethical systems, reh- 
gious and non-religious alike. Long ago the discov- 
ery was made that it is easier to tell men what to 
do than to get them to do it. When we come to close 
quarters with living men and women, the problem 
takes on aspects unknown to the closet. The great 
practical trouble, apart from the evil will, is not a 
lack of light, but, in the lower ranges of life, a general 
insensibility and irresponsiveness to moral ideas, and, 
in the higher ranges, a general discouragement. In 
the lower ranges we come upon man the animal, lead- 
ing not so much an immoral as a submoral life, one 
swayed by appetite and impulse, and molded by low 
traditions and base environment, a life of prosaic and 
sordid externalism, and of surpassing mental and 
moral squalor. In the upper ranges we find a general 
discouragement arising from the disillusionizing con- 
tact with life, a doubt whether anything really worth 
while is attainable under the conditions of our exist- 
ence. We can, indeed, live in peace and mutual help- 
fulness with our neighbors without looking beyond 
visible existence ; but when we are looking for some 
supreme aim which shall give meaning and dignity 
to life and make it worth while to live, forthwith 
we begin to grope. We can see with some clearness 



ATHEISM AND MORAL INSPIRATION 305 

what ought to be, but we are not so sure that what 
ought to be is. Moral ideals are fair, no doubt, but 
it is not so clear that they are practicable. Life is 
short and rather tedious. The great cosmic order is 
not manifestly constructed for moral ends. It seems 
mostly indifferent to them, and at times even opposed. 
It only remains that we find the law of life within 
the sphere of visible existence. And here, too, ideals do 
not count for much. Virtue within the limits of pru- 
dence is wise, but an abandon of goodness is hardly 
worldly wise. Upon the whole, visible life seems not 
over favorable to ideals, unless it be the modest one 
of not being righteous overmuch. One could indeed 
wish it were otherwise, that virtue were at home in 
the universe, and that our ideals were only shadows 
of the glorious reality. But what avails it to wish ? 
It is not so, and we must make the best of it. 

And man himself in the concrete is a disheartening 
object of contemplation. To what a hopeless earthly 
lot the great majority of men are condemned. The 
coarse features, the shambling gait, the ascendant ani- 
mal, the brutalizing effect of physical drudgery when 
unbalanced by some mental life, are all apparent. The 
inner life seems not to go beyond a dull and blurred 
mentality with some stimulus of passion and coarse 
sensation. And really not much can be done about 
it. Dead generations hold men in a fatal grip. The 
inertia to be overcome is too great ; and life hurries 
so swiftly to be gone. This is the concrete condition 
which moral theorists have to meet and provide for. 
They must furnish some inspiration which will make 
weight against the depressing sordidness of actual 
existence and the omnipresent irony of death, which 



306 THEISM AND LIFE 

mocks at wisdom, strength, and beauty, and which so 
soon and so surely blights all earthly prospects and 
blasts all earthly hopes. 

To meet the depressing and disheartening influ- 
ences arising from such considerations, the race in 
its higher members has long and increasingly had 
recourse to the belief in God and the future life. The 
world cannot be made rational on any other basis. 
This visible life is the beginning and not the end. 
The true life is not that of the flesh, but that of the 
spirit. The true and abiding universe is the moral 
universe, and not this outward order of phenomenal 
change. Righteousness is at the heart of things. 
Hence we may believe in its final triumph and in 
some larger life we shall see it. The Christian theist 
would add, Love also is at the heart of things. The 
Creator, the great God, is our unchangeable and al- 
mighty Friend, and he is causing all things, however 
confused and untoward they may seem, to work to- 
gether for our highest good. Nothing, whether it be 
things present, or things to come, or life or death, 
can pluck us out of his hand or thwart his loving will. 

Such a message, if accepted, would certainly relieve 
matters very much. It would bring healing, comfort, 
inspiration. But what inspiration has atheism to 
offer ? To tell men that they are automata is surely 
a poor preliminary to moral exhortation. To assure 
them that their conduct, whatever it may be, is only 
a product of the viscera, might well puzzle them con- 
cerning the ethics of responsibility, but could hardly 
encourage to high endeavor. To hint that conscience 
itself is only a psychological fact of obscure animal 
origin does not tend to increase its authority. To 



ATHEISM AND MORAL INSPIRATION 307 

teach men that death ends all for the individual, and 
by and by will end all for the race, is not particularly 
inspiring. The woes of life grow no less, nor less keen, 
when we learn that they spring from nothing and 
lead to nothing. To believe that even they work 
together for our good is often a trial of faith ; but 
they are no more easily borne when we learn that 
they are only the blind beating of a storm. 

It does not seem necessary to add anything con- 
cerning atheism as a source of moral inspiration. 

The difficulties of atheism in constructing a system 
of ethics may be summed up as follows : — 

First, ethics as a system of duties is absurd in a 
system of automatism. The attendant ideas of obli- 
gation and responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt 
and innocence, are illusory in such a theory. Sec- 
ondly, ethics as a system of judgments concerning 
right and wrong is in unstable equilibrium in atheistic 
theory. For atheism has no way of escaping the skep- 
tical implications of all systems of necessity. The 
necessity of denying proper moral differences among 
persons empties our moral judgments of all applica- 
tion to practical life. Thirdly, atheism can hold out 
no good for the individual or for the race but anni- 
hilation. At each of these points Christian theism 
is adequate. By affirming a free Creator and free 
creatures it gives moral government a meaning. By 
making the moral nature of man the manifestation 
of an omnipotent and eternal righteousness which 
underlies the cosmos, it sets our moral convictions 
above all doubt and overthrow. Finally, it provides 
a conception of man and his destiny that gives man 
a worthy task and an inalienable sacredness. The 



308 THEISM AND LIFE 

mere etiquette of conscientiousness is transformed into 
loyal devotion to the law and kingdom of God. We 
may, then, commit ourselves with confidence to the 
highest and best in us, in the conviction that it will 
not lead us astray. We set aside all the doubts and 
scruples and hesitations which spring out of the con- 
fusion of visible existence, in the faith that we are 
now the children of God, and are yet to be like him. 

The only elements in ethics that can claim to be 
absolute are purely formal, and furnish only a nega- 
tive guidance for life. All working theories of ethics 
must transcend these formal principles, and seek for 
the supreme moral aims and ideals in some general 
theory of life and the world. Either we must restrict 
our ideals to those attainable in our present life, or 
we must enlarge the life so as to make the larger 
ideals attainable and save them from collapse. The 
first duty of even a theory of morals is to be rational ; 
and it can never be rational to live for the impossible. 
Our conception of the nature and destiny of a being 
must determine our conception of the law the being 
ought to follow. 

Some have affected to find an unholy selfishness in 
this claim, and have even dreaded to admit a future 
life lest the purity of their devotion should be sullied. 
But this is not to be taken seriouslv ; it is one of the 
humors of polemics. The humor especially appears 
in the fact that these good people, when giving an 
account of the moral nature, generally find it markedly 
earthy and egoistic. In this respect the claim seems 
to be about on a par with the delicate feeling of the 
biblical critic who, with his mouth full of beef or 
mutton, professes to be shocked at the cruelty to 



ATHEISM AND MORAL INSPIRATION 309 

animals involved in the temple sacrifices. But, 
really, duty is none the less sacred for being rational. 
The denial of God and immortality lends no new 
sacredness to life, no new tenderness to sorrow, no 
higher inspiration to duty, no special sanctity to 
death. The brothers on earth can suffer no serious 
damage from the recognition of the Father in heaven. 

The feeling that underlies the objection, so far as 
it is real and not polemic, rests upon an inability to 
distinguish between a demand that we be paid for 
our virtue, and the revolt of our nature against a 
system that treats good and bad alike, and throws 
the better half of our nature back upon itself as 
absurd and meaningless. Neither God nor the future 
life is needed to pay us for present virtue, but rather 
as the conditions without which our nature falls into 
discord with itself and passes on to pessimism and 
despair. We need them, not for our egoistic satisfac- 
tion, but to save the rationality of the system; and 
we believe in them on that account. Having to ven- 
ture beyond knowledge and make vast and far-reach- 
ing postulates in the interest of the understanding, we 
do the same thing and with the same logical right in 
the interest of life and conscience. High and con- 
tinued effort is impossible without correspondingly 
high and abiding hopes. Moral theory which looks to 
form only and ignores ends reduces conduct to eti- 
quette. It may claim, indeed, to be sublime, but it 
misses sublimity by just one fatal step. 

The generation just passed made abundant experi- 
ment in this matter. At the beginning religion was 
so entangled with outgrown science that conflicts 
between religion and science were the standing order 

THEISM — 21 



310 THEISM AND LIFE 

of the day. Very naturally the more adventurous 
spirits felt relief at getting clear of the obsolete 
science, which they falsely supposed was a part of 
religion ; and for a time it was generally believed 
that no practical interest would suffer. We had 
unloaded the superstitions, it was thought ; and now 
humanity would surely flourish. But this naive faith 
received a rude shock as the logic of the situation 
worked itself out. When the invisible interfered 
with the rights of the visible, it was a relief to be 
clear of it. But after it was gone it began to dawn 
upon us that, after all, the invisible had a place and 
function in human thought and life which had been 
overlooked. The visible alone did not seem adequate 
to human needs, and pessimism began to invade. 
As soon as the attraction of novelty was gone, the 
suspicion arose that the new faith was likely to 
bankrupt humanity, and that we were in danger of 
repeating Frankenstein's experience with his home- 
made monster. We were living, it was said, on " the 
perfume of an empty vase " ; and doubt was raised 
whether any ideal elements of human life could be re- 
tained without again having recourse to the vanished 
dreams. 

And when the prophets and apostles of the new 
views were required to show what they could do for 
the healing and help of humanity, the failure was more 
than pathetic. They could not long keep up their 
disciples' courage or even their own. Their house 
was left unto them desolate. Everything human, even 
virtue and altruism, seemed to become contemptible. 
The roll of the oblivious ages drowned all other sounds. 
Moral paralysis set in, and the affections themselves 



ATHEISM AND MORAL INSPIRATION 311 

began to wither at thought of their own brevity and 
bootlessness. The freedom of science had indeed been 
won, but science, too, mattered nothing if men are but 
" cunning casts in clay," and are cut loose from reli- 
gion ! This is that inferential pessimism mentioned 
in the last chapter. The current speculation made for 
despair, and despair quickly followed. It was a brief 
but instructive episode in the history of belief, and 
showed conclusively that our speculative theories are 
not without practical bearing. A more critical phi- 
losophy, in conjunction with the reaction of life itself, 
has overthrown the speculative doctrine and discharged 
the resulting pessimism. 

One has a sense of the humorous in noting the em- 
barrassment of the advanced thinkers of that time in 
making some provision for the religious nature. In 
the lack of God we were urged to worship the cos- 
mos ; and " cosmic emotion " was put forward as some- 
thing which might well take the place of religion — 
thus coming pretty close to reversion to nature wor- 
ship. Humanity, also, was set up as a supreme object 
of worship, and endowed with many extraordinary 
functions and attributes — an echo of ancestor wor- 
ship. The Unknowable, too, had its altar, and was 
worshiped with much emotion, mainly of the "cosmic" 
sort. Mutual buffetings were freely exchanged by the 
apostles and disciples. The Unknowable was scoffed 
at as " an ever-present conundrum to be everlastingly 
given up," or as " a gigantic soap-bubble, not burst, 
but blown thinner and thinner till it has become 
absolutely imperceptible." But the worshipers of 
"Humanity" fared quite as badly at the hands of 
the disciples of the Unknowable, who did not fail to 



312 THEISM AND LIFE 

point out, with many clever sarcasms, how far short 
of an adequate and inspiring object of worship his- 
torical humanity falls. As death ends all for the in- 
dividual, much attention was devoted to proclaiming 
the selfishness of the desire for a future life ; but many 
could not see in what it is more selfish to desire to live 
hereafter than it is to desire to live to-morrow. To 
fill up the gap left by the vanishing of the immortal 
hope, a somewhat blind enthusiasm for progress was 
invoked ; but many again could find little meaning 
or value in a progress whose subjects are perpetually 
perishing. In his confession of atheism, " The Old 
Faith and the New," Strauss rebuked Hartmann for 
his pessimism, which he regarded as absiu-d and blas- 
phemous ; and demanded for the " universum " the 
same reverence which the Christian demands for God. 
Unfortunately, in another passage, Strauss had de- 
scribed the helpless position of man in the face of the 
mechanism of nature, not certain that at any moment 
he might not be torn to pieces or ground to powder 
by it. This gave Hartmann a chance to reply, " It is 
a rather strong, or rather naive claim, that we should 
experience a sentiment of religious piety and depend- 
ence for a ' universum ' which is only an aggregate of all 
material substances, and which threatens every instant 
to crush us between the wheels and teeth of its pitiless 
mechanism." Thus the advanced religions worried 
and devoured one another in ways that combined 
amusement and instruction for the bystanders. 

The attitude of atheistic speculation toward religion 
has undergone a great change in recent years. On 
that theory, this means that the basal and uncon- 
scious necessity is reacting toward theism and super- 



ATHEISM AND MORAL INSPIRATION 313 

stition. It would seem to have a most miseemly and 
unintelligible hankering after religion with all its 
absurdities. But at all events, the sturdy brutalities 
of the eighteenth century are out of date in intelli- 
gent circles. The ancient claim that religion is an 
adventitious accretion without any essential founda- 
tion in human nature is obsolete. The religious 
nature is recognized as a universal human fact, which 
cannot be ignored. The natural assumption in such 
a case would be that the objective implications of this 
fact should be recognized as real, at least until they 
are positively disproved. Failing to do this, we have 
an instinct without an object, an organ without a 
function, a demand with no supply. This is an im- 
possible view on any theory of knowledge, and espe- 
cially so on the evolution theory. We are instructed 
that mind itself is an adjustment of inner relations to 
outer relations, that uniformities of experience must 
produce uniformities of thought, and that natural 
selection and the survival of the fittest must tend to 
bring thought into harmony with reality, and then, 
by some strange freak of logic, we are required to 
believe that in the religious thinking of men there has 
been little but progressive maladjustment and aliena- 
tion, and the survival of the unfittest and falsest. 

This is the position of the religious nature in mod- 
ern atheistic systems. They cannot get along with- 
out it, and they are utterly at a loss to get along 
with it. How to provide for religion without admit- 
ting its objective theistic foundation, is a problem of 
exceeding difficulty. And nothing has been done but 
to talk vaguely of cosmic emotion, altruism, and prog- 
ress. But emotion with no basis of ideas is barren 



314 THEISM AND LIFE 

business. Altruism is paralyzed when life loses its 
value ; and progress is a doubtful thing when its sub- 
jects vanish into nothingness. From a purely induc- 
tive standpoint, the actual man is a poor aSair at 
best, and it is doubtful if he will ever amount to 
much. We know more and appear better than past 
generations, but it is not clear that character is much 
superior. The aesthetics of life progress and material 
comfort increases ; but these things do not necessarily 
involve a corresponding moral progress. And any- 
how the notion of indefinite progress for humanity 
upon the earth is distinctly forbidden by the condi- 
tions of physical existence. Both .progress and pos- 
terity bid fair to come to an end. And then for the 
race, as now for the individual, the whole meaning- 
less stir of existence will have sunk back into silence 
and left no trace or sign. And this is the end, this 
the outcome of the " high intuition," this the result 
of the " grand progress which is bearing Humanity 
onward to a higher intelligence and a nobler charac- 
ter." In such a view there is no healing and no in- 
spiration. It is in unstable equilibrium and must 
either return toward theism, or pass on to pessimism 
and despair. 

The contention of this chapter was not that God 
exists, but rather that theistic faith is such an impli- 
cation of our moral nature and practical life that 
atheism must tend to wreck both life and conscience. 
That contention has been established. That it wrecks 
knowledge and science, we have seen in previous chap- 
ters. As soon as atheism is required to develop a 
theory of life and thought and knowledge from its 
own resources, further argument is needless. 



CONCLUSION 

In the Introduction it was pointed out that thought 
demands some things, forbids some things, and per- 
mits some things. The first class must be accepted, 
for it consists of the laws and categories of reason and 
their implications. The second class must be rejected, 
as it violates the nature of reason. The third class 
belongs to the great realm of probability and practi- 
cal life. In this realm we reach conclusions, not by 
logical demonstration, but by a weighing of probabili- 
ties, or by a consideration of practical needs, or by a 
taking for granted in the interest of ideal tendencies. 
Our fundamental practical beliefs are not speculative 
deductions from formal premises, but formulations of 
life itself ; and they depend for their evidence mainly 
on the energy of the life they formulate. In this 
realm belief, or assent, involves an element of voli- 
tion. Abstract logic leaves us in uncertainty; and 
the living self with all its furniture of interest and 
instinctive tendency and concrete experience comes in 
to overturn the speculative equilibrium and precipitate 
the conclusion. 

We have abundantly seen that theistic faith has its 
root in all of these realms, and cannot dispense with 
any of them. Each contributes something of value. 
The speculative intellect necessarily stops short of the 
religious idea of God, but it gives us some fundamental 
elements of the conception. It is, too, of the highest 
service in outlining the general form which the theis- 

315 



316 CONCLUSION 

tic conception must take in order to be consistent with 
itself and the laws of thought. Here speculation per- 
forms the invaluable negative service of warding off a 
multitude of misconceptions, especially of a pantheis- 
tic type, which have been morally as pernicious in his- 
tory as they are speculatively absurd. But a mind 
with only cognitive interests would find no occasion 
to consider more than the metaphysical attributes of 
God. The demand to consider God as having ethical 
and aesthetic attributes arises not from the pure intel- 
lect, but from the moral and aesthetic nature. Here 
the understanding has only the negative function of 
maintaining consistency and preventing collision with 
the laws of thought. The positive content of these 
attributes cannot be learned from logic, and the faith 
in their objective reality must at last rest on our im- 
mediate conviction that the universe is no more the 
abode of the true than it is of the beautiful and the 
good. Indeed, the true itself, except as truth of fact, 
is a purely ideal element, and derives all its signifi- 
cance from its connection with the beautiful and the 
good. For truth of fact has only a utilitarian value, 
apart from the nature of the fact that is true. If the 
universe were only a set of facts, — such as, Water 
boils at 100° C, — it would have nothing in it to 
awaken wonder, enthusiasm, and reverence ; and '^ cos- 
mic emotion " would be quite as much out of place as 
religious sentiment. Such a universe would not be 
worth knowing, and scientific interest beyond its prac- 
tical bearing would soon vanish along with religion. 

Logically considered, our entire system of funda- 
mental belief rests upon a fallacy of the form known 
as the illicit process ; in other words, our conclusions 



CONCLUSION 31T 

are too large for the premises. A set of ideals arise 
in the mind under the stimulus of experience, but not 
as transcripts of experience. These ideals implicitly 
determine our mental procedure, and they do it all 
the more surely because we are generally unconscious 
of them. Our so-called proofs consist, not in deduc- 
ing them from experience, but in illustrating them by 
experience. The facts which make against the ideal 
are set aside as problems not yet understood. In this 
way we maintain our conception of a rational uni- 
verse, or of a God of perfect wisdom and goodness. 
We illustrate by picked facts, and this passes for 
proof. Of course it is not proof, but only an illustra- 
tion of preexisting conceptions. For one who has not 
the conceptions and the interests expressed in them, 
the argument is worthless. 

Logic, then, is in its full right in pointing out the 
non-demonstrative character of these arguments, but 
it is miserably narrow when it fails to see that these 
undemonstrated ideals are still the real foundation of 
our mental life. Without implicit faith in them no 
step can be taken in any field. The mind as a whole, 
then, is in its full right when, so long as these ideals 
are not positively disproved, it accepts them on its 
own warrant and works them out into the rich and 
ever-growing conquests of our modern life. By the 
side of this great faith and its great results the formal 
objections of formal logic sink into an almost despica- 
ble impertinence. 

Of all these ideals that rule our life theism is the 
sum and source. The cognitive ideal of the universe, 
as a manifestation of the Supreme Reason, leads to 
theism. The moral ideal of the universe, as a mani- 



318 CONCLUSION 

festation of the Supreme Righteousness, leads to the- 
ism. The practical ideal of a " far-off divine event to 
which the whole creation moves " leads to theism. In 
short, while theism is demonstrated by nothing, it i» 
implicit in everything. It cannot be proved without 
begging the question, or denied without ending in 
absurdity. 

But so far as logic goes atheism is no better off. 
Rigor and vigor methods, we have seen, are fatal to 
all concrete thinking. To assume the general truth 
and fairness of things may be a venture beyond 
knowledge, but to assume their essential untruth 
and unfairness is equally so. The assumption that 
sense knowledge is the only real knowledge, which 
has always been the mainstay of atheism, is not only 
not proved, but is demonstrably false in the sense 
in which it is commonly taken. The undeniable 
things, as we have seen, are not the mechanical 
factors of atheistic thinking, but the coexistence of 
persons, the common law of intelligence, and the 
common order of experience. And the task of phi- 
losophy is to interpret these facts, for the satisfaction 
of our total nature. As soon as this is seen, the 
impossibility of atheism becomes manifest. It makes 
a great many flourishes about "reason," "science," 
" progress," and the like, in melancholy ignorance of 
the fact that it has made all these impossible. On 
the one hand, there is a complete ignorance of all the 
implications of valid knowing, and on the other a 
ludicrous identification of itself with science. Its 
theory of knowledge is picked up ready-made among 
the crudities of spontaneous thought, and when the 
self-destructive implications of atheism are pointed 



CONCLUSION 319 

out, instead of justifying itself from its own premises, 
it falls back on thoughtless common sense, which 
forthwith rejects the implications. Of course the 
question is not whether the implications be true or 
false, but whether they be implications. This point 
is happily ignored, and the defense is complete. Its 
crude realism is found to be equally obnoxious to 
criticism. Its mechanical realities, instead of being 
the substantial facts of existence, are found to be 
only hypostasized abstractions that have no existence 
apart from intelligence. Its interpretations furnish 
no insight. It must proclaim our entire nature mis- 
leading. The universe that has evolved the human 
mind as the " correspondence of inner relations to 
outer relations " has produced a strange non-corre- 
spondence here. The all-illuminating formula, It is 
because it must be, sheds only a feeble light. The 
conception of blind power working for apparent ends, 
of non-intelligence producing intelligence, of uncon- 
sciousness producing consciousness, of necessity pro- 
ducing ideas of freedom and duty, — this conception is 
not a transparent one. But all this the atheist stead- 
fastly believes, and professes to be supremely logical 
and rational meanwhile. 

I Considering atheistic procedure as a whole, an ill- 
conditioned mind might lose patience with it ; but 
there is no occasion for warmth, for according to the 
theory itself, logical thought is not possible. Thoughts 
come and go, not according to any inherent rationality, 
but as produced by necessity. This probably contains 
the explanation of some of the extraordinary logic of 
atheistic treatises. Any hiatus between premises and 
conclusion is due to necessity. Any strange back- 



320 CONCLUSION 

wardness in drawing a manifest conclusion has the 
same cause. All lapses into sentiment just when 
logic is called for are equally necessary. Even the 
mistakes of theism and the hardness and uncircumci- 
sion of the critical heart have an equally solid founda- 
tion. A great authority, speaking of the advanced 
thinker, says, " He, like every other man, may prop- 
erly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies 
through whom works the Unknown Cause ; and when 
the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief 
he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that 
belief." With this conclusion the limits of mental 
self-respect are transcended, and the theory breaks up 
in a melancholy farce. ^ The theist may take some 
comfort, however, in remembering that his faith is no 
homemade fancy of his own, but a genuine product 
of the Unknown Cause, and he is thereby authorized 
to profess and act it out. 

No more need be said about atheism. As soon as 
its implications are understood, it disappears of itself. 
It is a kind of intellectual parasite and flourishes on 
the confusion and oversights of theism rather than 
through any force of its own. These superficialities 
and oversights of theism have been the chief source 
of atheistic doubt. This fact leads us to gather up 
some points which should be borne in mind in recom- 
mending theism. 

1. Our fundamental practical beliefs are formula- 
tions of life rather than speculative deductions ; and 
their evidence must be found mainly in the energy 
of the life that produces them, and in their har- 
mony with life and one another. The function of 
the understanding with regard to them is regulative 



CONCLUSION 321 

rather than constitutive. It formulates and system- 
atizes them; it cannot demonstrate or deduce them. 
Deduction of the rigor and vigor type is impossible and 
absurd in our human conditions. Thus the problem of 
our deepest beliefs is seen to be one of life and experience 
and history, rather than of academic reflection alone. 
• 2. We should note the complete emptiness of all 
mechanical or impersonal explanation. The necessary 
logical equivalence of cause and effect in such cases 
makes progress impossible and reduces explanation 
to tautology. The only explanation that escapes 
this futility consists in exhibiting the facts as the 
work of intelligence. Hence in explaining the world 
the alternative is theism or nothing. 

3. A further specification of this fact is that all 
philosophizing on the impersonal plane must lose 
itself in tautology or the infinite regress, and in 
either case comes to naught. For by the law of the 
sufficient reason and the logical equivalence of cause 
and effect, we are shut up to endless repetition of the 
facts with which we start without any possibility of 
transcending them. Free intelligence is the only so- 
lution of this contradiction. 

4. The previous difficulty was logical. Metaphys- 
ics further claims that there can be no philosophizing 
on the impersonal plane, because all the categories 
of the understanding, when impersonally taken, are 
only forms of thought without contents. They can 
be realized and made intelligible only when viewed 
as forms of living experience. As abstract principles 
they vanish. Hence in cosmic thinking, the alterna- 
tive is theism or positivism. Mechanical naturalism 
is a pure illusion. 



322 CONCLUSION 

5. Not every theory of things is compatible with 
the validity of knowledge. All necessitarian theories 
of whatever kind inevitably break down on the prob- 
lem of error, and establish the truth of opposing views 
as well as their own. The result is the overthrow 
of all knowledge and science. The alternative is free- 
dom in the world-ground and in the finite knower. 
This point is especially to be borne in mind, because 
it is so generally undreamed of. At present in the 
uninstructed goodness of our hearts, we show the 
largest hospitality toward all theories without ever 
dreaming of inquiring into their bearings upon the 
problem of knowledge. If any critic points out that 
a given theory destroys reason and thus violates the 
conditions of all thinking, such is our good nature 
that we conclude the consequences of the theory must 
be aberrations of the critic. The self-destructive theory 
is thus enabled to reserve all its strength for attack, 
and falls back on common sense to defend it from 
itself. This solemn folly wall continue until it is rec- 
ognized that the problem of knowledge is a real one, 
and one which cannot be finally settled by the crude 
assumptions of spontaneous thought. 

6. Any tenable theory of knowledge must bring 
the world of things within the sphere of thought ; 
and this can be done only by rejecting the extra- 
mental things of crude realism and irreligious natural- 
ism altogether, and making the world the incarnation 
of the thought of a Supreme Intelligence immanent 
in it. But this Intelligence is not to be viewed as an 
abstract logical mechanism or function of categories, 
but as a Living Will, a synthesis at once of knowledge 
and power. 



CONCLUSION 323 

7. We must regard the division of labor between 
science and speculation. The former traces the uni- 
formities of order in experience, the latter deals with 
their meaning and causation. Both inquiries are 
necessary to the full satisfaction of the mind and the 
complete mastery of experience ; and they cannot 
conflict except through confusion. Theism is con- 
tent to afhrm a divine causality in the world, and 
leaves it to science to discover the modes of its opera- 
tion. 

When these points are duly regarded, atheism will 
appear in its crudity and baselessness ; and science 
and religion will be seen to have their common 
source and justification in theism. 

So much for theism as a doctrine. As argument 
goes the theist has no occasion to be ashamed of his 
faith. The changing of this assent of the intellect to 
a living practical conviction is a matter for life itself. 
The chief value of the theoretical argument is in 
removing the obstacles to belief that spring up in 
unclear thought. In gaining the living conviction 
the individual must minister to himself. Only by 
faithful living in the service of the highest and best 
things can this conviction be won. A great deal of 
theistic faith is in the stage of external assent. From 
the form of human development it must begin here ; 
and then the task of the individual is to pass from 
these assents and verbal hearsays to the living reali- 
zation of the truth. This transition takes time and 
is rarely perfectly made. In this respect theistic 
faith itself is an ideal rather than a fully realized 
possession. 



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